The investment location choices of multinational enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe : the multi-level data and discrete choice methodology approach by Rasciute, Simona
Loughborough University
Institutional Repository
The investment location
choices of multinational
enterprises in Central and
Eastern Europe: the
multi-level data and discrete
choice methodology approach
This item was submitted to Loughborough University's Institutional Repository
by the/an author.
Additional Information:
• A Doctoral Thesis. Submitted in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the award of Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University.
Metadata Record: https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/8134
Publisher: c© Simona Rasciute
Please cite the published version.
 
 
 
This item is held in Loughborough University’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) and was harvested from the British Library’s 
EThOS service (http://www.ethos.bl.uk/). It is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
The Investment Location Choices of Multinational Enterprises 
in Central and Eastern Europe: the Multi-level Data and 
Discrete Choice Methodology Approach 
by 
Simona Rasciute 
Doctoral Thesis 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
for the award of 
Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University 
© by Simona Rasciute (2008) 
  Loughborough 
University 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the principal economic factors explaining firms' foreign direct 
investment (FDI) location decisions into 13 Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs) between 1997 and 2007 using discrete choice econometric methods. 
The first part employs Meta-analysis to systematically summarise, integrate and 
synthesise the results of empirical studies that analyse two main reasons why 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) locate their investment abroad: access to foreign 
markets and reducing productions costs. A large number of factors related to model 
specifications, dataset characteristics and methodologies in the primary studies explain 
the variation in the estimates of the market size and labour costs effects on FDI across 
the studies. Furthermore, the existing empirical literature on the market size effect on 
FDI is prone to publication bias more than the literature on the labour costs effect on 
FDI, as papers with statistically significant and larger market size effect on FDI are more 
inclined to be published in international journals. 
The second part employs four alternative discrete choice methodologies, including the 
Mixed logit (ML) model and the Latent Class (LC) model approaches to capture the 
main locational determinants of over a 1000 individual firm-level FDI location decisions 
in 13 CEECs between 1997 and 2007. The results show that the choice where abroad to 
invest does not only depend on the opportunities offered by foreign markets and 
industries but also on investing firms' individual characteristics. These results support 
the presence of heterogeneity in the investment location decisions, which is not only 
revealed by statistically significant interaction terms, but also by statistically significant 
standard deviations of the random parameters in the ML model and statistically 
significant class-specific explanatory variables in the LC model. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1989 when the Berlin Wall collapsed there was very little foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), but more than 15 years later there is about 
90 billion US dollars per annum flowing into the Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs) and the total stock outstanding is about 643 billion US dollars in current prices. 
The principal objective of this thesis is to contribute to the modelling of these financial 
capital flows. This significant increase in FDI to CEECs followed the transition period 
from planned to market economies, the integration of CEECs into the European Union 
(EU) and the corresponding elimination of barriers to trade and foreign investment. The 
satisfaction of economic, political and administrative criteria set at the Copenhagen 
European Council in 1993 and the subsequent adoption of a Western business and legal 
environment provided foreign investors with confidence in the success of each country's 
reforms. 
Arguably, the two main reasons why multinational enterprises (MNEs) locate their 
investment abroad are access to foreign markets (mainly in the case of horizontal FDI) 
and reducing production costs (mainly in the case of vertical FDI). A large number of 
empirical papers have analysed the determinants of FDI, however, the estimates of 
market size and labour costs effect on FDI do not only vary in magnitude but also in 
sign. The heterogeneity of studies in respect to statistical methods, model specifications 
and data used make it very difficult to simply compare the results from different studies. 
As a result, besides the extensive literature review on the determinants of FDI presented 
in Chapter 2, in Chapter 3, meta-analysis is applied to systematically summarise, 
integrate and synthesise the results of empirical studies that analyse the market size and 
labour costs effect on FDI. Previously only the tax effect on FDI has been systematically 
analysed by employing Meta-analysis. 
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MNEs face three major choices while undertaking foreign activities. The first choice is 
whether to produce at home and export, or whether to produce abroad. Conditional on 
locating the production abroad the firm has a choice among alternative locations of 
production. Conditional on deciding where to locate foreign capital, the firm decides the 
scale of investment. The first two decisions are discrete. The existing theoretical 
literature on FDI mainly analyses the first choice: why some firms only serve the 
domestic market, while others also export or serve foreign markets through a subsidiary. 
Recently, the `New Economic geography' has analysed where economic activity takes 
place, concentrating on the agglomeration of industries and workers. 
The purpose of the thesis is to investigate where foreign firms choose to locate their 
capital once the decision to serve a foreign market with a local production has been 
made. As a result, in Chapter 4, a basic theoretical model is set up explaining investment 
location choices of MNEs. This model is a theoretical rationalisation for the variables 
that explain where MNEs choose to locate their capital and it is designed to be 
empirically tractable rather than theoretically complete. The theoretical framework of 
monopolistic competition is based on three assumptions: firms are heterogeneous across 
industries in respect to productivity, industries vary in factor intensities and countries 
differ in relative factor abundance. The choice to invest abroad, therefore, does not only 
depend on the opportunities offered by foreign markets and industries, but also on firms' 
individual characteristics. 
Most of the existing empirical literature on the determinants of FDI, on the other hand, 
has analysed the scale of investment, where the determinants of the size of investment 
between different pairs of countries are modelled. The few studies that investigate where 
MNEs choose to invest rely either on Multinomial logit (MNL) or Nested logit (NL) 
models (Becker et al., 2005; Crozet et al., 2004; Disdier and Mayer, 2004; Head and 
Mayer, 2004). These models, however, are not sufficiently flexible to analyse 
investment location choices of MNEs. The MNL model is subject to restrictive 
assumptions regarding the substitution patterns across investment location alternatives 
and the absence of heterogeneity across decision-makers (investing firms), while the NL 
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model only partially relaxes the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption 
in order to accommodate the substitution across alternatives to a limited degree. 
Another limitation of the existing empirical literature on the determinants of FDI is that 
it has tended to focus on macroeconomic (i. e. country and industry) characteristics and it 
has incorporated firm-level factors mainly to analyse the agglomeration effects on FDI. 
However, the choice where to invest abroad does not only depend on the opportunities 
offered by foreign markets and industries but also on investing firms' individual 
characteristics. As a result, in Chapter 5, a novel three-level dataset has been constructed 
to examine the factors explaining 1,108 foreign investment location decisions from firms 
of 20 market economies (EU15 countries, USA, Japan, Russia, Norway and 
Switzerland) to firms in 13 transition economies (12 new EU member states (except for 
Malta and Cyprus) plus Croatia, Russia and Ukraine) from 1997 to 2007. This multi- 
level data set allows firm, industry and country effects to simultaneously determine the 
firm-level FDI location decisions. 
Furthermore, the Mixed logit (ML) model and the Latent Class (LC) model are applied 
for the first time to model the investment location choices of multinational corporations 
in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 respectively. The ML model is a very flexible model that 
allows for investing firms heterogeneity, unrestricted substitution patterns and 
correlation in unobserved factors over time. A semi-parametric extension of the ML 
model- the LC model- is similar to the ML model, but it relaxes the requirement to make 
a specific assumption about the distribution of random parameters across decision- 
makers, which is the most challenging task in the specification of the ML model. The 
LC model allows the segmentation of decision-makers (investing firms) into a 
predetermined number of classes in order to account for heterogeneity. It estimates 
parameters separately for each group of decision makers and allows location (country- 
level) variables to have a different value for firms of different characteristics. The 
investment location choices of MNEs will not only depend on observed attributes, but 
also on latent heterogeneity that varies with unobserved factors. 
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For comparison reasons, the Multinomial logit (MNL) and Nested logit (NL) models are 
also applied to the constructed dataset in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 respectively. 
However, in contrast to the previous empirical literature, which has used an intuitive 
partitioning of investment locations into nests in the NL model, the Heteroskedastic 
Extreme Value model is applied as a tool to reveal the best nesting structure. The HEV 
model puts each alternative in a separate nest and estimates inclusive value parameters 
for those nests. The inclusive value parameters with the closest estimated values are then 
grouped together to form nests in order to accommodate differential patterns of variance 
between subsets of alternatives. Although there is a possibility that the nesting structure 
based on common sense is the appropriate one, there is a high risk that a misspecified 
nesting structure will cause losses in predictive ability and yield misleading insights 
about the attribute elasticities within nests. 
The highly significant empirical results show that the responsiveness of FDI in the 
CEECs to country-level variables differs both across sectors and across investing firms 
of different sizes and profitability. These results support the presence of heterogeneity in 
the investment location decisions, which is not only revealed by statistically significant 
interaction terms, but also by statistically significant standard deviations of the random 
parameters in the ML model and statistically significant class-specific explanatory 
variables in the LC model. The results show that firms investing in traditional sectors are 
less likely to be discouraged to invest in countries with higher unemployment rate, but 
are more likely to be discouraged by higher wage rates as compared to MNEs that invest 
in non-traditional sectors, for example, science-based industries, service sectors and 
scale-intensive industries. The larger the host country the more likely it is to be chosen 
by foreign investors to locate their capital and the effect is stronger for larger investing 
firms. On the other hand, more profitable firms are less likely to be discouraged to invest 
in more remote countries, when compared to less profitable firms, as they have more 
resources to pay for transaction costs associated with investment in more remote 
countries. 
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Despite the widespread use of interaction terms in Discrete Choice Methodology, the 
majority of applied researchers misinterpret the coefficients of interaction terms (Ai and 
Norton, 2003). Unlike in linear models, the interaction effect in nonlinear models is a 
function of not only the coefficient for the interaction term, but also the coefficients for 
each interacted variable and the values of all the variables in the model (Greene, 2008). 
Therefore, the sign of the interaction coefficient may not indicate the direction of the 
interaction effect, as the interaction effect may have different signs for different values 
of covariate. Furthermore, the interpretation of a variable separately included in the 
model if it is also a part of an interaction term changes (Jaccard, 2001). It does not 
represent a "main effect' 'but a conditional effect instead: the effect of the variable when 
the values of the moderator variable (the other interacted variable) are zero. In the thesis 
this problem is tackled by revealing the direction of the interaction effects with the help 
of elasticities, marginal effects and simulation. 
This thesis makes three principle contributions to the existing literature. First, it is the 
first study that applies the Mixed logit (ML) and Latent Class (LC) models to investigate 
FDI location decisions, which show that to allow for firm heterogeneity is important. 
The constructed three-level dataset does not only include country and industry factors 
but also investing firms' characteristics. Second, the Heteroskedastic Extreme Value 
(HEV) model is used for the first time as a guide for the best nesting structure in the 
specification of the Nested logit (NL) model. Third, Meta-analysis is applied for the first 
time to systematically summarise, integrate and synthesise the results of empirical 
studies that analyse the market size and labour costs effect on FDI. 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: the literature on the determinants of FDI is 
reviewed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 presents Meta-regression analysis of the market size 
and labour costs effect on FDI. Chapter 4 sets up a theoretical framework. The 
construction of the three-level dataset and the description of the explanatory variables 
are presented in Chapter 5. The application of discrete choice methodology is presented 
in Chapters 6-9: the Multinomial logit model is applied in Chapter 6, the Nested logit 
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model in Chapter 7, the Mixed logit in Chapter 8 and the Latent Class model in Chapter 
9. Chapter 10 presents conclusions and policy implications. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE RECENT LITERATURE ON THE PRINCIPLE 
DETERMINANTS OF FDI 
"Economists do not have as fully developed theory of multinational enterprise as they do of 
many other issues in international economics" 
(Krugman and Obstfeld, 1994) 
2.1. FDI in Central and Eastern Europe 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) emerged at the beginning of the previous century and 
expanded substantially after World War II. Initially, MNEs tended to concentrate in the 
USA, Japan and Western Europe and it was not until the 1990s when FDI became 
increasingly important in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The transition process 
from planned to market economies, integration into the EU and subsequent elimination 
of trade and investment barriers have led to a major FDI boom in CEE' with annual 
inflows for the region reaching 90 billion US dollar in 2006 (Figure 2.1). 
FDI has played an important role in the transition process of CEECs in respect to 
enterprise restructuring and modernisation; and, consequently, economic growth (Barrell 
and Holland, 2000). Under the Communist regime and central planning, production 
decisions were based on political motives rather than economic reasoning. Vertical 
integration, government monopoly over most means of production, exclusion of private 
property ownership, price and quantity controls, no access to foreign technologies and 
inconvertibility of the rouble excluded CEE from the scene of global markets. With the 
transition process from planned to market economics, the industrial and regional 
structure of the economy had to be reorganised, new technologies, management 
Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. 
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techniques, distributed networks and marketing practices had to be introduced, in order 
to compete with imports and new firms, whose production processes were based on 
market principles (Barrell and Holland, 2000). 
The role of MNEs in the world economy is substantial in respect of value added, 
employment and exports of foreign affiliates. In 2005, foreign affiliates generated about 
4.5 trillion US dollars in value added, employed about 62 million workers and exported 
goods and services valued at more than 4 trillion US dollars (UNCTAD, 2006). The EU, 
Japan and the US hosted 85 of the world's top 100 MNEs in 2004. By 2006 the number 
of MNEs had risen to approximately 77,000 with over 770,000 foreign affiliates 
(UNCTAD, 2006). Developed countries still attracted the largest amount (59 percent) of 
FDI, with developing countries and CEECs accounting for approximately 36 and 10 
percent respectively of inward FDI flows. At a country level, UK and the US were the 
largest recipients of inward FDI (UNCTAD, 2006). In CEE, Russia received the largest 
amount of inward FDI, and it was followed by Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary 
(Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1. FDI inflows into CEECs (millions of US dollars) 
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The three main industries in which MNEs operate globally are the automobile industry, 
pharmaceuticals and telecommunications and this trend is also prominent in CEECs. 
The sectoral distribution of FDI in CEE indicates the strength of capital-intensive and 
resource-intensive, rather than labour-intensive sectors (Figure 2.2). Transport 
equipment -a capital-intensive industry - is one of the fastest developing sectors in 
CEE. For example, in a decade and a half Slovakia has been transformed from a country 
with no assembly capacity into a key international player in automobile production due 
to three large assembly plants: Germany's Volkswagen, France's PSA Peugeot-Citroen 
and Hyundai of the Republic of Korea. Over its 13-year presence in Slovakia, 
Volkswagen has invested around 1.3 billion US dollars in its factory in Bratislava. 
Volkswagen employs about 11,000 people, while its first-tier suppliers employ a 
workforce of more than 9,000. 
Resource-intensive sectors, for example, the wood and paper industry in Poland and 
Croatia, are important in many CEECs in respect to inward FDI and exports due to the 
availability of natural resources in those countries and geographical proximity to 
European markets. In Romania, for example, the wood industry is benefiting from tight 
links with the booming construction sector. In labour-intensive sectors, on the other 
hand, CEE faces competition from low-cost Far East countries, despite the fact that 
Textiles and Textiles products together with Leather and Leather products have had a 
long tradition in the region. 
At the beginning of the 2000s the industry composition of inward FDI gradually started 
shifting from manufacturing towards services, and within services, from network 
industries privatised in the earlier years towards business services. In the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland services in inward FDI already became dominant in the 
late 1990s. In general, CEECs are characterised by substantial FDI penetration in 
infrastructure services (banking, telecommunications, water and electricity). For 
example, the majority of assets of banks in CEECs are controlled by foreign banks. 
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Figure 2.2. Sectoral distribution of FDI stock in host CEECs, 2000 (min US 
dollars) 
Q Tertiary sector 
  Secondary sector, 
1 Primary sector 
Data source: UNCTAD Statistics 
Primary sector includes such industries as agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; mining, quarrying 
and petroleum. 
Seconclawy sectors include such industries as food, beverages and tobacco; textile, clothing and leather; 
forestry, wood, pulp, paper, publishing and printing; petroleum, chemicals, rubber and plastic products; 
oil refinery industry; coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel, chemical and petrochemical industry, 
chemicals and chemical products; building materials; non-metallic mineral products; ferrous metallurgy; 
non-ferrous metallurgy; machinery and equipment; electric and electronic equipment; motor vehicles and 
other transport equipment, etc. 
Tertiary sector includes such industries as electric power industry; electricity, gas and water; contraction; 
trade and repairs; hotels and restaurants; transport, storage and communications; telecommunications; 
finance and insurance; real estate and business activities; etc. 
Service-related FDI inflows into CEE have followed the trend of growth in services as a 
fraction of GDP and employment worldwide and in CEE. For example, the share of 
services in the national products of CEECs has risen steadily to reach 57 percent in 
2001. Furthermore, in 2003 a number CEE countries introduced policy measures aimed 
at liberalising, promoting and protecting FDI. For example, the Czech Republic further 
liberalised its energy market and telecommunications industry, while Hungary adopted 
laws on the privatisation of healthcare and on the gradual liberalisation of the national 
/4cp 40P 
gas market in accordance with EU regulations. However, structural change in Russia has 
been slower with both primary and secondary sectors retaining a large share of FDI. 
Most service-FDI is market seeking and non-tradable, as services need to be produced 
when and where they are consumed. The liberalisation of services-FDI regimes in many 
countries and opening industries previously close to foreign entry has brought another 
surge of mergers and acquisitions2 (M&As) rather than greenfield investment3, 
especially in such industries as banking, telecommunications and water. 
2.2. The Theories of the Determinants of FDI 
There are various definitions of foreign direct investment. The OECD (1999) notes that 
foreign direct investment reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a 
resident entity in one economy ("direct investor") in an entity resident in an economy 
other than that of the investor ("direct investment enterprise"). The lasting interest 
implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the 
enterprise and a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise. 
Although foreign direct investment means `controlling interest', there is no consensus on 
the minimum percentage of shareholding that constitutes a controlling interest. 
Furthermore, control can be exercised not only through equity ownership but also 
through contractual arrangements, such as franchising, licensing, subcontracting, etc. 
The IMF (2006) recommends using 10 percent of shareholding as the basic dividing line 
between direct investment and portfolio investment, and defines the owner of 10 percent 
or more of a company's capital as a direct investor. This guideline is not a strict rule, as 
a smaller percentage may entail a controlling interest in the company and, conversely, a 
share of more than 10 percent may not signify control. 
FDI can be classified from the perspective of the host country as well as from the 
perspective of the source country. From the perspective of the source country horizontal 
2A merger is the joining together of two corporations when one corporation transfers all of its assets to the 
other, which continues to exist. 
3 greenfield investment occurs when an entirely new plant is set up. 
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and vertical FDI can be distinguished. In the case of vertical FDI firms become 
multinationals to reduce overall production costs, allocating certain stages of production 
to foreign countries where inputs intensively used in the production are cheaper. In this 
case, products produced abroad will differ from the ones produced at home. In the 
horizontal pattern of internationalization firms become multinational in order to gain 
better access to foreign markets. The products produced abroad and at home are the 
same, consequently, exports are substituted for local production (Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1. Models of the multinational firms 
Motive for internationalization 
Lower production costs Easier market access 
Vertical MNEs Horizontal MNEs 
Model structure Perfect competition model, Imperfect competition model, 
negligible trade costs positive trade costs 
Determinants of Differences in factor High trade costs. Similarity of 
internationalization endowments countries in absolute and 
relative factor endowments. 
Scale economies at the firm 
level 
Firm structure Vertical Horizontal 
Product Different goods and services Same goods and services 
produced in different produced in different 
countries, production countries 
fragmented into different 
stages 
Production for... Home country demand Local (host country) demand 
Activities One-directional Two-directional 
Trade and affiliate Complements Substitutes 
sales 
Effects on the Affects factor prices and Negligible effect 
income income distribution in favour 
distribution of (human) capital in the 
home country and in favour of 
labour in the host country 
Source: Moosa (2002) 
In the horizontal pattern of internalisation, the activities of MNEs usually take place 
mainly on two-way basis, while one-way activities should be important in the case of 
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vertical MNEs. Buch et al. (2005) use the Grubel-Lloyd index4 as a standard measure for 
the importance of two-way activities versus one-way activities. The index ranges from 
zero to one with zero indicating purely one-way activity and one indicating purely two- 
way activity. It is concluded that activities among developed countries mainly take place 
on two-way basis. Small, human capital-intensive countries such as Netherlands have 
relatively low Grubel-Lloyd indices. Activities with developing countries take place 
mainly on one-way basis. Additional evidence on vertical versus horizontal FDI can be 
obtained analysing sectors in which both parent companies and their affiliates operate. If 
a parent company and its affiliate are in the same sector, the firm is most probably 
horizontally integrated, while if they operate in different sectors, it is more likely that the 
firm is vertically integrated. 
From the perspective of the host country, Moosa (2002) classifies FDI into the following 
categories: import-substituting FDI, export-increasing FDI and government-initiated 
FDI. Import-substituting FDI takes place in the countries where previously imported 
goods are produced in order to serve the local market, to avoid transportation costs 
and/or to overcome trade barriers. Export-increasing FDI is driven by the availability of 
inputs (raw materials and/or intermediate components) with the purpose to export 
intermediate or final products back to the investing country. Government-initiated FDI is 
driven by the incentives offered by governments to foreign investors in order to solve 
balance of payments deficit problems. 
A firm can serve the foreign market from home via exports; it can have a licensing or 
franchising agreement with a host firm, or it can move the production to a host country 
via FDI. FDI can take the form of greenfield investment, cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As), and join ventures. greenfield investment occurs when an entirely 
new plant is set up and it may be advantageous to a host economy for its job-creating 
potential and value-added output. However, greenfield investment can not only create 
additional productive capacity in a host country, but it may also create new competition 
4 The Grubel-Lloyd indices (GL) are calculated using GL =I- (abs (outward sales - inward sales) / (outward sales + 
inward sales) ), using German outward and inward data aggregated over all sectors for each partner country. 
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for existing local companies. When a foreign investor acquires a firm but replaces 
equipment, plants, etc., the term `brownfield investment' is used. A merger is the joining 
together of two corporations when one corporation transfers all of its assets to the other, 
which continues to exist. No new entity is created from a merger, as the shareholders of 
the corporation which stops existing receive shares of the surviving corporation. An 
acquisition (takeover) is the acquiring control of a corporation by stock purchase or 
exchange. An acquisition can be either hostile or friendly. A joint venture, on the other 
hand, is the pooling of assets in a common and separate organization by two or more 
firms who share joint ownership. 
FDI theories can be classified into four groups: industrial organisation, corporate 
investment theory, strategic theory and portfolio theory (van Aarle and Skuratowicz, 
2000). In the FDI theories based on industrial organisation, firm-specific aspects are the 
main determinants of a firm's decision to locate its production abroad. Corporate 
investment theories stress the locational determinants of FDI, for example, the size of 
the foreign market, the presence of cheap factors of production, the presence of trade 
barriers, etc. Strategically motivated theories of FDI concentrate on the interaction with 
local and international competitors and the desire to gain and maintain local sources of 
supply. The concept of portfolio theories of FDI is the firms' ability to diversify their 
production and sales risks over more countries through FDI. 
One of the most famous approaches that have integrated different factors of 
internationalization into an eclectic framework is the so-called OLI paradigm by 
Dunning (1993), which explains the internationalisation of a firm on the basis of 
ownership advantages (0), location advantages (L) and internalisation (I). The 
ownership specific advantages arise from the possession of such intangible assets as 
patents, the capacity to innovate, superior production technique, access to raw materials, 
cheap finance, and the systems for buying, producing and marketing. Location 
advantages arise either from natural differences between countries, for example, 
differences in endowments of natural resources, differences in input, production and 
transport costs, or artificial differences, such as trade barriers and technical 
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specifications. The internalization advantage explains why it is more beneficial to 
exploit ownership and location advantages internally by setting up a subsidiary rather 
than licensing some other firm in the host country to produce the good. 
Before 1960 the explanation of international capital movements was based on the 
neoclassical financial theory of portfolio flows, which assumed that capital moves in 
response to changes in interest rate differentials. As capital is transacted between 
independent buyers and sellers, MNEs do not play any role and FDI is not analysed 
separately (Dunning and Rugman, 1985). However, this theory could not explain the 
expansion of an established foreign-based subsidiary without capital export from the 
home country by borrowing locally and reinvesting its profit. Furthermore, the 
distribution of FDI among the world economies is not compatible with the portfolio 
view of capital flows, as investors usually hold the majority stake in their affiliate firms 
and most of their affiliates are in the same industry, i. e. the investment is not diversified. 
Hymer (1976) was the first to analyse MNEs as institutions of international production 
through the perspective of the industrial organisation theory. However, a MNE would 
emerge as a result of market imperfections by removing competition internationally in 
order to achieve monopolistic power (Dunning and Rugman, 1985). According to 
Hymer, MNEs always exist for monopolistic reasons ignoring the fact that hierarchical 
organisational structure can replace imperfect markets for efficiency reasons. Hymer 
treats vertical integration as a monopoly devise of providing extra profits instead of a 
competitive weapon against non-integrated firms. 
The substantial scale of multinational activity has given rise to a extensive research 
investigating factors that drive FDI. In the 1960s there were attempts to explain the rise 
of MNEs mainly in the US, as MNEs initially concentrated in USA, Japan and Europe. 
Untill late 1970s FDI from the US to less developed countries was explained by 
comparative costs, while FDI between industrialised countries was explained by 
internalisation. However, substantial short-run swings in acquisition FDI in the US in 
the 1980s and 1990s could no longer be explained by traditional theories. As a result, a 
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lot of researchers tried to explain short-run fluctuations in FDI by exchange rate 
movements. 
2.2.1. The Effects of Exchange Rates on FDI 
Up to the beginning of the 1990s industrial organisation theory denied the role of 
exchange rates as a determinant of FDI (Froot and Stein, 1991). The argument was that 
when capital is perfectly mobile, risk-adjusted expected returns on all international 
assets are equalised. If the currency depreciates, the returns of assets denominated in that 
currency will fall, and hence the price of these assets will rise. As a result, exchange rate 
movements are not favourable to either domestic or foreign investors in respect to cost- 
of-capital, as all countries have access to the same international capital markets. 
However, Froot and Stein (1991) argue that exchange rates affect FDI through the link 
between wealth position and investment and argue that the effect of exchange rate 
changes on relative wealth position is substantial even if capital is still perfectly mobile 
and both foreign and domestic investors have access to the same borrowing markets. If 
foreigners hold more of their wealth in foreign currency, the depreciation of the home 
currency increases the relative wealth position of foreigners and hence lower their 
relative cost of capital. However, this result depends on the nature of the asset being 
purchased in respect to information asymmetry. The relationship between exchange rates 
and FDI will be more pronounced for more information intensive assets- those with 
higher monitoring costs. 
To test the relationship between exchange rates and capital flows empirically, Froot and 
Stein use quarterly data on capital inflows into the US from 1973 to 1988 and find that 
FDI is the only type of capital inflow that is statistically negatively correlated with the 
value of the dollar, while there is no statistically significant relationship between 
portfolio investment and exchange rates. Froot and Stein also run separate regressions 
for different industries and find that aggregate data are not hiding great diversity across 
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industries. The strongest exchange rate effects appear in manufacturing industries, 
particularly chemicals. 
The exchange rate may influence FDI not only through the relative wealth effect 
(imperfect-capital-markets effect) but also through the relative wage effect (relative- 
labour-cost theory), as exchange rate movements have been thought to be largely 
responsible for both relative wage and relative wealth movements between the US and 
other industrialised countries (Klein and Rosengren, 1994). Klein and Rosengren 
analyse FDI to the US from seven other industrialised countries over the period from 
1979 to 1991 and confirm the results of Froot and Stein: the exchange rate influences 
FDI through the relative wealth effect rather than the relative wage effect. 
The reason why exchange rate movements may affect acquisition FDI in particular is 
because acquisitions facilitate access to firm-specific assets (for example technology, 
managerial skill, etc. ) that are transferable within a firm across markets without a 
currency transaction and which can guarantee returns in currencies other than that used 
for purchase (Blonigen, 1997). Furthermore, due to goods-market imperfections, it is 
assumed that investors do not have equal access to all markets. To analyse the effect of 
exchange rate movements on acquisition FDI, Blonigen employs data on Japanese 
acquisitions in the US across 3-digit industries from 1975 to 1992. Empirical results 
support the argument that Japanese acquisition FDI into the US is strongly motivated by 
the interest to access technology and other firm-specific assets, and the movements of 
the real exchange rate affect acquisition FDI in manufacturing industries, high R&D 
manufacturing industries in particular, where firm-specific assets are more important. It 
is expected that the competitiveness benefits of sharp depreciation in the host country 
will boost firms' sales, assets and investments. In contrast to Froot and Stein's empirical 
results, Blonigen fords no effect of the real exchange rate for capital intensive industries. 
However, Blonigen's reasoning and findings based on the data of Japanese mergers and 
acquisitions in the US could not be applied to less industrialised countries, where fewer 
firms have intangible assets. As a result, Desai et al. (2004a) analyse US investment in 
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emerging markets from 1991 to 1999 and argue that while depreciation of the currency 
in the host country can improve investment opportunities for foreign affiliates, at the 
same time it increases financial constrains for domestic firms. They find that after 
depreciation American multinational affiliates in the tradable sector of emerging markets 
increase sales, assets and capital expenditure by 5.4 percent, 7.5 percent and 34.5 
percent more that local firms. While multinational affiliates receive additional financing 
from their parents in response to a sharp depreciation, local firms react to currency 
depreciation in a different way depending on their ability to overcome financial 
constraints, for example, the level and composition of debt before the depreciations. 
Local firms that rely heavily on short term debt are likely to face significant liquidity 
constraints, especially since interest rates often increase following depreciation. 
Furthermore, local firms with high level of debt are the firms associated with the low 
investment response. As a result, local firms with the most leverage and with the shortest 
term debt reduce investment the most. 
FDI decisions can be affected by future expected exchange rate movements rather than 
actual exchange rate movements. Therefore, Campa (1993) and Cushman (1985) analyse 
how uncertainty and expectations about future exchange rate movements may affect FDI 
decisions. Campa (1993) finds that exchange rate volatility is negatively related to the 
number of foreign investments that occurred in 61 four-digit SIC US wholesale (non- 
manufacturing) industries during the 1980s (from 1981 to 1987). It is concluded that the 
negative effect is more pronounced for industries where sunk investments in physical 
and intangible assets are relatively high, therefore, with greater exchange rate 
uncertainty firms choose to wait with their foreign investments. Campa also finds that 
although exchange rate volatility deters investment from all countries, its effect is most 
significant for investments by Japanese companies. 
Goldberg and Kolstad (1995), on the other hand, explore the implications of short-term 
exchange rate variability for bilateral FDI flows to the US from Canada, Japan and the 
United Kingdom for the period from 1978 to 1991 and find support for their hypothesis 
that short-term exchange rate variability increases the share of production activity 
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located abroad by risk averse producers. Although, Goldberg and Kolstad and Campa 
use US data to test the effects of exchange rate volatility on FDI, both find support for 
contradicting hypotheses. 
2.2.2. The Effect of Taxation on FDI 
Another broad strand of literature on the determinants of FDI analyses the effect of the 
corporate income tax rate on FDI. The challenge of the analysis of the effects of taxation 
on FDI arises from the differences in tax systems among countries with respect to types 
of taxes imposed, the tax base on which taxes are calculated, tax rates, and whether or 
not tax is levied on income generated by their citizens if these citizens reside outside 
their national boundaries. The international taxation environment affects various 
decisions of MNEs, such as location decisions, organisational form decisions, financing 
decisions, remittance policy, transfer pricing policy, working capital management, 
capital structure policy, etc. 
Organisational form decisions include such alternatives as exports, licensing, setting a 
subsidiary, etc. In contrast to subsidiaries, for branches, income earned in the host 
country is consolidated with the domestic income of the parent company. Furthermore, 
branch remittances are not subject to withholding tax as dividends from subsidiaries. 
Consequently, it can be beneficial to open a branch when first operating abroad, since 
losses are usually incurred at the initial stage of operating and they can be used to offset 
domestic income by the parent MNE for tax purposes. Thus a subsidiary is preferable 
after the start-up years, when operations become profitable. Financing for the foreign 
subsidiary provided by the parent company is preferred in the form of debt rather than 
equity financing, since interest payments, but not dividends, are treated as deductible 
expenses by most countries (Moosa, 2002). 
There are two methods of declaring tax jurisdiction: the source ("territorial") and the 
residential ("worldwide") method. In the source method, the tax is imposed by the host 
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government on all income earned within the country disregarding the nationality of the 
tax payer. In the residential method the home government imposes tax on worldwide 
income of its residents. In the case of a subsidiary operating in a different country than 
the parent MNE, income can be taxed by the governments of both home and host 
countries. Consequently, a double taxation problem arises, which can be solved either by 
tax treaties or tax credits. 
The analyses of the effects of taxes on FDI dates back to Hartman (1984), who explored 
the impact of domestic tax policy on FDI in the US. The key insight of Hartman's work 
is that foreign affiliates pay both the same corporate taxes in the host country as 
domestic firms and `withholding tax' on repatriated earnings. As a result, foreign firms 
will tend to exhaust its foreign earnings for further investment before turning for money 
to a parent firm. This means the retained earnings should only be responsive to corporate 
tax rates in the host country, while FDI through new transfers of capital should respond 
to corporate taxes in both home and host countries. Hartman's empirical analyses only 
includes corporate tax rates in the host country (US) but not in the home countries and 
the results show that only FDI through retained earnings responds significantly to the 
host country's corporate tax rates. 
Initially, the majority of research regarding the effect of taxes on FDI concentrated on 
the US. An important issue examined by researchers was the impact of the US tax 
reform in 1986 on inward US FDI (Scholes and Wolfson, 1990; Swenson, 1994). The 
tax reform act of 1986 introduced less generous depreciation schedules, increased the 
rate of capital gains tax, eliminated the ability to avoid a corporate-level capital gains tax 
on the difference between the market value and the adjusted tax basis of corporate assets 
sold or distributed in a planned corporate liquidation, reduced the ability to use 
instalment sales to postpone capital gain taxes, increased the amount of ordinary income 
that must be recaptured on a corporate liquidation, increased the proportion of the 
purchase price paid in access of the fair market value of the tangible assets acquired that 
must be treated by the buyer as goodwill, introduced more stringent rules regarding the 
availability of net property loss and other tax attribute carry-forwards in the event of a 
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merger and reduced marginal tax rates, decreasing the potential gains accelerating the 
usage of net operating loss carry-forwards or to stepping up the depreciable basis of 
assets (Scholes and Wolfson, 1990). 
Scholes and Wolfson (1990) note that increased tax rates as a result of the 1986 tax Act 
affected foreign acquisitions and domestic acquisitions in a different way; it discouraged 
transaction among US corporations and increased the demand for merger and acquisition 
transactions between US sellers and foreign buyers. The effect of the US tax reform on 
inward FDI has been further analysed through the effect of taxes on the return of the 
underlying assets by Swenson (1994). The tax reform alters the relative attractiveness of 
various assets, and asset price adjustment is required to induce investors to continue to 
hold all assets. Competition for the tax favoured assets causes the relative price of the 
tax-advantaged asset to rise, as a result, the equality of post-tax returns is restored 
whenever the balance is upset by tax reform. Investors are induced to hold the more 
highly taxed assets because the pre-tax return on these assets rises. Swenson analyses 
investor's responses to changes in the US tax climate due to 1986 tax law reform across 
different industries and confirms Scholes and Wolfson's results. 
However, Scholes and Wolfson's hypothesis applies to new capital investment and 
investment in equipment, however, the majority of investment in the US in 1980s took 
place in the form of mergers and acquisitions, however, not of equipment-intensive 
firms (Auerbach and Hassett, 1993). Furthermore, the FDI boom in the US was part of 
the worldwide FDI boom, as the US share of outbound FDI from other countries did not 
increase during the period 1987-1989. Auerbach and Hassett argue that the evidence 
how tax rates affect investment has been mixed is due to the fact that past studies 
concentrated on financial flows rather than investment itself and failed to account 
adequately for the different methods foreign multinationals can use to invest in the US. 
The tax effect on FDI does not only depend on the source of funds and home country's 
tax rules, the factors that have been accounted for in the previous research, but also on 
the method of undertaking investment. As a result, Auerbach and Hassett distinguish 
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three ways in which a foreign MNE can undertake foreign investment in the US: it can 
acquire an existing US company, establish a new US branch or subsidiary and invest 
through and affiliate branch or subsidiary already operating in the US markets. 
Depending on whether the company is based in "territorial" country or "worldwide" 
country, all the three ways of undertaking investment in the US will react differently to 
the Tax Reform act of 1986. Auerbach and Hassett show that companies based in a 
"territorial" countries will enter foreign markets through mergers and acquisitions, while 
companies based in a "worldwide" countries that provide a tax credit for taxes paid to 
foreign governments will invest in new equipment. 
The corporate tax effect on foreign investment by firms located in countries that provide 
foreign tax credit for taxes paid to foreign governments and that do not provide such tax 
credits is further investigated by Hines (1996), who analyses the distribution of foreign 
investment among US states. He argues that foreign firms which are not offered tax 
credits by their governments are more responsive to state tax rates than are investors 
from foreign tax-credit countries and finds that a tax rate increase by 1 percent is 
associated with an 11.5 percent smaller share of property, plant and equipment (PPE) 
ownership by exemption investor than by foreign-tax-credit investor. Hines also uses 
state's share of a country's total number of affiliates as a dependent variable while 
estimating OLS regression and finds a significant negative effect of the state tax rate on 
the number of affiliates: 1 percent increase in tax is associated with 3.2 percent smaller 
shares of affiliates from exemption countries than from foreign-tax-credit countries. 
However, Hines doubts the extent revealed by the results to which foreign investment 
react to taxes at the US state level, as state taxation may change the pattern of foreign 
ownership without changing patterns of real investment to the same degree, for example, 
foreign investors may be selling local assets to other foreign investors. Furthermore, 
Hines finds that foreign investors choose between different states with considerably 
more sensitivity to local tax rates than they choose between countries. 
All the previously discussed studies that analyse the tax effect on FDI use country-level 
and/or industry-level data and do not capture the effect at the firm level. Furthermore, 
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these studies mainly focus on corporate income taxes ignoring all other kinds of taxes 
that foreign firms incur while investing abroad, for example, sales taxes, value-added 
taxes, property taxes, excise taxes, etc5. Non-income taxes differ from corporate income 
taxes in three respects: indirect tax obligations are not functions of income, hence, they 
are not affected by the financing of foreign affiliates and by the prices used for intra-firm 
transfers; indirect taxes encourage firms to reduce their capital/labour ratios to a much 
lesser extent than income taxes; and, finally, firms are ineligible to claim foreign tax 
credits for indirect tax payments, so they are likely to be as sensitive to indirect tax rate 
differences as are local firms (Desai et al., 2004b). 
Desai et al. analyse the effect of multiple host country taxes, including non-income 
taxes, on FDI activities of American MNEs. They argue that foreign indirect tax 
obligations of US MNEs are more than one and a half times their direct tax obligations 
over their sample period from 1982 to 1997 in 9 out of 10 countries with the largest 
ratios being in Europe. However, indirect taxes paid by affiliates in the sample are not 
dominated by value added taxes. Furthermore, indirect tax rates appear to be negatively 
correlated with investment levels measured by assets approximately to the same degree 
as are corporate income tax rates: American affiliates located in countries with 10 
percent higher indirect tax rates have 7.1 percent (2.9 percent) less assets (output), and 
American affiliates located in countries with 10 percent higher corporate income tax 
rates have 6.6 percent (1.9 percent) less assets (output). However, high income tax rates 
depress affiliate capital/labour ratios and profit rates, while high indirect tax rates do not 
have a significant effect on these variables. 
Relatively few empirical studies regarding the influence of taxation on the FDI decision 
exist. Bellak (2004) surveys six papers with taxes as determinants of FDI and finds a 
median tax rate elasticity of -0.22 (1 percentage point increase in the tax rate will reduce 
s Desai et. al. (2004b) define indirect taxes as taxes other than income and payroll taxes and non-tax 
payments (other than production royalty payments): (a) sale, value added, consumption and excise taxes 
collected by the affiliate on goods and services that the affiliate sold; (b) property taxes and other taxes on 
the value of assets and capital; (c) any remaining taxes (other tan income and payroll taxes); (d) import 
and export duties, license fees, penalties and all other payments or accruals of no-tax liabilities (other tan 
production royalty payments. 
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FDI by 0.22 percent). The low elasticity supports the view that tax-cutting strategies of 
governments may have little influence on the FDI decision. FDI is only partly driven by 
costs and may just reflect a strategic decision by management. However, the effect of 
taxes on FDI has changed over time. Investment location decisions have become more 
sensitive to tax rates, as technological advances, fewer trade restrictions and capital 
controls have allowed more capital to cross national borders (Altshuler et al., 1998). 
According to the results by Altshuler et al. (1998), the location of real capital by US 
MNEs in manufacturing affiliates abroad became more sensitive to tax rates in the 
period from 1984 to 1992. 
A large variation in empirical results of the tax effect on FDI may be due to the fact that 
tax systems are extremely complex and any approach that tries to capture them is subject 
to a significant measurement error. The problem is that that corporate income tax rate 
rates and non-income tax rates do not reflect actual taxes paid by MNEs, as the tax 
burden can be influenced by the depreciation scheme, tax credits and the treatment of 
debt among others. For example, in some countries companies may be allowed to 
accelerate depreciation; taxes can be reduced or subsidies can be introduced for some 
kinds of investment; and some countries allow companies to subtract interest on debt 
from taxable income. As a result, the tax burden can be reduced. Studies that include tax 
rates as factors affecting FDI usually use statutory corporate income tax rates. However, 
these rates are not an appropriate indicator of the tax burden especially in the case of 
FDI, as the statutory rate is only one of the determinants of the total tax burden (Bellak 
and Leibrecht, 2005; Carstensen and Toubal, 2004; Clausing and Dorobantu, 2005; Wei, 
2000). Effective corporate tax rates could be a more realistic measure of the tax burden 
on foreign investors and they are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
2.2.3. Vertical versus Horizontal Motives of Internalisation 
The majority of the above literature on the determinants of FDI uses a partial 
equilibrium framework based on industrial organisation and finance and examine how 
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exogenous macroeconomic factors, such as, exchange rates and taxes, affect firms' FDI 
decisions (Blonigen, 2005). The general equilibrium theory of FDI, on the other hand, 
has focused on two main motives of locating production abroad: the access to foreign 
markets (horizontal FDI) and the reduction of production costs (vertical FDI) (Helpman, 
1984; Markusen, 1984). In the case of vertical FDI firms become multinational to reduce 
overall production costs, allocating certain stages of production to foreign countries 
where inputs intensively used in the production are cheaper. In the horizontal pattern of 
internationalization firms become multinational in order to gain better access to foreign 
markets. 
In the vertical pattern of internalisation, it is usually the low-skilled labour-intensive 
stage of production that is located in a host country with relatively lower labour costs. 
As a result, labour costs are an important investment location advantage of a host 
economy, especially for firms, which want to establish an export oriented production in 
the host country. However, the relative cost advantages of producing in an economy 
where wages are relatively lower may be outweighed by lower productivity, variable 
exchange rates and an unstable political environment. Furthermore, MNEs may as well 
enter foreign markets with different motives and employ more skilled labour, 
consequently rewarding the skilled labour with higher wages, which reflects the skill 
premium. Therefore, it has not been agreed in the literature on either the magnitude or 
the direction of the labour costs effect on FDI. For example, Barrell and Pain (1997, 
1999) find a high labour cost FDI-reducing effect, while Wei (2000) finds an FDI- 
increasing effect. Holland and Pain (1998) finds a significant negative impact of wages 
on inward FDI in the host countries, whether they controlled for productivity levels or 
not. 
Labour costs may have a dynamic nature and gain importance in some countries over 
time. For example, Merlevede and Schoors (2004) use unit labour costs proxied by the 
ratio of GDP to employment and find that relative unit labour costs have a negative 
effect on FDI but are only significant when interacted with the time variable. The results 
imply that relative unit labour costs gain importance over time. De Santis et al. (2004) 
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use relative unit labour costs and find only a weakly significant labour cost effect on 
FDI. Surprisingly, relative unit labour costs are found to have a significant effect on 
Euro area outward FDI to the US, which is explained by the fact that unit labour costs 
term may be driven by the developments in labour productivity differentials. 
Estrin et. al. (2001) uses relative unit labour costs controlled not only for the labour 
productivity but also by the bilateral exchange rates between the host and the source 
countries and confirms the relevance of relative labour costs for inward FDI to transition 
economies. FDI is significantly higher between countries where the relative unit labour 
cost advantages of relocation are higher. Husan (1996) tries to explain why foreign 
direct investment in the motor industry in Poland remained low after 1990. Low labour 
productivity may not be the only factor responsible for the low levels of FDI, as 
internally-controlled labour costs of an enterprise on average account for only 
approximately 14 percent of unit cost. MNEs may also face transport and related costs of 
imports. Furthermore, low volume production, and the necessity of substantial, ever 
increasing amount of flexible, high-tech equipment for start up may add to the list of 
reasons for the low level of FDI in the motor industry in Poland. 
However, even if unit labour costs reflect to some extent the quality of labour, they do 
not take into account the flexibility of labour, for example, the adaptability of employees 
to new machinery or other changes in the production process. The unemployment rate in 
the host country can, to a certain degree, reflect the flexibility of labour and, therefore, 
have an ambiguous effect on MNEs' decisions to invest abroad. On the one hand, a high 
unemployment rate may mean that it is easy to recruit labour, on the other hand, it could 
reflect a low local demand for the product and labour market rigidity (Carlton, 1983). 
Unemployment in the host country may have a different effect on firms investing in 
different sectors. For example, empirical results by Carlton show that the unemployment 
variable is positive and statistically significant for the industry of Fabricated Plastic 
Products, though it is negative for the industries of Communication Transmitting 
Equipment and Electronic Component but statistically significant only for the latter. It 
can be concluded that the effect of unemployment on FDI is related to skills: 
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unemployment will have a positive effect for firms investing in low-skill industries and 
negative effect for firms investing high-skill industries. 
Although the majority of FDI has been shown to be horizontal, vertical motivations for 
FDI are still important for particular sectors and countries. For example, in contrast to 
the previous empirical literature that focused mainly on the aggregate level of FDI 
activity, Feinberg and Keane (2001) employ firm-level data to examine how the bilateral 
trade flows of US MNEs and their Canadian affiliates respond to US-Canadian tariff 
reduction from 1983 to 1992. They find that Canadian affiliate sales to the US are 
negatively correlated with Canadian tariffs but US parent sales to Canadian affiliates 
have little association with Canadian tariffs. These results show that Canadian tariff 
reductions do not lead to Canadian affiliates importing most of their value-added parts 
from abroad. However, substantial heterogeneity exists in MNE responses to tariff 
changes within narrowly defined manufacturing industries. The results show that 
unobserved characteristics of MNEs account for a significant portion of the variation in 
the levels of the trade flows across firms. The decomposition of the variance of the 
random tariff coefficient into within- and across-industry variance show that within- 
industry (firm) effects explain much more variance in the random tariff coefficient than 
do cross-industry effects. Firms within the same industry respond quite differently to 
tariff changes because of idiosyncratic firm characteristics such as differences in 
technology or organization. 
In contrast to the previous literature on the vertical pattern of internalisation, which 
analyse aggregate trade flows between MNEs and their affiliates without distinguishing 
between the trade in intermediates and final goods, Hanson et al. (2005) focus on trade 
in intermediates rather than total trade by foreign affiliates and analyse what factors 
shape the composition of production inside these affiliates. They use firm-level data on 
US multinationals to examine trade in intermediate inputs for further processing between 
parent firms and their foreign affiliates. The results show that vertical production 
networks are explained by cross-country or/and cross-industry differences in trade costs, 
factor prices and the technological separability of production. 
27 
Hanson et al. find that demand for imported inputs is higher when affiliates face lower 
trade costs, lower wages for less-skilled labour (both in absolute terms and relative to 
wages for more-skilled labour), higher wages for more-skilled labour, and lower 
corporate income tax rates. A lot of the empirical literature finds that higher trade costs 
encourage FDI. However, Hanson et al. argue that higher trade costs also alter the 
composition of production, with far less reliance on imported inputs. Only certain 
industries with distinct production stages and with different factor intensities appear to 
be good candidates for input processing, for example, machinery, transport equipment, 
and electronics, of which the largest sub-industry is computers. 
Markusen (1997) has integrated both horizontal and vertical models of FDI into the so- 
called knowledge-capital model, where horizontal and vertical MNEs are considered as 
special cases. The model predicts a high share of vertical MNEs in small, human-capital 
abundant countries, while horizontal pattern of internationalization becomes more 
important when the degree of similarity between countries increases. Carr et al. (2003) 
emphasise three main assumptions, on which the knowledge-capital model is based. 
First, services of knowledge-intensive activities, like R&D, can be geographically 
separated from production and supplied to production facilities at low cost. Second, 
these knowledge-intensive activities are relatively skilled-labour intensive as compared 
to production, which gives rise to the vertical FDI. Finally, knowledge-based services 
have a (partial) joint-input characteristics, in that they can be supplied to additional 
production facilities at low cost, which gives rise to horizontal FDI. The results of Carr 
et al. provide strong support for the knowledge-capital model of FDI. Affiliate sales are 
strongly sensitive to aggregate economic activity (the sum of the GDPs of the two 
countries), squared differences in GDP, differences in skilled labour endowments, and 
the interaction between size and endowment differences. The evidence suggests more 
weakly that affiliate activity depends on investment costs and trade. 
Markusen and Maskus (2002) perform a test of the three models: the knowledge capital 
model, the horizontal model and the vertical model and note how each model offers 
predictions about foreign affiliate production of multinational firms as a function of 
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characteristics of both the parent country and the host country. The knowledge capital 
model states that both horizontal and vertical multinationals can co-exist. On the one 
hand, multinationals are important when countries are similar in size and in relative 
endowments, and trade costs are moderate to high, while on the other hand, 
multinationals are important when countries differ in relative endowments, particularly 
if the skill-abundant country is small. Their empirical results support the knowledge 
capital model and horizontal model, finding them to be essentially indistinguishable and 
show that FDI is important between countries that are similar in size and relative 
endowments. This can be explained by the fact that a large proportion of world's FDI 
flows from high-income developed countries to similar high-income developed 
countries. However, vertical motives for investment are important in some industries and 
for some host countries. 
The above literature on the determinants of FDI analyse affiliate production for local 
sale (horizontal FDI) and affiliate production in order to export to the parent country 
(vertical FDI). This literature ignores the role of third countries. Third-country effects 
should be important since the average country pair is relatively small as compared to the 
rest of the world (Baltagi et al., 2007). MNEs set plants abroad not only to serve the 
domestic market more cheaply or to serve the host country in order to save on trade 
costs, but also to engage in trade with third markets. As a result, Ekholm et al. (2007) 
analyse affiliate production for third countries, referred to as third-country export- 
platform FDI. First, the theoretical three-country model is set out, where two identical 
countries are large and high-cost and the third country is small and low-cost. Two cases 
are considered: when trade costs for intermediate and final goods are the same for all 
trade links and when a free-trade area exists, reducing the trade costs between one high- 
demand and high-cost country and the low-cost and low-demand country. 
The equilibrium of the theoretical model is consistent with the results of the empirical 
model on sales of US manufacturing affiliates in 39 host countries during the period 
1984-2000 (exports to third countries are aggregated over all countries). The results 
reveal a big difference between North American and European affiliates. For example, 
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affiliates in Canada and Mexico export less to third countries than affiliates in other 
countries, while affiliates in Europe exhibit an opposite pattern: they have more exports 
to third countries, irrespective of whether they are high or low income countries. 
Furthermore, entry into the EU of a low-income country leads to a big jump up in the 
share of third-country exports to other free-trade area countries, and a fall in the share 
followed by the entry of a high-income country. 
While the majority studies try to identify different determinants of initial FDI, Sethi, 
et. al. (2002) propose "a generic theoretical model... that provides a holistic 
conceptualization of the phenomenon of changing trend of FDI flows". They analyse 
investment by US multinational enterprises into Western Europe and Asia over the 20- 
year period, integrating both institutional and strategic factors. The empirical results 
provide evidence that there is a significant shift of US FDI from the culturally 
proximate, developed countries of Western Europe (low populations and high GNPs), to 
the developing countries in Asia (high populations and low GNPs). 
2.2.4. Agglomeration Effects 
More recently, agglomeration economies have been considered important for FDI 
location decisions (Krugman, 1991). "Transnational companies are in position to set up 
linkages with foreign firms and institutions to explore, evaluate and utilize resources, 
skills and expertise available on a global scale, combining these with their own assets" 
(Castellani and Zanfei, 2004). Locating close to other firms results in two counteracting 
effects: technological and pecuniary externalities and competition among the firms in the 
market. 
There is no consensus in the literature on which force is stronger. Benefits related to the 
number of manufacturing plants clustered in a specific area include inter-firm 
technological spillovers, specialized labour and intermediate inputs among others (Head 
et al., 1995). However, firms operating in markets with relatively large numbers of firms 
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face stronger competition in product and labour markets. Firms may prefer to enter the 
market that already has a large pool of workers and firms, even if they forgo some 
monopoly power (Amiti and Pissarides, 2005). However, allowing MNEs to enter a 
foreign market and establish plants increases the demand and the price for capital in that 
country, reducing factor price differences and the tendency towards agglomeration 
(Markusen and Venables, 2000). 
Barrell and Pain (1999) employ industry-level data on the location of investment by the 
US MNEs in Europe and find that both centripetal forces (forces that tend to promote 
spatial concentration of economic activity) and centrifugal forces (forces that oppose 
such concentration) are important. Initially agglomeration is stimulated by declining 
costs of market entry, with industries exploiting economies of scale and locating close to 
large markets. Further integration may cause price dispersion of immobile factors and 
goods, with higher prices being in the core, outweighing the economic gains from newly 
established agglomerations. 
Agglomeration economies can have a different effect on heterogeneous firms. Firms 
with the best technologies, human capital, suppliers and distributors will have little 
motivation to cluster geographically, as their technologies, human capital, suppliers and 
distributors will spill over to competitors, and only firms with the weakest technologies, 
human capital, suppliers and distributors will be willing to cluster (Shaver and Flyer, 
2000). Agglomeration effects have been found to be more important to `vertical' groups, 
for example, MNEs and their components suppliers, while `horizontal' groups are more 
defined by financial linkages and tend to behave more like diversified conglomerates 
(Head et al., 1995). Furthermore, agglomeration economies are of varying importance to 
firms operating in different industries: investors in low-skilled and labour intensive 
industries, like the clothing industry, are much less sensitive to agglomeration 
economies as compared to such industries as computers, office machinery, car parts and 
machine tools (Cantwell and Piscitello, 2005). 
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Empirical investigation of Japanese investment in the U. S. by Head et al. (1995) shows 
that the Japanese ventures do not simply mimic the geographical pattern of U. S. 
establishments in their industry, and the location of Japanese investments is significantly 
influenced by the locations of previous Japanese investments in the same industry and/or 
keiretsu6. On the contrary, Cantwell and Piscitello (2005) analyse investment into 
manufacturing industries in 92 French regions from 1985 to 1995 and produce 
contrasting results. The agglomeration economies are taken into account with three 
proxies: the count of firms from the same home country as the investor belonging to a 
certain industry and region; the count of other foreign firms and the count of French 
firms. 
The results show that agglomeration with French firms is much higher than 
agglomeration with other foreign firms either with the same or a different country of 
origin. Cantwell and Piscitello give three main reasons for the results. First, the 
competition faced by the foreign investor in France is fiercer with other foreign firms 
than with French firms. Second, technological spillovers passing through informal 
communications or the inter-firm mobility of qualified workers is substantially easier 
with French firms. Finally, French firms may have better information than foreign 
companies on the `true' comparative attractiveness of French regions. As a result, 
foreign firms are more inclined to replicate French firms' choices than choice made by 
other multinational companies. 
Agglomeration processes are especially important in innovative activities (Cantwell and 
lammarino, 2001). Internationally integrated networks within the firm can result an 
improvement of innovative capacity not only of the MNE but also of the host location. 
Furthermore, inter-firm networks between subsidiaries and local firms may reinforce the 
existing sectoral pattern of technological specialization of local systems (Cantwell and 
Iammarino, 2001). Location strategies of MNEs depend on the relative position of the 
region in a geographical hierarchy, "as a consequence of the interaction and intensity of 
6 Keiretsu can be defined as a uniquely Japanese form of corporate organization. The keiretsu system 
refers to a web of relationships that links banks, manufacturers, suppliers, and distributors with the 
Japanese government. 
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general external economies and localization economies, which in turn shape the sectoral 
characteristics of the regional system considered" (Cantwell and Iammarino, 2001). 
However, the effect of agglomeration economies on FDI has not been extensively tested 
empirically with the main obstacle for that being the unavailability of detailed data. 
Rather the approach has been to calibrate a model, by assuming some parameter values, 
and to attempt some numerical simulations (see for example, Markusen and Venables 
(1998)). Proper modelling of investment location decisions requires highly 
disaggregated industrial and spatial data, data on each new single investment in 
particular. In an attempt to overcome this problem, some researchers have used crude 
proxies for agglomeration economies. For example, Coughlin et al. (1991) use 
manufacturing employment density, Woodward (1992) uses total manufacturing 
establishments and Wheeler and Mody (1992) use agglomeration benefit indices based 
on measure of infrastructure quality, degree of industrialisation and the level of FDI as a 
measure of agglomeration economies. Barrell and Pain (1999), on the other hand, 
analyse US manufacturing FDI in six EU countries from 1978 to 1994 and use two 
sector-specific relative measures of the characteristics of the host economy: the relative 
scale of production given by the ratio of national production to EU production and a 
measure of relative size of research base proxied by the stock of R&D undertaken in the 
host country relative to the total stock of R&D in all EU locations to take agglomeration 
economies into account. 
Hilber and Voicu (2007) investigate location decisions of foreign manufacturing plants 
in Romania between 1990 and 1997 and distinguish among different types of 
agglomeration: industry-specific foreign agglomeration economies (proxied by the 
number of plants with foreign participation in the same industry as the investor), 
industry-specific domestic agglomeration economies (proxied by the number of 
domestic plants in the same industry as the investor), service agglomeration economies 
(proxied by total employment in tertiary sector per square kilometre and inter-industry 
knowledge spillovers and diversity externalities proxied by the Herfindahl index of the 
diversity of the countries' industrial infrastructure). However, this kind of detailed data 
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exists for few countries, which restricts the analyses of agglomeration economies jointly 
in countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Furthermore, the theory of agglomeration economies would suggest that once countries 
attract the first mass of investors, the process will be self-reinforcing, without needing a 
change in policies (Campos and Kinoshita, 2003). As a result, if there is any 
agglomeration effect, the past stock of FDI should be a good predictor of current FDI, 
even after controlling for the classical factors of comparative advantages. Consequently, 
agglomeration can only be observed using time-series data for FDI. In the presence of 
agglomeration, newly made investment will be an increasing function of the past 
investment. Campos and Kinoshita (2003) use one-year lagged FDI stock as a proxy for 
agglomeration economies in the analyses of FDI into 25 transition countries. However, 
investment location choices are usually empirically modelled by employing discrete 
choice methodology to firm-level data, where investment location decision by an 
individual firm is usually a one-shot event rather than a continuous process. Therefore, 
this sort of analyses would not have a time-dimension, as a foreign firm would usually 
invest once in a certain location. 
Agglomeration effects are, therefore, not explicitly modelled in the thesis, due to 
measurement problems. There are, however, other reasons for believing that 
agglomeration effects are unlikely to be important in the sample of firms analysed here. 
First, agglomeration economies are thought to be more important for greenfield 
investment rather than acquisitions of existing firms. But as the thesis looks at the 
Brownfield investment, the agglomeration economies are less important. Second, some 
of the countries studied are small and hence industrial regions are either geographically 
close or indeed, singular location within the country. 
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2.2.5. Country Risk and FDI to CEE 
There has been a significant increase in the flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) to 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) since 1990s when many of the 
countries started their transition period from planned to market economies. This growth 
in foreign investment is also thought to be driven by the process of integration of CEECs 
into the European Union (EU) and the corresponding elimination of barriers to trade and 
foreign investment. The CEECs are, however, not homogeneous and accordingly the 
stock of FDI differs across countries. Although the Central European countries with 
favourable initial conditions, such as the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland and 
Hungary, have attracted a substantial amount of foreign capital, more risky and poorer 
performing CEECs are still behind. This discrepancy cannot be explained only by 
traditional FDI determinants, such as market size, trade costs, input costs and relative 
factor endowments, because transition-specific factors, such as risk associated with each 
host country play an important role in the investment decision of multinational 
companies. For example, such countries as the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland and 
Hungary are characterized by a low country risk, high share of private businesses and 
high level of reform. On the other hand, in Bulgaria and Romania, the slow progress 
towards the market economy has impeded FDI flows, despite them having the lowest 
labour costs in Central and East Europe. 
One of the most often used transition specific factors in the empirical literature on the 
determinants of FDI in CEE is the risk associated with the host country. Moosa (2002) 
defines country risk as "an exposure to a loss in cross-country transactions, caused by 
events in a particular country that are, at least to some extent, under the control of the 
government, but definitely not under the control of a private enterprise or individual". 
Both domestic and foreign investments are subject to the general risks, such as market 
risk and credit risk, while "investing outside a country's national frontiers entails more 
and different kinds of risk", which arise as a result of the nature of the foreign market 
(i. e. currency risk and country risk) (Moosa, 2002). Furthermore, investing abroad 
implies additional costs resulting from lack of knowledge about the foreign market. 
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Country risk consists of political and economic risk. Political risk is related to potential 
losses to firms resulting from adverse development in the country such as currency 
inconvertibility, expropriation of assets, war, occupation, unexpected change in the tax 
laws, etc. Economic factors are related to the current and potential state of the economy, 
for example, interest rate, exchange rate and inflation. The long term nature of FDI 
makes it very sensitive to each risk component, especially political risk (Pusterla and 
Resmini, 2005). 
Through its historical evolution, the concept of political risk has undergone three 
transformations. Until the 1960's there was neither an elaborated concept of political risk 
nor a political risk consciousness; in the 1970's the birth of the concept of political risk 
was linked to the spread of collective doctrines (Nationalism and Marxism); the main 
feature of the 1980's was the birth of quantitative risk assessment methods, the 
probabilistic interpretation of political risk and the systematic use of these quantitative 
approaches on the corporate level and by the professionals; the period since the 1990's is 
the period of the scientific refinement of the political risk concept through the 
contributions of other fields of research such as political science, sociology, decision 
theory and psychology and the interdisciplinarity between political science and 
economics in the political risk research (Wafo, 1998). 
In the economic literature the definition of political risk varies. Wafo (1998) 
distinguishes between the extensive and restrictive contents of political risk definition. 
In the extensive definition the sources of political risk are seen in both government 
instability and societal instability, and predictable, as well as unpredictable political 
events are taken into account. Furthermore, economic variables related to both monetary 
and fiscal policy are part of this extensive definition of political risk. The restrictive 
definition of political risk, on the other hand, encompasses only political instability that 
is originated exclusively in the state activities and only unpredictable political events are 
included in defining political risk. Consequently, Wafo distinguishes between broad 
political indicators that make use of all available political variables of the political 
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system to generate a complete political image of a country, and political indicators that 
stress one political variable and generate a partial political image of a country. 
One of the examples of general political indicators is the Business Risk Service Index 
(BERI)T which consists of Political Risk Index (PRI) measuring socio-political changes; 
Operations Risk Index (ORI) measuring the degree to which complex operating 
conditions affect profits earned in the local currency by a foreign firm; and R-factor 
measuring the risk to remittance of profits and repatriation of capital in a convertible 
currency. One of the examples of partial political indicators can be "Corruption 
Perceptions Index" published by "Transparency International". Transparency 
International corruption perception index, ranks countries in terms of the degree to 
which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. The 
rankings of a country's level of corruption are based on surveys of business people, 
political analysts and the public. It varies from 1 (high corruption) to 10 (no corruption). 
The accelerating globalisation process, the growing share of knowledge-intensive 
products in international trade and investment flows and the increased use of 
intellectual-property related assets beyond national boundaries by MNEs, requires 
protection of knowledge. In order to take this protection of knowledge in different 
countries into account, Ginarte and Park (1997) and Rapp and Rozek (1990) have 
developed the most popular measures of patent rights protection. The later index takes 
into account five categories of patent laws: extent of coverage, membership in 
international patent agreements, provisions for loss of protection, enforcement 
mechanism and duration of protection. Javorcik (2004) stresses the advantages of the 
Ginarte-Park index being a great level of detail and taking into account the treatment of 
foreigners, however its main disadvantage is the focus on the laws present on the books 
but it does not capture their enforcement. As a result, Javorcik goes further and extends 
7 The BERI was developed by F. Theodore Haner as a quantitative guide to political risk ratings. BERI 
reviews more than forty-five countries three times a year and is based mainly on the judgments and 
appreciations of a panel of outside experts which try to rank countries according to fifteen factors affecting 
business climate. 
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the Ginarte-Park index to capture both the legislative and the enforcement aspect of the 
Intellectual Property Rights regime. 
A sound business environment as a result of macroeconomic and political stability is 
achieved with the help of well-functioning and reliable institutions. As a result, well- 
functioning and reliable institutions are prerequisites for inward-FDI (Bevan et al., 2004; 
Seidman, 1999). In order to account for the institutional quality in a host country, 
Pournarakis and Varsakelis (2004) use two sources of data: Freedom House and 
Transparency International. Three indices from Freedom House are used to measure the 
quality of political institutions: the index of political rights, the index of civil liberties 
and the index of freedom of the press. 
The index of political rights reveals how free and fair elections are, if those who are 
elected rule the country and the opposition plays a significant role in the political 
system, if the citizens enjoy self determination, and if there is presence of military 
involvement and civil war. The index of civil liberties takes into account the rule of law, 
the level of corruption and free economic activity. Finally, the index of the freedom of 
the press measures the degree to which a country permits the free flow of information, 
taking into account news delivery system. However, the results by Pournarakis and 
Varsakelis (2002) show that the institutional variables are only statistically significant 
when interacted with the market size and internationalization variables. The empirical 
results imply that FDI decisions require simultaneous improvements in markets, 
internationalization and institutions. 
Different institutions may affect inward- FDI to a different degree. Following Rodrik 
and Subramanian (2003), Fabry and Zeghni (2006) distinguish among four categories of 
formal market institutions: market creating, market regulating, market stabilizing and 
market legitimizing institutions, in order to find out which kind of institutional 
arrangement could have a positive impact on inward-FDI. Five independent variables 
that represent institutional environment (the stage of transformation and the institutional 
context) are used. The first one is the EBRD index of enterprise reform that captures the 
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reduction of budgetary subsidies to firms, the improvement of tax collection, the share of 
industry in total employment and the change in labour productivity. It varies from 1 (no 
progress) to 4 (near standard of advanced economies). The second variable is the EBRD 
index of competition policy that includes a quantitative measure of privatization (share 
of private enterprise), as well as a qualitative one (efficiency of privatization method, the 
performance of privatized enterprises, and the share of foreign investment in capital). 
The index varies from 1 (low) to 4 (excellent). 
The third variable is the Transparency International corruption perception index. The 
fourth variable is the expenditure on health and education as a percentage of GDP. 
Finally, the last variable is the Freedom House index of civil liberties, which takes into 
account the freedom to develop views, institutions and personal autonomy without 
interference from the State. The indicator is measured on a scale from 1 to 7, with higher 
values indicating fewer liberties. The results of the empirical test show that uncertain 
institutional environment impedes foreign investors' entry in business efficiently. The 
market creating institution appears to be the most important inward FDI attractor. 
Furthermore, FDI is more sensitive to institutional environment in EU candidate 
countries than in new the EU member states. 
In order to take into account institutional quality, Disdier and Mayer (2004) use two 
indicators. The first one is the degree of freedom, which is the average of two ratings: 
political rights and civil liberties, constructed by Freedom House. The second measure 
of institutional quality is proxied by two indexes of economic liberalization: an annual 
liberalization index (LI) and a cumulative liberalization index (CLI), both constructed by 
de Melo et al. (1997). LI is measured as a weighted average of internal markets 
liberalization, external markets liberalization and private sector entry. "Institutional 
variables" are statistically significant and positive, indicating that institutional quality is 
an important determinant of investment location choices of MNEs. 
However, not all researchers find the negative effect of country risk on inward-FDI. For 
example, Pusterla and Resmini (2005) use the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
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rating as a measure for country risk, which comprises 22 variables divided into three 
subcategories: political, financial, and economic. A separate index is created for each of 
the subcategories. The Political Risk index is based on 100 points, Financial Risk on 50 
points, and Economic Risk on 50 points. The total points from the three indices are 
divided by two to produce the weights for inclusion in the composite country risk score. 
The composite index ranges from 0 indicating very high risk to 100 indicating very low 
risk. However, the parameter of the variable has a negative sign, "indicating that markets 
compensate higher risks with higher profits and special economic zones are not effective 
in attracting foreign firms" (Pusterla and Resmini, 2005). On the other hand, foreign 
investors may be negatively affected by the country risk when the level of risk is very 
high, like in developing countries. However, if the level of risk in a host economy is 
moderate, foreign investors may be encouraged to establish a foreign subsidiary instead 
of licensing the production in order to have more control over their activities beyond 
national boundaries. 
2.3. Multilevel Modelling 
The complexity of the international business environment does not allow a single model 
to fully incorporate all FDI factors through time, for all MNEs, industries and countries. 
FDI is a firm level decision, one that evolves from the firm's idiosyncratic strategic 
objectives in the prevailing international economic environment (Sethi et al., 2002). 
Aggregating across firms of different sizes and firms operating in different sectors 
assumes an average firm which does not exist (Buch et al., 2005). On the other hand, 
FDI trends indicate that the investments by MNEs are usually concentrated in a 
particular country or region despite the variations in individual investment decisions, 
indicating that country level factors, as well as industry specific determinants also effect 
FDI decisions. Heck and Thomas (2000) state that the analysis conducted at different 
levels may produce divergent results. Different sets of variables are associated with 
different levels, or clusters, in the data, and ignoring such nested structures can lead to 
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false inferences about the relations among variables, as there are effects that may result 
from various interactions across the levels. 
The reason why some researchers do not find the expected magnitude, statistical 
significance and even sign of the parameters of some country-level explanatory variables 
may be the fact that these country-level variables have a different effect for firms 
operating in different industries and for firms of different characteristics. Buch et al. 
(2005) recognize not only the importance of the factors at the aggregated level for 
foreign investment decisions, but also the adjustment processes at the level of the 
individual firm, since the determinants of FDI differ among country, sectoral and firm- 
specific dimensions. They investigate the determinants of German firms' foreign 
activities in 100 foreign countries and use FDI stock and affiliate sales at firm level and 
aggregated at industry- and country-level as dependent variables. 
Regarding the sectoral trend, Buch et al. find that market size has a positive effect on the 
sales of German firms' foreign affiliates for all sectors except for utilities sector, where 
barrier to entry have prevailed over market size effect. Distance has a negative effect on 
affiliate sales for all sectors except mining, wood, construction and hotels, where foreign 
activities are determined by the availability of resources. The negative impact of FDI 
restrictions is statistically significant for only half of the sectors, while a positive effect 
is found for mining and wood products, which rely heavily on the availability of natural 
resources. The horizontal motive for foreign capital allocations dominates in the service 
sectors and the vertical internalisation pattern of FDI is important in manufacturing 
sectors. 
Furthermore, Buch, et al. test how the size of the foreign affiliates adjust to changes in 
some country-level variables, for example, the market size, and affiliate's tangible and 
intangible assets and profit. Although the parameters of the country-level variables are 
statistically significant and they have the same sign, the estimated coefficients are much 
smaller than for the aggregated data. The results show that the adjustment in the size of 
the foreign affiliate makes up for one-third of the adjustment to the market growth, 
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leaving two thirds of the adjustment to market entry of other firms. The interaction term 
between the measure for internationalisation, proxied by the number of countries 
worldwide in which the firm is active, and other explanatory variables reveal that the 
impact of explanatory variables on the dependent variables are different for the `small' 
less international firms and `large' more international firms. For example, more 
international firms tend to be more profitable and productive and higher productivity 
increases the probability to set up a foreign affiliate. 
Pusterla and Resmini (2007) and Disdier and Mayer (2004) analyse the investment 
location choices of MNEs in Europe applying the Nested logit model. The former 
investigate the investment location choices at NUTS II regional level and the latter 
concentrate on the location decisions of French firms in 13 EU countries and 6 CEECs. 
Although the authors admit the importance of the firm-level dimension in the investment 
location decision process, the only firm-level explanatory variable included in the model 
is agglomeration effect proxied by Hoover's localisation index in Pusterla and Resmini 
(2007) and by a number of French firms in Disdier and Mayer (2004). 
Although, the previous empirical literature has acknowledged the importance of the 
determinants of foreign investment at the aggregate level (country- and industry-level) 
as well as the adjustment processes at the level of the individual firm, it has not 
incorporated investing firm's characteristics, as determinants of FDI. However, foreign 
firms of different characteristics can benefit from host country factors to a different 
degree. As a result, in order more robust estimates are achieved, not only host country 
and industry factors but also investing firm's characteristics have to be incorporated. 
Furthermore, there are still very few studies that analyse where MNEs choose to locate 
their capital in CEE. The studies that investigate the investment location choices of 
MNEs rely on basic discrete choice models, for example, the Multinomial logit and 
Nested logit model, which are subject to restrictive assumptions. In order to achieve 
more efficient estimation, more flexible discrete choice models should be applied to 
investigate the investment location choices of foreign firms in CEE. As a result, in 
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Chapters 5-9 discrete choice models are applied to the novel three-level dataset, which 
does not only incorporate country- and industry-level explanatory variables but also 
investing firms' characteristics. 
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CHAPTER 3 
META-REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF MARKET SIZE AND 
LABOUR COSTS ON FDI 
"The foundation of science is the cumulation of knowledge from the results of many studies " 
(Hunter and Schmidt, 1990) 
Arguably the two main reasons why multinational enterprises (MNEs) locate their 
investment abroad are access to foreign markets (mainly in the case of horizontal FDI) 
and reducing productions costs (mainly in the case of vertical FDI). Market access may 
be good because the host country has a large high-income population, which in 
empirical work is usually proxied by the host country's GDP, GDP per capita or 
population. When investing and investment receiving countries are of different factor 
endowments, therefore, the prices of inputs, for example labour, are lower in the host 
country than at home, MNEs split the production across borders, accessing low-cost 
inputs. As a result, FDI is usually positively affected by the market size and negatively 
affected by the labour costs in the host country, and at least the former is an established 
and well-known relationship in empirical FDI literature. 
A large number of empirical papers have analysed the determinants of FDI and nearly 
all of them control for market size and labour costs in the host country, however, 
estimates do not only vary in magnitude but also in sign. The heterogeneity of studies in 
respect to statistical methods, model specifications and data used make it very difficult 
to simply compare the results from different studies. Meta-analysis, on the other hand, 
can capture the variation in estimated results by comparing the studies in a systematic 
way. Meta-analysis is a statistical technique that systematically summarises, integrates 
and synthesises conceptually comparable quantitative results of empirical studies that 
analyse a particular relationship expressed in the same statistical form and it represents 
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the best scientific estimate of the underlying effect found in the literature (Stanley and 
Jarrell, 2005). 
There are three main reasons why different studies and different specifications within 
studies generate different estimates (Disdier and Head, 2008). The first reason is 
sampling error, which arises while estimating a population parameter from a finite 
sample drawn from that population. The second reason is "structural" heterogeneity 
caused by differences in parameters across sub-populations. The final reason for 
different estimates is "method" heterogeneity, which is caused by differences in 
statistical techniques, mis-measurement of the explanatory variables or omission of 
important control variables. Meta-analysis allows controlling for "structural" and 
"method" heterogeneity by the inclusion of particular explanatory variables. "The value 
of meta-analysis lies in the fact that it reduces the random errors experienced by a single 
study and it can lead to a more precise estimate of the overall effect" (Torgerosn, 2003). 
Meta-analysis was developed by Glass (1976) in response to the growing volume of 
research in psychotherapy and many other fields, as traditional narrative approaches 
were not able to summarise and integrate the results. Glass (2000) notes that the word 
"meta" comes from the Greek preposition meaning "behind" or "in back of. " Its 
application as in "metaphysics" comes from Aristotle's writings during the Middle Ages, 
in which the section dealing with the transcendental was bound immediately behind the 
section dealing with physics; lacking any title provided by its author, this final section 
became known as Aristotle's "metaphysics. " Although, meta-analysis is not the grand 
theory of research; it is a way of speaking of the statistical analysis (Glass, 2000). 
Meta-analysis has been developed for, and widely used in, sciences with an 
experimental setting, such as educational, psychological and medical research. However, 
the methodology can also be employed in economics (De Mooij and Ederveen, 2005). 
Empirical studies in economics usually attempt to identify the determinants of economic 
phenomena, to estimate the magnitude of interconnections among economic phenomena 
or to test a particular hypothesis (Stanley and Jarrell, 2005). A lot of research in 
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economics is based on a standard regression model, so it can be narrowed down to the 
focus on the magnitude or significance of a particular regression coefficient in each 
study. 
Although the application of meta-analysis in economics has been limited so far, it has 
been applied to analyse the effect of an increase in a minimum wage on employment of 
low-wage workers in the US (Card and Krueger, 1995), multinational companies and 
productivity spillovers (Gorg and Strobl, 2001), the impact of taxes on economic 
development (Phillips and Goss, 1995), the Ricardian equivalence theorem (Stanley, 
1998,2001), the rate of return on schooling investment (Ashenfelter et al., 1999), gender 
wage discrimination (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2005), government-funded 
training programmes (Greenberg et al., 2003), the effect on productivity of various 
forms of workers participation (Doucouliagos, 1995), variations in price and income 
elasticities of residential water demand (Dalhuisen et al., 2003), the impact of unions on 
productivity (Doucouliagos and Laroche, 2003), unemployment persistence (Stanley, 
2004), the effect of currency unions on international trade (Rose and Stanley, 2005), the 
size distribution of cities (Nitsch, 2005), the union-nonunion wage gap (Jarrell and 
Stanley, 1990) and efficiency measurement (Button and Weyman-Jones, 1994) among 
others. 
Narrative literature reviews are usually based on so called vote-counting when studies 
with different signs and significance are divided in separate groups and the largest group 
is thought to reveal the true effect. However, studies that report the estimated effects of 
opposite signs do not cancel-out. Furthermore, narrative reviews automatically imply 
that studies with the estimated statistically significant effect of the same sign agree, 
without taking into account the magnitude of the effect. Meta-analysis, on the other 
hand, takes into account different specifications, estimation techniques and dataset 
characteristics in original studies to explain the variation of the sign and magnitude of 
the effect under investigation across studies. 
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Meta-analysis is also more "objective" than the narrative or vote-counting literature 
review, as it sets explicit criteria for study selection process (De Mooij and Ederveen, 
2005). Completeness and replicability dictates the choice of original papers, and there is 
no room for individual assessment (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2005). In the 
narrative or vote-counting review some papers can be discarded due to personal beliefs 
and prejudice towards the author and data used. "This makes qualitative reviews prone 
to greater degree of speculation than quantitative reviews" (Doucouliagos and Laroche, 
2003). With Meta-analysis lower quality studies do not have to be discarded but the 
quality can be evaluated and accounted for with the help of weights. However, even in 
meta-analysis there still remains a lot of subjectivity in respect to which studies to 
include in the analysis, what weights to attach to the results of each study and which 
factors to include as being responsible for differences among the results (Stanley and 
Jarrell, 2005). 
One of the major disadvantages of Meta-analysis is publication bias, when the numerical 
size of the effect is overestimated due to missing studies with low and insignificant 
results (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2005). Publication bias arises when 
referees and editors are more inclined to select papers with statistically significant 
results, leading to studies that find small or statistically insignificant effects to remain 
unpublished. Authors will perceive those conventionally expected results as criteria for 
the acceptance of papers for publication. Therefore, studies that find small or statistically 
insignificant effects remain in the `file drawer'. As a result, the studies that have been 
published may constitute a biased sample of what has been found by researchers (De 
Mooij and Ederveen, 2005). For that reason it is important that the meta-sample includes 
results from unpublished work. There is also a bias towards internationally published 
research leading to studies in non-English languages being underrepresented. While any 
form of review of empirical work, including narrative reviews, cannot avoid the 
publication bias problem, meta-analysis can employ statistical methods that can help 
identify and accommodate those biases (Stanley, 2005). 
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It can be argued that unpublished work is usually perceived to be of lower quality, as 
compared to articles published in top international journals. In order to take the quality 
of a primary study into account, various quality characteristics can be included in the 
meta-regression as independent variables. Another approach to control for a primary 
study's quality is to weight good quality studies published in top journals more heavily 
than the rest, assuming that the peer-review process allows only reliable studies to be 
published in the best journals (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2005). 
Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) also suggest other quality indicators in order 
to identify an appropriate weighing scheme, for example, if there is more than one 
estimate reported per study, and the results are the same for different specifications, the 
study should be judged as more reliable. Then studies can be weighed with the inverse 
of the coefficient of variation among the estimates in one study. Furthermore, sample 
size, the number of regressors in the equation and R-squared of the original regression 
can be used as weighting schemes. 
It is common in the literature for applied meta-analyses to base the search of the 
presence of a publication bias on the fact that studies with larger samples (degrees of 
freedom) are more likely to find statistically significant effects, as the standard errors are 
usually larger in smaller samples. So, if there is no publication bias, the t-statistics of the 
estimated coefficient in question should be positively related to the size of the sample 
(Card and Krueger, 1995; Doucouliagos and Laroche, 2003; Gorg and Strobl, 2001). 
However, if the studied effect is zero, then the larger sample will not tend to make the 
reported t-statistic larger in absolute terms (Stanley, 2005). As a result, the absence of 
the relationship between primary study's reported t-statistic and its degrees of freedom, 
would not necessarily indicate the publication bias, as the non-existence of the estimated 
effect, even where there is no publication selection, produces the same results. The 
absence of the significant relationship between the primary study's t-statistic and its 
degrees of freedom is consistent with either publication bias or the non-existence of the 
investigated empirical effect. To differentiate between these potential causes requires 
further investigation. Stanley (2005) suggests that publication bias is present when the 
reported t-statistics tend to average around 2. If papers are selected on the basis of their 
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directional statistical significance, t-statistics will vary randomly around the mean of a 
truncated t-distribution. 
Furthermore, graphical tests can also be employed to detect and analyse publication bias. 
The simplest and most common graphical method to detect publication bias is an 
informal examination of a funnel plot (Stanley, 2005). A funnel plot is a scatter diagram 
of precision (measured either by the inverse of the standard error or the sample size or 
its square root) versus non-standardised effects (estimated elasticities, regression 
coefficients or correlation coefficients) (Stanley, 2005). When there is no publication 
bias, estimates will vary randomly and symmetrically around the mean. The plot will be 
spread out more at the bottom than at the top, as smaller samples, which are usually at 
the bottom of the plot, typically have larger standard errors and hence less precision. If 
publication selection favours a particular direction, the plot will be biased towards one 
side or another in respect to its mean. If publication selection favours statistical 
significance, regardless of direction, the funnel would tend to be hollow and excessively 
wide. However, the disadvantage of the funnel plot is that visual inspections are 
inherently subjective and prone to ambiguity. In order to avoid the subjectivity in the 
visual investigation of a funnel plot, Stanley (2005) suggests regressing the inverse of 
the standard errors on the t-statistics in the original studies. The presence of a 
statistically significant intercept would indicate publication bias in the funnel plot. 
The second disadvantage of funnel graphs is the assumption that there is a single 
underlying `true' effect common to all studies or its variation is assumed to be random 
and hence symmetric. This assumption may be valid for experimental studies; however, 
in empirical research in economics the publication selection may not be the only source 
of asymmetry, as the heterogeneity of true effects across studies may be due to the use of 
different datasets, different time periods, different countries, different estimation 
techniques and omitted variables (Stanley, 2005). As a result, in the empirical economic 
literature, the excess variation in the estimated effect may be due to the selection for 
statistically significant estimates in the publication process, the effects of random 
misspecification biases or genuine heterogeneity in the estimated effect. However, if 
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there is no directional selection, it is unlikely that the overall assessment of Meta- 
analysis will be affected (Stanley, 2005). 
3.1. Meta-Regression analysis for Market Size Effect on FDI 
3.1.1. The Data and Results 
The meta-sample consists of studies collected through a comprehensive search of 
articles that investigate the effects of market size on the decision how much and where 
to invest. The search for original studies is conducted in Google, Google Scholar, 
EconLit and Web of Science using keywords "determinants", "foreign direct 
investment", "multinational enterprises", "foreign firms", "market size" or "gdp". 
Furthermore, the most recent economic journals have been searched. Only the papers 
that conduct empirical analysis have been selected. The meta-sample includes 52 studies 
with a total of 306 meta-observations (estimates of the effect of market size on foreign 
direct investment). 19 out of 53 studies are published in the international academic 
journals and the remaining 34 are working papers and policy reports (Appendix 3.1 
includes the listing of studies in the meta-sample). 
The studies in the sample estimate the effect of market size on FDI using different 
methodologies: 28 studies use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) (including fixed and 
random effects), I study uses Generalised Least Squares (GLS), 1 study applies the 
Error Component model, 3 studies employ Generalised Method of Moments (GMM), 2 
studies use a Negative binomial model and, finally, 21 studies use a discrete choice 
methodology, Conditional logit, Nested logit, Tobit and Probit models in particular. 13 
studies (74 observations) include developing countries in their samples, 27 studies (127 
observations) include developed countries and 22 studies (180 observations) include 
transition countries in their samples. The majority of studies (49 studies with 279 
observations) use panel data, 1 study uses time-series data and the rest of the studies 
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employ cross-sectional data. 28 studies (214 observations) use only country-level data, 
while the rest of the studies also employ less aggregate data. In 28 studies (108 
observations) the time period covered starts before 1990 and for the rest of the studies it 
starts after 1990. In terms of variable definitions, 132 observations are obtained from 19 
studies that measure their dependent variable as a flow of FDI, while 74 observations are 
obtained from 11 studies that measure their dependent variable as a stock of FDI, 19 
studies (85 observations) employ the discrete choice methodology where the dependent 
variable reflects, which countries or regions have been chosen to locate investment and 
the rest of the studies use FDI flows divided by host country's GDP or population or a 
number of firms acquired and created. 
Following Stanley and Jarrell (2005), the meta-regression model is employed in order to 
explain the variations in results across primary studies in the meta-sample: 
K 
Y= Qo +ZQkXrk +e, i =1,2,..., N (3.1) 
k=1 
where Y; is the estimated parameter of the effect of market size on FDI in original study i 
from a total sample of N studies, ßo is the `true' value of the parameter of interest, ßk is 
the meta-regression coefficient which reflects the biasing effect of particular study 
characteristics, k, e, is a meta-regression disturbance term, and Xk is meta-independent 
variables which take into account relevant characteristics of a primary empirical study 
and explains its systemic variation from other results in the literature. Meta-independent 
variables are usually dummy variables that reflect whether important explanatory 
variables are included in the primary study, specification variables that take into account 
different functional forms, variables that reflect different types and quality of data, etc. 
The meta-independent variables are listed in Appendix 3.2. 
A number of characteristics of the original studies are accounted for in order to explain 
the variation in the parameter values of the market size variable in the original studies. 
The differences in time periods are taken into account by including a dummy variable to 
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differentiate between samples that started before 1990 and after 1990 and a variable of 
the number of years covered in the dataset of a primary study. To distinguish among 
different aggregations of data a dummy variable is included to control for whether the 
data employed in a primary study are only country-level or it also includes an industry 
and/or firm-level dimension. In respect to the type of data it is taken into account 
whether the data is panel data or only time-series or cross-sectional. In order to account 
for regional coverage of the data in an original study, three dummy variables are 
included for three groups of countries: developing, developed and transition countries8. 
The nature of the dependent variable in original studies depends on the methodology 
used. For example, when a model is estimated with OLS, foreign direct investment in a 
receiving country is usually measured as a stock or a flow; when discrete choice 
methodology is used the dependent variable takes the value of one if a country or region 
is selected by a foreign investor and zero otherwise. As a result, a dummy variable is 
included to distinguish between the dependent variable being defined as a stock of FDI 
or a flow in primary studies that use OLS estimation. Different definitions of the market 
size variable are controlled for by including a dummy variable for GDP as a proxy for 
the market size in the host country versus population and GDP per capita. Different 
specifications are taken into account by controlling for the inclusion of certain host 
country characteristics in original studies, for example, labour costs, openness, corporate 
income tax rate, FDI policy, return on capital, risk, infrastructure, agglomeration effect, 
natural resources, the quality of human capital and distance between investing and 
investment receiving countries. 
Methodological differences are accounted for by distinguishing between studies that 
employ OLS and the rest of the methodologies, mainly discrete choice models. The 
dynamic nature of the equation estimated in the original study is taken into account by 
including a dummy variable for the presence of a lagged dependent variable in the 
original study. The size of the meta-dependent variable may also depend on whether the 
functional form in a primary study is logarithmic or linear. As a result, a dummy 
g Original studies include countries from one, two or all the three groups. 
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variable is included to take this effect into account. To control for primary study's 
quality, a dummy variable is constructed and it takes a value of 1 if a study is published 
in an international journal and 0 if it is a working paper or policy report. Finally, a 
dummy variable is included to control whether a primary study includes country and 
time fixed effects. 
It is important that the values of the meta-dependent variable that come from different 
primary studies are comparable. If OLS estimation is used in the original study, a 
regression coefficient shows the size of the change in the dependent variable per unit 
change in the independent variable, which can be measured in different monetary units. 
In discrete choice methodology, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient does not 
have much explanatory power, as further estimation of elasticities and marginal effects 
is needed to reveal the effect of the explanatory variable on the probability of selecting a 
particular investment location. As a result, the estimated coefficients from different 
original studies may not be comparable. One of the ways to avoid the problems is to use 
t-statistics instead of regression coefficients, as the t-statistic has no dimensionality and 
it is a standardised measure of the parameter of interest (Stanley and Jarrell, 2005). 
Furthermore, the estimated coefficients reflect only the size and direction of the effect 
but not the significance of the effect, while the t-statistics does not only reflect the 
significance but also the direction of the effect. 
In contrast to medical research, where the replication of experiments is common, in 
economics researchers try to be `original' and `innovative', resulting in heterogeneity in 
their studies (De Mooij and Ederveen, 2005). The dependent variable in meta-regression 
analyses, is usually taken from the original studies with different characteristics 
(different datasets, different explanatory variables, etc. ) and different methodologies 
may be used to estimate the effect under investigation. As a result, the meta-regression 
error terms are usually heteroskedastic, however, they are unbiased and consistent 
(Stanley and Jarrell, 2005). 
53 
Furthermore, in economics, researchers usually report a number of estimates based on 
different specifications but the same dataset, and every estimate is treated as a separate 
observation in the meta-sample. Therefore, studies with multiple estimates are given 
more weight and disproportional importance than studies with just one estimate. There is 
also a risk that multiple estimates from one study may not be independent. In their meta- 
analysis on the gender wage differentials in the U. S. Stanley and Jarrell (1998) try to 
account for this problem by only selecting one estimate per paper, which is considered 
by the authors as the best. 
Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) criticise this approach on the basis that the 
principle of replicability is violated and suggest including all estimates provided by each 
study but weighting them with the inverse of the number of estimates per study. Even if 
the right approach were to use only one estimate per study, it would be difficult to 
decide which one should be chosen. Furthermore, if only one estimate per paper is used, 
information is lost, as different estimates are usually based on different sample periods, 
different specification, etc., and those differences could be controlled for with 
independent variables, which can be used to investigate within-study variation. 
In order to keep useful information by including all estimates per study but to deal with 
the problem of dependence and heterogeneity at the same time, the random effect panel 
specification is employed. While OLS regression gives as much weight to between- 
paper variation as it does to within-paper variation, the random effects method places 
greater emphasis on within-paper variation than cross-paper variation (Disdier and Head, 
2008). Fixed effects estimation is not used due to the loss of a large number of degrees 
of freedom. The results of the random-effects panel estimation are presented in Table 
3.1, specifications 3 and 4, where specification 3 includes all the meta-independent 
variables presented in Appendix 3.2, and specification 4 is the preferred model that 
includes only statistically significant meta-independent variables. For comparison 
reasons, the results of OLS estimation where t-statistics are weighted with the number of 
estimates per study are reported in specifications 1 and 2. 
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Table 3.1. Meta-analyses results of the market size effect on FDI for the total 
sample of primary studies that employ different methodologies 
O LS Random Effects 
1 2 3 4 
Variables Coeff t-stats Coeff t-stats Coeff t-stats Coeff t-stats 
Published -2.490** (-2.22) -1.163 (-0.63) 
Clevel -1.620 {-1.49} 2.178 {1.03} 
Panel 3.910*** (1.87) 3.280** (2.08) 5.232 {1.24} 
Developing 0.990 {0.92} 0.070 {0.16} 
Developed 0.340 (0.26) 1.594 {0.69} 
Transition 2.130 {1.57} 0.732 (0.38) 
B1990 -2.460 (-1.38) -5.840* (-5.94) -0.823 {-0.39} 
Period 0.540* (4.24) 0.660* (7.12) 0.431** {2.21} 0.450* (3.54) 
OLS -4.160** (-2.41) -2.570** (-1.96) -2.244 (-1.09) -3.865* {-2.85} 
Logit 5.240* {2.88} 4.570* (3.43) 2.910 {1.08} 
Flows 1.430 (0.65) -2.357 (-0.73) 
Stock -1.430 {-0.68} -2.068 (-0.94) 
GDP 2.700*** {1.93} 1.603 {0.66} 
Log -0.960 (-0.91) -0.341 {-0.15} 
Real 3.030* {2.47} 3.980* (3.89) 1.182 {0.62} 
Wage -1.390 {-1.08} -1.337 (-0.74) 
Openness 0.450 (0.33) 0.667 {0.40} 
Tax -3.960* {-3.40} -3.970* {-4.04} -3.321* {-2.75} -3.016* (-2.64) 
Distance 2.560*** {1.93} 0.751 (0.35) 
FDIpoI 0.760 (0.35) 0.804 (0.18) 
Intrate 2.810 {1.31} 1.025 (0.25) 
Risk -4.090* {-3.46} -3.750* (-3.83) -1.111 {-1.17} 
Infrastr 4.270* {3.06} 1.328 (0.69) 
Agglom -8.690* {-6.03} -7.280* {-6.17} -8.074* {-3.56} -8.491* {-4.28} 
Natresourc -3.980*** {-1.93} -4.584 (-1.10) 
Ceffect 3.250*** {1.89} 0.731 {0.51} 
Teffect 4.490* (2.96) 3.600* {2.77} 1.492 {1.31} 
Dynamic -4.080* {-2.79} -5.450* {-4.86} -1.253 {-0.72} 
Humcap -1.060 (-1.00) -3.935** {-2.12} 4.123** (-2.39) 
Constant 0.540 (0.18) 1.500 (0.82) 0.161 {0.03} 6.960* (3.87) 
R-sqr 0.4434 0.3859 
Adj R-sqr 0.3849 0.362 9 
R-sqr within 0.1417 0.1504 
R-sqr between 0.3878 0.1706 
R-sqr overall 0.2701 0.0846 
# of obs 306 306 306 306 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Significant at 1 percent level ** Significant at 5 percent level *** Significant at 10 percent level 
Column 1 presents the results of the meta-analyses estimated by OLS when all explanatory variables are 
included. Column 2 presents the results of the meta analyses estimated by OLS when only statistically 
significant explanatory variables are included. Column 3 presents the results of the meta-analyses 
estimated with random effects panel estimation when all explanatory variables are included. Column 4 
presents the results of the meta-analyses estimated by the random effects panel estimation when only 
statistically significant explanatory variables are included, which is the preferred specification. 
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Only five explanatory variables are statistically significant. Studies that control for 
corporate income tax rate, human capital and agglomeration effect in the host country 
tend to report, on average, lower t-statistics than studies that do not control for those 
effects. The failure to include these variables seems to overestimate the importance of 
the market size effect. However, the inclusion of labour costs, openness, distance, FDI 
policy, natural resources, risk and infrastructure variables do not appear to have 
statistically significant effects on the size of t-statistics. The reason may be that primary 
studies do not use appropriate measures of labour costs, openness, FDI policy, natural 
resources, risk and infrastructure. 
It does not appear to matter if the market size effect on FDI is analysed in developing, 
developed and/or transition countries in the original studies, whether primary studies use 
panel, cross-sectional or time-series data, whether they employ country-level or less 
aggregate data and whether their include a lagged dependent variable. The primary 
studies that express variables in a logarithmic form do not tend to report statistically 
different t-statistics as compared to studies that use linear specifications; however, 
studies that convert variables into real terms tend to report, on average, higher t- 
statistics, as compared to studies that express variables in nominal terms. Studies that 
use OLS to estimate the market size effect on FDI, find, on average, lower t-statistics 
than studies that use other methodologies, mainly discrete choice methodology. This 
implies that market size may be more important for the decision where to invest, as 
compared to how much. 
In terms of the definition of the FDI and market size variables, it does not appear to be 
important how the two variables are constructed: whether FDI is measured as a flow or a 
stock and whether market size is measured as a GDP, population or GDP per capita. 
That a primary study is published in an international journal does not appear to influence 
t-statistics either, unpublished work as well as research published in international 
journals report on average similar results regarding market size effect on FDI. Similar 
results provided by both published and unpublished work indicate that publication 
process should influence neither the direction nor the statistical significance of the 
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market size effect on FDI. Whether studies with higher and more statistically significant 
market size effect on FDI are more likely to be published will be further investigated 
with various tests for publication bias. 
3.1.2. Testing for Publication Bias 
Following the test for publication bias by Card and Krueger (1995), the logarithm of the 
absolute value of the study's t-statistics is regressed on the logarithm of the square root 
of the study's sample size. The estimated parameter is positive and statistically 
significant9. The presence of a positive relationship between t-statistics and the sample 
size indicates the absence of publication bias. Furthermore, these results are also 
supported by the fact that the reported t-statistics in the sample do not average around 2. 
Many other statistical properties of the primary literature of the market size effect on 
FDI can be explored to test for publication bias, for example, an informal examination of 
a funnel plot. Figure 3.1 illustrates a funnel plot of precision (the inverse of standard 
errors) against non-standardised effects (the estimated coefficients) for the entire meta- 
sample of studies that analyse the market size effect on FDI. The dashed vertical line 
illustrates the average of top four points on the graph, which is close to zero, while the 
average of the whole sample is equal to approximately 0.79, which is much larger that 
the average indicated by the graph's peak. The difference between the two averages 
shows by how much the estimated effects divert from the true effect due to publication 
bias. 
The estimated coefficient is 0.6481 and the t-statistic is 5.45 
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Figure 3.1. Funnel Plot of precision measured in the inverse of standard errors of 
primary studies that use various methodologies to estimate the market size effect 
on FDI 
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A few studies with very small standard error distort the figure and do not allow 
examining how estimated coefficients are distributed at the bottom of the graph (Figure 
3.1). As a result, for illustration purposes, 26 observations with the lowest standard 
errors are removed from the sample, which rescales the graph and gives a clearer picture 
how the estimated coefficients are located in respect to the inverse of the standard errors 
(Figure 3.2). It cannot be concluded, however, that estimated coefficients are 
symmetrically and randomly distributed around the true effect, revealing 
heteroskedasticity. The plot stretches more on the right side than on the left indicting 
publication bias towards the positive sign of the estimated coefficient. However, the 
funnel plot is not hollow indicating that publication selection does not favour statistical 
significance. The figure is more spread out at the bottom because studies with smaller 
samples and therefore larger standard errors have less precision and the reported 
estimates will be more variable. 
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Figure 3.2. Funnel Plot of precision measured in the inverse of standard errors of 
primary studies that use various methodologies to estimate the market size effect 
on FDI (with outliers removed) 
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The precision in the funnel plot can also be measured in sample size (Appendix 3.3). 
Again the plot stretches more on the right side than on the left indicting publication bias 
towards the positive sign of the estimated coefficients; however, it is not hollow 
indicating that publication selection does not favour statistical significance. The 
existence of publication bias revealed by funnel plots is also confirmed by the 
statistically significant intercept10 when t-statistics are regressed on the inverse of the 
standard errors following Stanley (2005). 
These results are not in line with the presence of a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between t-statistics and the sample size in the primary studies, which 
indicates the absence of publication bias. Furthermore, statistically insignificant dummy 
variable that distinguishes between papers published in international journals and the 
10 The estimated coefficient is 5.0865 and t-statistics is 12.65. 
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rest of the studies suggests that publishing process does not favour a statistically 
significant and positive market size effect on FDI. However, Stanley (2005) also argues 
that publication bias is not the only cause of asymmetry of the funnel plot, as 
heterogeneity of true effects can be caused by the use of datasets that cover different 
countries and different time periods in different primary studies. However, the skewing 
variations in the funnel plot's distribution due to different econometric modelling 
choices, for example, omitted variables, estimation techniques and model functional 
forms are ascribed to misspecification biases, which are a primary source of publication 
bias (Stanley, 2005). 
The meta-regression analysis of the market size effect on FDI, however, exhibits a low 
model fit and only a small number of meta-independent variables are statistically 
significant. This may be due to the fact that the meta-sample consists of the estimates 
that come from studies that employ very different methodologies, mainly OLS and 
discrete choice methodology. The two methodologies are quite different in two respects. 
First, the dependent variable in OLS is a size of FDI (stock or flow); while in discrete 
choice methodology it is a choice where to locate foreign capital. Second, the OLS 
equation is linear in both parameters and estimation, and although discrete choice 
models are linear in parameters they are non-linear in estimation, as the maximum 
likelihood estimation is used. Although the t-statistic is a standardised measure, the two 
groups of methodologies are too different to be grouped together. As a result, two 
separate meta-regression analyses are conducted for studies that use OLS (including 
random and fixed effects) and discrete choice methodology: conditional logit, nested 
logit and probit models in particular, to estimate the market size effect on FDI. 
3.1.3. Meta-analysis for Studies that Use OLS 
There are 28 studies (160 observations) in the meta-sample that use OLS to estimate the 
market size effect on FDI, out of which 12 are published in international journals and the 
rest are working papers and policy reports. 20 studies (101 observations) apply basic 
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OLS, 6 studies (51 observations) apply fixed effects estimation and the rest of the 
studies employ random effects estimation. The estimates in 20 studies (137 
observations) are based on country-level data, while 8 studies (23 observations) also 
employ less aggregate data. All studies in the meta-sample except for 3 studies (12 
observations) use panel data, as compared to time series or cross-sectional data. In 10 
studies (56 observations) developing countries are among the countries in the sample, 13 
studies (66 observations) include developed countries and 13 studies (99 observations) 
include transition countries. 13 studies (57 observations) employ datasets that start 
before 1990, while the rest of the studies employ datasets with more recent years. 
The meta-independent variables do not only include the explanatory variables used in 
the meta-regression analysis for the entire sample but also a few additional variables: the 
dummy variables to distinguish among basic OLS, random effects estimation and fixed 
effects estimation and R-squared of the primary studies to control for the model fit. 
However, the variable that distinguishes between OLS regression employed in the 
original studies and the rest of the methodologies is redundant. The results of the random 
effects panel estimation are presented in Table 3.2 (Specifications 3 and 4). 
Specification 3 includes all the meta-independent variables regardless of the statistical 
significance, while the preferred specification 4 includes only statistically significant 
meta-independent variables. 
For comparison reasons, the results of meta-regression estimated by OLS, where t- 
statistics are weighted with the number of estimates per study, are presented in 
specifications 1 and 2. The R-squared of meta-regression for studies that employ OLS 
has increased more than eight-fold as compared to the R-squared for meta-regression 
that employs the entire sample (increased from 0.0846 to 0.6894), despite the sample 
size being nearly halved. Furthermore, more meta-independent variables are statistically 
significant. This may be due to the fact that the two methodologies (OLS and discrete 
choice models) are too different to be analysed jointly. 
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Table 3.2. Meta-analyses results of the market size effect on FDI for the sample of 
primary studies that employ OLS estimation 
O LS Random Effects 
1 2 3 4 
Variables Coeff t-stats Coeff t-stats Coeff t-stats Coeff t-stats 
Published 3.510* {6.93} 3.600* (8.50) 2.161* {3.06} 1.552** {1.93} 
Clevel -1.700* {-2.87} -1.570* (-2.90) -0.306 (-0.34) 
Panel 8.850* (6.60) 9.070* {7.85} 11.640* {7.37} 11.277* {6.95} 
Developing 0.150 (0.39) 0.047 (0.23) 
Developed -2.630* (-3.16) -2.190* {-4.47} -0.618 {-0.68} 
Transition -0.250 {-0.18} 0.019 {0.01} 
B1990 -4.070* {-2.84} -4.020* {-5.13} -2.545 {-1.58} -2.468** {-2.15} 
Period 0.150** {2.49} 0.140** {2.50} -0.081 {-0.79} 
Random -1.370 {-1.06} -2.058*** {-1.77} -1.774*** (4.81) 
OLSbasic -0.470 (-0.73) 0.018 {0.02} 
Flows -2.100** {-2.00} -3.540* {-4.60} -3.554* {-3.00} -3.089** {-2.03) 
Stock 0.290 {1.26} 0.123 {0.48} 
GDP 2.330* {2.65} 4.489* {3.96} 4.676* (3.64) 
Log -4.490* {-5.38} -5.200* (-8.25) -4.304* {-4.24} -4.831* (-3.73) 
Real -2.860** {-2.42} -3.060* {-4.67} -3.188* (-3.07) -3.737* {-3.18} 
Wage -0.170 (-0.19) 2.101 ** (2.17) 2.744" {2.44} 
Openness -2.770* {-4.19} -2.530* (-4.76) -2.656* {-3.06} -2.174** (-2.35) 
Tax 1.010*** (1.67] 1.540* (3.14) -0.134 {-0.22} 
Distance 3.490* (5.02) 3.270* (5.91) 2.208* {2.67} 2.344** {2.40} 
FDIpol -7.420* (-5.63] -7.770* (-6.29) -7.663* {-4.96} -4.616** (-2.24) 
Intrate 2.810* (2.85] 1.520** f2.51) 2.063 (1.62) 
Risk -3.000* {-5.70} -2.860* {-5.79} -1.245* {-2.42} -1.092** (-2.33) 
Infrastr -2.060** {-1.60} -2.700* (-2.93) -3.151** {-1.98} -4.457* {-3.17} 
Agglom 5.520* {1.92} 7.280* (3.53) 8.670** {2.34} 11.783* {3.25) 
Natresourc -5.290* {-3.76} -6.600* {-7.42} -4.944* {-3.34} -5.196* (-2.71) 
Ceffect 1.900*** {1.63} 0.782 {1.07} 
Teffect 1.410** {2.03} 1.170*** {1.82} 0.916 {1.59} 
Dynamic -1.330 {-1.38} -1.552 {-1.34] 
Humcap -2.300* (-3.05) -2.670* {-4.25} -2.671* {-3.02} -3.061** {-2.43} 
R-sqr 0.000 {-1.00} -0.002 (-0.79) 
Constant 2.270 10.91) 3.090* {2.73} -0.810 (-0.31) -1.6755 (-0.671 
R-sqr 0.852 6 0.8325 
Adj R-sqr 0.816 9 0.809 7 
R-sqr within 0.2446 0.2846 
R-sqr between 0.78 0.745 
R-sqr overall 0.7743 0.6894 
# of obs 106 106 106 106 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Significant at 1 percent level ** Significant at 5 percent level *** Significant at 10 percent level 
Column 1 presents the results of the meta-analyses estimated by OLS when all explanatory variables are 
included. Column 2 presents the results of the meta analyses estimated by OLS when only statistically 
significant explanatory variables are included. Column 3 presents the results of the meta-analyses 
estimated with random effects panel estimation when all explanatory variables are included. Column 4 
presents the results of the meta-analyses estimated by the random effects panel estimation when only 
statistically significant explanatory variables are included, which is the preferred specification. 
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Following the results presented in Table 3.2, in specification 4, primary studies that are 
published in international journals tend to report, on average, higher t-statistics. This 
may indicate that publication process may influence the findings of papers to be 
published in international journals, as positive and statistically significant market size 
effects on FDI may be preferred by editors and referees. Although, the length of the 
period covered in the datasets of the original studies does not appear to have a 
statistically significant effect on t-statistics, studies with datasets going back to earlier 
years than 1990 tend to find, on average, lower t-statistics than studies using more recent 
data. This may imply an increase of the importance of the positive market size effect on 
FDI over time. 
The measurement of both the FDI variable and the market size variable in the primary 
studies has a statistically significance influence on t-statistics. FDI measured as a flow 
tends to result in lower t-statistics, as compared FDI measured as a stock. Market size in 
the host country (proxied by GDP) results in higher t-statistics, than market size proxied 
by population or GDP per capita. However, it does not appear to matter how aggregate 
data are in the primary study. This may be due to the fact that country-level data include 
all relevant factors that explain the size of investment at the country level. While the 
decision where to locate investment is made by individual firms, and it can be explained 
by country-, industry- and firm-level factors by employing discrete choice methodology, 
the size of investment at the country level estimated by OLS is usually explained by 
factors at the same level of aggregation. 
Original studies that control for the openness, FDI policy, risk, infrastructure, natural 
resource and human capital in the host economy tend to report, on average, lower t- 
statistics than studies that exclude the variables from the analysis. Studies that fail to 
control for the openness, FDI policy, risk, infrastructure, natural resource and human 
capital, risk overestimating the importance of the market size effect on FDI. On the 
contrary, the original studies that control for labour costs, distance and agglomeration 
effect in the host country tend to report, on average, higher t-statistics than studies that 
do not include those variables in the estimation. Studies that fail to control for labour 
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costs, distance and agglomeration effect tend to underestimate the t-statistics of the 
market size effect on FDI. The inclusion of the tax variable in the primary study does not 
appear to have a significant effect on t-statistics. This may be due to the fact tax systems 
are highly complex and proxies used in the primary studies do not capture the real effect 
of taxation on FDI, as they are subject to measurement errors. 
The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable does not appear to have a statistically 
significant effect on t-statistics. On the other hand, studies that convert variables into 
logarithm and studies that express variables in real terms tend to report, on average, 
lower t-statistics than studies, which estimate linear specifications or express variables in 
nominal terms. It is more likely that the effect closer to the true one is revealed when 
variables are expressed in real terms, as inflationary effects are removed. Primary 
studies that apply random effects estimation tend to get, on average, lower t-statistics, as 
compared to studies that employ basic OLS estimation or fixed effects estimation. 
However, it does not appear to matter if original studies control for country or time fixed 
effects or if the datasets in original studies includes developing, developed or transition 
countries, which is surprising, as market size effect on FDI should be more important for 
the investment in developed countries and transition countries to a certain extent, as 
compared to developing countries. MNEs investing in developing countries usually to 
take advantage of cheaper production factors rather than better market access. 
Studies that use panel data as compared to time-series or cross-sectional data tend to 
report, on average, higher t-statistics. Gorg and Strobl (2001) suggest that this difference 
across the results may be due to unobserved time invariant effects. For example, if there 
are time-invariant effects across individual industries and firms, which are not captured 
in the explanatory variables but which are correlated with the FDI variable then the 
cross-sectional studies may produced biased and inconsistent results, while such time- 
invariant effects may be removed from panel data studies if, for example, fixed or 
random effects estimation techniques are used. 
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In order to test for publication bias, the logarithm of the absolute value of the primary 
study's t-statistics is regressed on the logarithm of the square root of the study's sample 
size and the estimated parameter is positive and statistically significant". The presence 
of a positive and statistically significant relationship between the sample size and t- 
statistics indicates the absence of publication bias in the literature of the market size 
effect on FDI. The results are also supported by the fact that the reported t-statistics in 
the sample does not average around 2. Furthermore, as for the whole meta-sample, the 
funnel plot of precision (inverse of standard errors) against non-standardised effects 
(estimated coefficients) is examined to test further for publication bias (Figure 3.3). The 
dashed vertical line illustrates the average of top four points on the graph at 0.0034, 
while the average of the whole sample is at 0.8064, which is much larger that the 
average indicated by the graph's peak. The difference between the two averages shows 
by how much estimated effects divert from the true effect due to publication bias. 
As the funnel plot for the whole meta-sample (Figure 3.2), the funnel plot for the meta- 
sample that include only primary studies that use OLS to estimate market size effect on 
FDI does not show that the estimated coefficients are symmetrically and randomly 
distributed around the true effect. The plot stretches more on the right side than on the 
left indicting publication bias towards positive estimated coefficients of the market size 
effect on FDI. However, the funnel plot is not hollow, indicating that publication 
selection does not favour statistical significance. The figure is more spread out at the 
bottom because studies with smaller samples and therefore larger standard errors have 
less precision and the reported estimates will be more variable. 
11 The estimated coefficient is 0.9109 and the t-statistic is 5.69 
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Figure 3.3. Funnel plot of precision measured the inverse of standard errors of 
primary studies that apply OLS to estimate the market size effect on FDI (without 
outliers) 
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The funnel plot with precision measured in sample size is presented in Appendix 3.4. 
The funnel plot is asymmetric but not hollow indicating that only positive but not 
statistically significant estimates of the market size effect on FDI are preferred in the 
publication process. The asymmetry of the funnel plots is confirmed by the statistically 
significant intercept in the regression of the inverse of standard errors on t-statistics 12. 
However, publication bias indicated by the funnel plots does not go in line with the 
results from the other tests for publication bias. The reason for this inconsistency of 
results of different tests for publication bias may be due to the fact that publication bias 
is not the only reason for the asymmetry of the funnel plot, as there may be 
heterogeneity in the true market size effect on FDI. As a result, it cannot be concluded 
that the publication process favours statistically significant and positive estimates of the 
market size effect on FDI. 
12 The estimated coefficient is 3.3671 and t-statstics is 11.00. 
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3.1.4. Meta-analysis for Studies that Use Discrete Choice Methodology 
The meta-sample consists of 19 primary studies (85 observations) that employ discrete 
choice methodology to estimate the market size effect on investment location choices of 
MNEs. The majority of studies in the meta-sample employ the Conditional logit model 
(16 studies, 55 observations), 4 studies (26 observations) employ the Nested logit model 
and 1 study employs the Probit model. 11 studies (45 observations) are published in 
international journals and the rest of the studies are working papers and policy reports. 
All studies, except for one (9 observations), employ panel data. Only 6 studies (32 
observations) employ only country-level data, while the rest of the studies also employ 
less aggregate data. More recently, the availability of firm-level data allowed applying 
discrete choice methodology more widely to model the investment location decisions of 
individual firms. Studies that employ discrete choice methodology usually use less 
aggregate data to model investment location decisions at the individual firm level, as 
compared to studies that employ OLS estimation to model the determinants of the size 
of FDI flows or stock at the country-level. 
12 studies (35 observations) employ datasets that start before the year 1990, as 
compared to the rest of the studies with more recent samples. 10 studies (68 
observations) convert variables into logarithms, while to the rest of the studies use 
linear-in-parameter models to estimate the market size effect on FDI. The majority of 
studies (14 studies and 63 observations) analyse the market size effect on FDI in 
developed countries, 5 studies (35 observations) in transition countries, and only one 
study (1 observation) in developing countries. The lack of studies analysing market size 
effect on investment location choices of MNEs in developing countries may be 
explained by the widespread application of discrete choice methodology to firm-level 
data and the limited availability of the firm-level data for developing countries and for 
transition countries to a certain extent. Furthermore, investment location choices in 
developing countries are usually driven by the access to cheap factors of production 
rather than market access. 
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Some of the meta-independent variables that were used in meta-regression for studies 
that employ OLS to estimate the market size effect on FDI cannot be used in meta- 
regression analysis for studies that employ discrete choice methodology, for example, 
dummy variables to distinguish among basic OLS, random effects and fixed effects 
estimation, or dummy variables to distinguish between FDI measured as a flow and FDI 
measured as a stock. The dependent variable in discrete choice methodology is of 
different nature: it takes the value of one if an alternative (investment location) is 
selected and zero otherwise. However, additional dummy variables are introduced in 
meta-regression analysis for studies that employ discrete choice methodology to 
distinguish among primary studies that employ the Conditional logit model, the Nested 
logit model and the Probit model (see Appendix 3.2 for the description of the meta- 
independent variables). 
The results of random effects panel estimation are presented in Table 3.3 in 
specifications 3 and 4. Specification 3 includes all meta-independent variables and 
specification 4 includes only statistically significant meta-independent variables, which 
is the preferred model. For comparison reasons, the results of meta-regression estimated 
by OLS, where t-statistics are weighted with the number of estimates per study, are 
presented in specification 1 and 2. The model fit proxied by R-squared of meta- 
regression analysis of studies that employ discrete choice methodology is much higher 
that the model fit of meta-regression analysis of the whole sample (R-squared is 0.5678 
as compared to 0.0846). The R-squared is high despite the fact that less meta- 
independent variables are statistically significant (Table 3.3 and specification 4). 
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Table 3.3. Meta-analyses results of the market size effect on FDI for the sample of 
primary studies that use discrete choice methodology 
OLS Random effects 
1 2 3 4 
Variables Coeff t-stats Coeff t-stats Coeff t-stats Coeff t-stats 
Published -19.107** {-2.10} -14.148* {-5.32} -17.806** {-1.96} 
Clevel 2.928 {0.54} 4.588 {0,65} 
Panel 35.532*** {1.93} 27.491* (5.59) 32.202*** {1.88} 
Developing 15.207 (0.73) 8.365 {0.39} 
Developed -3.535 (-0.33) -6.135 {-0.53} 
Transition -0.250 {-0.05} 0.025 (0.00) 
B1990 -2.511 (-0.38) -1.253 {-0.22} 
Period 0.519 {0.83} 0.714* {3.35} 0.416 (0.75) 0.737* {3.64} 
Clogit 12.531 {0.87} 22.020* (4.58) 11.236 {0.85} 
Nlogit 10.594 {0.72} 23.097* (4.33) 9.490 (0.71) 
GDP 6.620 (0.75) 8.469* {3.03} 5.406 {0.79} 
Log 3.063 (0.45) 4.912 {0.80} 
Real -5.643 f-0.71) -4.146 {-0.46} 
Wage 9.322 {1.29} 7.731 {1.19} 
Openness 7.545 (0.44) 6.091 (0.35) 24.096* (3.20) 
Tax -15.879 {-3.13} -8.619* {-3.60} -11.136** {-2.45} -5.160* {-2.71} 
Distance -10.777 (-1.61} -8.819 {-1.53} 
FDlpol 2.583 (0.20) 2.696 (0.23) 
Risk -16.530 (-1.52) -16.045 (-1.30) 
Infrastr 0.526 {0.09} -0.843 {418} 
Agglom -11.502** (-2.09) -11.86l* {-4.82} -11.180** {-2.34} -4.150** {-2.56} 
Natresourc -11.962 {-0.76} -12.231 {-0.83} 
Ceffect 10.189 {1.32} 11.628* {2.62} 7.532 (1.31) 
Teffect 11.740** (2.25) 14.151* (3.26) 14.822*** {1.67} 22.850* {5.30} 
Dynamic -13.545*** {-1.90} -10.983* {-2.93} -10.657 {-1.35} 
Humcap 6.306 {0.92} 5.891** (2.29) 4.694 {0.67} 
Constant -22.827 {-0.97} -33.923* {-4.92} -19.368 {-0.90} 2.449 {1.12} 
R-sqr 0.7202 0.6793 
Adj R-sqr 0.5948 0.6259 
R-sqr within 0.2266 0.1459 
R-sqr 
between 0.9872 0.8968 
R-sqr overall 0.653 5 0.5678 
# of obs 85 85 85 85 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Significant at 1 percent level ** Significant at 5 percent level *** Significant at 10 percent level 
Column 1 presents the results of the meta-analyses estimated by OLS when all explanatory variables are 
included. Column 2 presents the results of the meta analyses estimated by OLS when only statistically 
significant explanatory variables are included. Column 3 presents the results of the meta-analyses 
estimated with random effects panel estimation when all explanatory variables are included. Column 4 
presents the results of the meta-analyses estimated by the random effects panel estimation when only 
statistically significant explanatory variables are included, which is the preferred specification. 
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The results show that the longer is the period covered in the datasets of the original 
studies, the higher t-statistics, on average, they tend to report. Original studies that 
control for the openness of the host economy tend to get, on average, higher t-statistics, 
while the studies that control for the corporate income tax rate and agglomeration effects 
in the host country, tend to report, on average, lower t-statistics. Original studies that fail 
to control for openness (taxation and agglomeration effects) tend to underestimate 
(overestimate) the t-statistics of the market size effect on FDI. Finally, primary studies 
that control for time fixed effects, tend to report, on average, higher t-statistics. 
Following Card and Krueger (1995), the logarithm of the square root of the sample size 
employed in a primary study is regressed on the logarithm of the absolute value of t- 
statistics. The parameter is negative and statistically insignificant 13, implying that there 
is publication bias in studies that use discrete choice methodology to estimate the market 
size effect on foreign investment location choices. However, t-statistics do not average 
around 2 (it is 1.0574) contradicting the results of the previous test and implying the 
absence of publication bias. As a result, further investigation is required to test for 
publication bias. Figure 3.4 presents the funnel plot of precision (inverse of standard 
errors) against non-standardised effects (estimated coefficients), which does not appear 
to be symmetrical. The plot is overweighted on the right side indicating that there is 
publication bias towards positive estimates of market size effect on FDI. However, the 
funnel plot (figure 3.4) is not hollow indicating that there is no preference for 
statistically significant results in the publication process. 
13 The estimated coefficient is -0.1772 and t-statistics is -0.97. 
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Figure 3.4. Funnel plot of precision measured in the inverse of standard errors of 
primary studies that use discrete choice methodology to estimate the market size 
effect on FDI 
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Funnel plot with precision measured in sample size is presented in Appendix 3.5. The 
funnel plot is asymmetric, however, not hollow indicating that publication selection is 
only directional (prefers positive estimates) but it does not prefer statistically significant 
estimates of the market size effect on foreign investment location choices. The 
publication bias revealed by the asymmetry of the funnel plots is confirmed by a 
statistically significant intercept14 in the test suggested by Stanley (2005) when the 
inverse value of standard errors in the primary studies are regressed on t-statistics. 
According to the tests for publication bias, the original studies that employ discrete 
choice methodology are more inclined to be prone to publication bias as compared to 
original studies that employ OLS to estimate the market size effect on FDI. 
14 The estimated coefficient is 3.3671 and t-statistics is 11.00. 
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3.1.5. Conclusions 
Three separate meta-regressions have been estimated in order to investigate the factors 
that influence the market size effect on FDI: one meta-regression that employs the entire 
sample of original studies that use a variety of methodologies to estimate the market size 
effect on FDI; another meta-regression that employs the sample of original studies that 
use only OLS estimation and finally another meta-regression that employs the sample of 
original studies that use only discrete choice methodology to investigate the market size 
effect on foreign investment location choices. The meta-regression that employs the 
entire sample of original studies exhibits the lowest model fit (R-squared is 8.46 percent) 
despite using a larger sample as compared to separate meta-regressions for original 
studies that employ different groups of methodologies, OLS estimation and discrete 
choice methodology in particular (see Tables 3.1,3.2 and 3.3). 
The results of the meta-regression for studies that employ OLS to estimate market size 
effect on FDI show the highest model fit (R-squared is 68.94 percent) and a lot of meta- 
independent variables have a statistically significant effect on the t-statistics of the 
market size effect on FDI in the original studies. The estimated t-statistics in the studies 
that employ OLS estimation appear to be responsive to whether primary studies are 
published in international journals, what kind of data the original studies employ, how 
the dependent and independent variables are defined, whether the variables in primary 
studies are converted into logarithm or real terms, how old the data are, whether primary 
studies employ basic OLS, random effects or fixed effects estimation and, finally, 
whether original studies control for labour costs, openness, FDI policy, risk, 
infrastructure, agglomeration, natural resources, human capital in the host country and 
the distance between investing and investment receiving countries. 
The results of the meta-regression for primary studies that apply discrete choice 
methodology shows that only the period covered in original studies, controlling for 
openness, corporate income tax rate, agglomeration effect in the host country and the 
inclusion of time fixed effects have a statistically significant influence on the t-statistics 
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reported by the primary studies. These diverse results of the three meta-regression 
analyses show that the market size effect on FDI estimated by different methodologies 
cannot be analysed jointly, therefore, two separate meta-regression analyses have to be 
conducted for original studies that employ OLS estimation and discrete choice 
methodology to estimate the market size effect on FDI. Furthermore, the empirical 
literature regarding the market size effect on FDI may be subject to publication bias and 
it is stronger for studies that employ discrete choice methodology to estimate market size 
effect on investment location choices. However, the results of the tests for publication 
bias are inconclusive for both meta-analyses. 
3.2. Meta-Regression analysis for Labour Cost Effect on FDI 
The meta-sample consists of 44 studies (249 observations) that analyse the labour costs 
effect on FDI. More than half of the primary studies in the meta-sample (26 studies and 
107 observations) are published in international journals, while the rest are working 
papers and policy reports. Half of the studies (149 observations) use country level data 
to estimate the labour cost effect on FDI, while the rest use less aggregate data. The 
majority of original studies in the meta-sample (38 studies and 138 observations) use 
panel data in contrast to cross-sectional and time series data. 7 studies (40 observations) 
include developing countries in their sample, 23 studies (109 observations) include 
developed countries and 18 studies (128 observations) include transition countries. Only 
6 studies (42 observations) employ datasets that start before the year 1990, while the rest 
of the primary studies employ more recent data. 
The construction of the dependent variable in an original study does not only depend on 
the choices made by the researcher or the availability of data but also on the 
methodology used. For example, when OLS is used to estimate the labour costs effect on 
FDI, FDI can be measured, for example, either as a flow or a stock. When the discrete 
methodology is used in an original study, the dependent variable is a choice of an 
investment location (country or region). 18 studies (103 observations) in the meta- 
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sample use OLS to estimate the labour cost effect on FDI, another 18 studies (97 
observations) use discrete choice methodology, while the rest of the studies use GMM 
estimation, negative binomial model, error component model, GLS and WLS. 
Accordingly, 13 studies (82 observations) define FDI as a flows, 8 studies (53 
observations) define FDI as stock and in 18 (97 observations) the dependent variable is 
defined as a choice of a country, state or region to locate foreign investment. 
The same independent variables are used in meta-regression analysis for the labour costs 
effect on FDI, as in meta-regression analysis for the market size effect on FDI 
(Appendix 3.2) (the dummy variable that distinguishes between different proxies of the 
market size in a host country is an exception). The results of the random effects panel 
estimation are presented in Table 3.4 in specifications 3 and 4 and the results of OLS 
estimation (t-statistics are weighted with the number of estimates per study) are 
presented in specifications 1 and 2. The R-squared of the preferred specification 4 show 
that the statistically significant meta-independent variables explain about 56.34 percent 
of the variation in the estimated t-statistics of labour costs effect on FDI. The statistically 
significant results show that studies published in international journals report, on 
average, lower t-statistics than studies that have not been published. This implies that 
journals prefer studies that report more negative t-statistics and/or statistically significant 
results, which may result publication bias in the literature of the labour costs effect on 
FDI. 
Primary studies that use datasets with longer periods of time report, on average, lower t- 
statistics as compared to studies that use datasets that cover less years. Longer time- 
series in the datasets of original studies tend to reveal more negative t-statistics or/and 
more statistically significant labour cost effect on FDI. Studies that employ country- 
level data also get, on average, lower t-statistics than studies which employ less 
aggregate data. Primary studies that include developed countries in their samples tend to 
report, on average, higher (less negative) t-statistics. The results are supported by the 
fact that inward FDI to developed countries are usually characterised by the horizontal 
pattern of internationalisation and it is expected to be mainly driven by the access to 
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foreign markets, while inward FDI to developing countries and to transition countries to 
some extent are expected to be characterised by the vertical pattern of 
internationalisation when MNEs tend to locate labour-intensive stages of production in 
less-skilled labour abundant countries, in order to take advantage of lower input costs. 
Consequently, the results of Meta-regression analysis show that the labour costs effect 
on FDI is stronger in developing countries and transition countries to a limited degree as 
compared to FDI in developed countries. 
Regarding the definition of the dependent variable, original studies that define FDI as a 
flow or stock, tend to get, on average, higher t-statistics than studies that use any other 
definition of FDI, with FDI defined as a flow reporting the highest t-statistics. 
Furthermore, studies that employ discrete choice methodology and, therefore, define 
FDI as an investment location choice, report, on average, lower t-statistics than studies 
that define FDI as a flow or stock but higher t-statistics, than the rest of the studies. 
Labour costs appear to have a stronger (more negative) effect on the decision where to 
locate foreign capital than on the decision how much to invest. Once the decision to 
invest abroad is made, labour costs have less effect on the amount invested. 
Original studies that convert the variables into logs tend to report, on average, higher t- 
statistics. Regarding different specifications, studies that control for market size, FDI 
policy, infrastructure, human capital in the host country and the distance between 
investing and investment receiving countries, tend to report, on average, lower t- 
statistics than studies that do not take these effects into account. The failure to control 
for market size, FDI policy, infrastructure, human capital in the host country and the 
distance between investing and investment receiving countries results overestimated t- 
statistics. On the other hand, studies that control for natural resources in the host 
country, report, on average, higher t-statistics, as compared to studies that do not include 
the variable. 
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Table 3.4. Meta-analyses results of the labour cost effect on FDI for the entire 
sample of nrimarv studies that employ different methodologies 
OLS Random Effects 
1 2 3 4 
Coef t-stats Coef t-stats Coef t-stats Coef t-stats 
Published -0.364 {-0.78} -1.847* (-3.14) -1.194* (-2.66) 
Clevel -1.410* {-3.10} -1.727* {-4.70} -1.687** {-2.50} -1.542* {-3.20} 
Panel -3.141* {-3.80} -3.548* (-5.26) -1.671 {-1.17} 
Developing -1.640** (-1.88) -2.038* (-2.93) -0.172 {-0.69} 
Developed 1.003 (1.21) 3.344* {3.89} 2.634* {4.58} 
Transition 2.539* (3.27) 2.447* {3.92} 1.103 {1.15} 
B1990 2.413* (3.17) 2.254* (3.97) 1.427 (1.28) 
Period -0.063 {-0.96} -0.186** {-2.06} -0.106** (-2.12) 
OLS -0.031 (-0.03) 0.227 (0.22) 
Logit 3.050* (3.93) 2.935* (4.87) 1.878*** {1.83} 2.295* (2.67) 
Flows 6.411* {5.00} 6.100* (7.08) 5.030* {3.55} 5.079* (5.35) 
Stock 5.658* (5.19) 5.445* (6.33) 3.251* {2.99} 3.548* {3.67} 
MarketSize -2.890* {-4.75} -2.634* {-5.24} -3.851* (-5.12) -4.580* {-6.91} 
Logs 0.443 {0.96} 1.287** {2.14} 1.881* (4.24) 
Real -0.971** {-2.30} -0.980* (-2.62) -0.233 (-0.40) 
ULC -0.160 {-0.23} -0.911 {-1.29} 
HumCap -0.441 {-0.83} -2.047* {-2.85} -1.231** (-2.37) 
Openness -1.322** {-2.12} -1.484* {-2.70} 0.775 {1.14} 
Tax 0.063 (0.13) -0.784 (-1.37) 
Distance -1.529* {-2.79} -1.021** (-2.52) -2.280* (-3.46) -1.956* {-3.68} 
FDIpol -6.809* {-6.03} -6.774* {-6.72} -8.589* (-5.83) -9.144* {-7.92} 
IntRate 3.751* {3.26} 3.231* {4.25} 4.272* (3.49) 3.693* {4.30} 
Risk 0.274 (0.42) -0.161 {-0.31} 
Infrastr 0.061 {0.10} -1.403*** {-1.83} -1.571* {-2.81} 
Agglom 0.288 {0.58} 1.011 {1.42} 
Natresourc 3.576* (2.83) 2.024** (2.19) 5.648* {3.89} 5.474* (4.96) 
Ceffect 0.454 (0.63) 0.121 (0.17) 
Teffect 1.009 (1.58) 1.036** {1.98} 0.784 {1.23} 
Dynamic -0.575 {-0.92} -0.115 {-0.48} 
Constant 0.587 {0.42} 1.149 {1.58} 3.056 (1.63) 1.721 (1.46) 
R-squared 0.7223 0.6057 
Adj R-squared 0.685 0.5785 
R-sqr within 0.015 0.0056 
R-sqr between 0.0845 0.806 2 
R-sqr overall 0.5933 0.563 4 
# of obs. 249 249 249 249 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Significant at 1 percent level ** Significant at 5 percent level ***Significant at 10 percent level 
Column 1 presents the results of the meta-analyses estimated by OLS when all explanatory variables are 
included. Column 2 presents the results of the meta analyses estimated by OLS when only statistically 
significant explanatory variables are included. Column 3 presents the results of the meta-analyses 
estimated with random effects panel estimation when all explanatory variables are included. Column 4 
presents the results of the meta-analyses estimated by the random effects panel estimation when only 
statistically significant explanatory variables are included, which is the preferred specification. 
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In order to test for publication bias of the empirical literature on the labour costs effect 
on FDI, the logarithm of the absolute value of the t-statistics in the original study is 
regressed on the logarithm of the square root of the sample size of the study (Card and 
Krueger, 1995). A positive, however, statistically insignificant estimated parameter 
indicates the presence of publication bias in the literature of the labour costs effect on 
FDI. However, it is only a basic test for publication bias and further investigation is 
needed, for example, an informal examination of the funnel plot. 
Figure 3.5 illustrates a funnel plot of precision (the inverse of the standard errors of the 
estimated parameters in the primary studies) against non-standardised effects (estimated 
coefficients) for the entire meta-sample of labour costs effect on FDI. For illustration 
purposes, in order to avoid a highly clustered plot and to see how the coefficients are 
distributed at the bottom of the graph, 3 highest and 3 lowest values of the coefficients 
are removed. The dashed vertical line illustrates the average of top 3 points on the graph 
at -0.002, while the average of the whole sample is at -4.690, which is much smaller that 
the average indicated by the graph's peak. The difference between the two averages 
shows by how much the estimated average effect diverts from the true effect due to 
publication bias. The funnel plot is biased toward the left (more negative effects), 
however, it is not hollow implying that even if publication selection favours a particular 
direction, it does not favour statistical significance. 
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Figure 3.5. Funnel plot of precision measured in the inverse of standard errors of 
primary studies that use various methodologies to estimate the labour cost effect on 
FDI (6 outliers are removed) 
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The funnel plot with precision measured in sample size of a primary study is presented 
in Appendix 3.6. The funnel plot is more or less symmetric and not hollow. Therefore, 
the plot does not indicate that publication selection favours either a particular direction 
or statistical significance. In order not to rely only on the visual inspection of the funnel 
plots, the inverse values of standard errors in primary studies are regressed on t- 
statistics, and statistically insignificant intercept15 confirms the absence of publication 
bias revealed by the symmetry of the funnel plot. 
15 Estimated coefficient is -0.0002 and t-statistics is -0.99. 
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3.2.1. Meta-analysis for Studies that Use OLS to Test for Labour Costs Effect on FDI 
The meta-sample of original studies that employ OLS to estimate labour costs effect on 
FDI consists of 18 studies (104 observations), half of which (30 observations) are 
published in international journals and the other half is working papers and policy 
reports. The majority of studies (13 studies and 86 observations) employ country-level 
data as compared to the rest of the studies that also use less aggregate data, as studies 
that employ OLS, mainly tend to explain the size of investment at the country-level with 
independent variables at the same level of aggregation. The majority of observations 
(101) in the meta-sample come from 16 studies that use panel data, in contrast to cross- 
sectional or time series data. 4 primary studies (34 observations) include developing 
countries in their sample, 6 studies (22 observations) include developed countries and 11 
studies (59 observations) include transition countries. 
Regarding the definition of the labour costs and FDI variables, 12 studies (78 
observations) define FDI as a flow, while the rest of the studies define it as a stock. 8 
studies (31 observations) adjust labour costs for productivity or use unit labour costs, 
while the rest of the studies use labour costs unadjusted for productivity. While the 
majority of studies (14 studies, 78 observations) apply basic OLS to estimate labour 
costs effect on FDI, 2 studies (7 observations) employ random effects estimation and the 
rest of the studies employ fixed effects estimation. Only 4 studies (41 observations) 
include a lagged dependent variable, while the rest of the studies estimate static 
equations. 49 observations come from 9 studies that use log-linear equations and 63 
observations come from 11 studies that convert variables into real terms. 6 studies (42 
observations) employ datasets that go back further than 1990, while the rest of the 
studies employ more recent data. 
Table 3.5, specifications 1 and 2 present the results of OLS regression where estimates 
that come from the same study are weighted with the inverse of the number of estimates 
per study; and specification 3 and 4 present the results of random effects panel 
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estimation. The result presented in the preferred specification 4, where all meta- 
independent variables are statistically significant, indicates that original studies which 
employ country level data tend to report, on average, lower t-statistics than studies that 
use less aggregate data. Primary studies that include transition countries in their datasets 
tend to report, on average, lower t-statistics than studies that include developed countries 
but higher t-statistics than studies that include developing countries. This confirms the 
results of meta-regression analysis for the entire sample that the labour costs effect on 
FDI is stronger in developing countries, as compared to developed and transition 
countries. 
The measurement of both the dependent variable and the explanatory variable under 
investigation can influence t-statistics. Most of the original studies define FDI as a flow 
and report, on average, lower t-statistics than studies that define FDI as a stock. 
Furthermore, studies that adjust labour costs for productivity or use unit labour costs get, 
on average, higher t-statistics than studies that do not adjust labour costs for 
productivity. The adjustment of labour costs for productivity may make the labour cost 
differences among countries smaller mitigating the labour cost effect on FDI. 
Regarding specification differences, studies that control for market size, human capital, 
interest rate in the host country and distance between investing and investment receiving 
country, tend to report, on average, lower t-statistics than studies that fail to account for 
these effects. Studies that do not control for market size, human capital, interest rate in 
the host country and distance between investing and investment receiving country tend 
to overestimate t-statistics. On the other hand, controlling for natural resources in the 
host country tends to increase the reported t-statistics. 
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Table 3.5. Meta-analyses results of the labour costs effect on FDI for primary 
studies that employ OLS estimation 
O LS Random Effects 
1 2 3 4 
Coef t-stats Coef t-stats Coef t-stats Coef t-stats 
Published 0.250 {0.19} 0.347 (0.22) 
Clevel -3.385 {-1.16} -2.892* {-3.21} -5.536*** {-1.66} -4.747* (-2.78) 
Panel -4.287 {-1.43} -2.636*** {-1.81} -4.265 (-0.93) 
Developing -0.024 {-0.05} -0.006 {-0.02} 
Developed 6.543* {4.58} 6.171* (6.70) 6.638* (3.96) 6.321* (5.38) 
Transition 10.319** {2.47} 9.958* (3.73) 12.400*** (1.94) 9.738** (2.56) 
B1990 11.430 {1.61} 10.512* {2.94} 17.016** {2.11} 11.390* (2.91) 
Period 0.055 {0.15} -0.223 {-0.59} 
OLSbasic 0.695 {0.42} 0.894 (0.52) 
Random 10.425* {5.20} 9.753* (5.93) 10.429* (5.38) 9.345* (5.51) 
Flows -7.295* {-2.59} -8.633* (-5.46) -5.356*** {-1.69} -3.929** (-2.17) 
R-squared -9.069* (-2.94) -9.498* {-3.72} -6.827* {-3.01} -6.107* {-3.02} 
MarketSize -1.904 {-0.89} -2.419*** {-1.93} -2.412 {-0.91} . 4.421* {-3.68} 
Logs -0.487 {-0.44} -1.383 {-0.59} 
Real -5.959 {-2.45} -5.585* {-6.99} -4.546*** (-1.64) -3.466* {-2.95} 
ULC 9.282* {3.53} 7.874* {6.47} 9.749* {2.68} 6.571* (4.38) 
HumCap -6.924*** {-1.86} -6.494* (-6.77) -9.377** (-2.40) -6.732* {-3.76} 
Openness 0.725 {0.55} 1.579 {0.76} 
Tax -3.074 {-1.30} -3.739* (-3.69) -0.449 {-0.20} 
Distance -5.875* {-3.14} -5.407* {-6.10} -6.934** (-2.35) -6.483* {-3.71} 
IntRate -14.117* {-3.75} -13.164* {-5.90} -12.537* {-2.72} -8.663* {-3.77} 
Risk -0.252 {-0.20} -0.640 {-0.63} 
Infrastr -0.849 {-0.54} -1.032 (-0.36) 
Agglom -1.758 {-0.42} 4.551 (-0.74) 
Natresourc 4.269 {0.53} 12.063 {1.31} 7.782** (1.97) 
Ceffect 0.270 {0.14} 0.032 (0.02) 
Teffect 0.154 {0.15} 0.249 (0.23) 
Dynamic 0.188 {0.43} 0.082 {0.28} 
Constant 13.654** {2.39} 15.424* {4.95} 10.804 {1.61} 7.551*** (1.81) 
R-squared 0.7721 0.7627 
Adj R-sq 0.687 0.7223 
Within R-sq 0.3442 0.3206 
Betw R-sq 0.991 0.832 1 
Overall R-sq 0.652 0.6132 
# of obs. 104 104 104 104 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Significant at 1 percent level ** Significant at 5 percent level *** Significant at 10 percent level 
Column I presents the results of the meta-analyses estimated by OLS when all explanatory variables are 
included. Column 2 presents the results of the meta analyses estimated by OLS when only statistically 
significant explanatory variables are included. Column 3 presents the results of the meta-analyses 
estimated with random effects panel estimation when all explanatory variables are included. Column 4 
presents the results of the meta-analyses estimated by the random effects panel estimation when only 
statistically significant explanatory variables are included, which is the preferred specification. 
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In respect to the time period covered in the original studies, estimates that are based on 
the data that start before 1990 are, on average, higher than the ones of the more recent 
data. The negative labour cost effect on FDI has become stronger with time. Original 
studies that employ random effect estimation, as compared to basic OLS or fixed effects 
estimation, report, on average, higher t-statistics. Primary studies that use variables 
expressed in real terms get, on average, lower t-statistics, as compared to studies that use 
variables expressed in nominal terms. Finally, the fit of the models in the original studies 
(proxied by the R-squared) is negatively related to the estimated t-statistics, which 
indicates that better specified models tend to report more negative t-statistics of the 
labour cost effect on FDI. On the other hand, due to publication selection bias 
researchers may expect that papers with negative and statistically significant estimates of 
labour costs effect on FDI have more chance to be published. Therefore, they will refine 
and improve the model in order to get the desired results, increasing the fit of the model. 
In order to test for publication bias, first, the basic test offered by Card and Krueger 
(1995), is used: the logarithm of the absolute value of the t-statistics is regressed on the 
logarithm of the square root of the sample size. The estimated positive, however, 
statistically insignificant coefficient indicates that the presence of publication bias 
cannot be rejected. The publication bias is further examined by employing graphical 
tests, the funnel plots. Figure 3.6 illustrates a funnel plot of precision (inverse of 
standard errors) against non-standardised effects (estimated coefficients) of the studies 
that employ OLS to estimate labour costs effect on FDI. However, the graph is more or 
less symmetrical and not hollow, indicating that publication selection favours neither a 
particular direction nor statistical significance. 
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Figure 3.6. Funnel plot with precision measured in the inverse of standard errors 
of primary studies that use OLS to estimate the labour cost effect on FDI (7 outliers 
are removed) 
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The funnel plot with precision measured in sample size is presented in Appendices 3.7. 
The plot is more or less symmetrical and not hollow indicating that the publication 
process favours neither a particular direction, nor statistical significance. In order not to 
rely only on the visual inspection of the funnel plots, the inverse values of standard 
errors in the primary studies are regressed on t-statistics. The statistically insignificant 
intercept16 confirms the absence of publication bias revealed by the symmetry of funnel 
plots. 
16 Estimated coefficient is -0.0028 and t-statistics is -0.99. 
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3.2.2. Meta-analysis of labour costs effects on FDI for studies that employ discrete 
choice methodology 
The meta-sample of original studies that employ the discrete choice methodology to 
estimate the labour costs effect on FDI consists of 19 studies (99 observations), 12 of 
which (66 observations) are published in international journals and the rest of the studies 
are working papers and policy reports. The majority of studies (17 studies and 89 
observations) in the meta-sample use panel data, as compared to cross-sectional or time 
series data. 13 studies (57 observations) employ datasets that start before 1990, while the 
rest of the studies use more recent data. 70 observations come from 17 studies that use 
the Conditional logit model to estimate the labour costs effect on FDI, while the rest of 
the estimates are taken from studies that employ the Nested logit model (a few studies 
employ both models for comparison reasons). 
The discrete choice methodology has been more widely used in economics only recently 
with the increased availability of firm-level data. This explains why the majority of 
studies (13 studies and 67 observations) that employ discrete choice methodology use 
firm- and industry-level data together with country-level data. Furthermore, the majority 
of original studies in the meta-sample (15 studies and 80 observations) analyse the 
labour costs effect on FDI in developed countries and only 4 studies (31 observations) 
include transition countries and 1 study with 1 estimated specification includes 
developing countries in the sample. This may be explained by the unavailability of 
reliable firm-level data for developing and, to a certain extent, for transition countries. 
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Table 3.6. Meta-analyses results of the labour cost effect on FDI for the primary 
studies that employ discrete choice methodology 
OLS Random Effects 
1 2 3 4 
Coef t-stats Coef t-stats Coef t-stats Coef t-stats 
Published 6.074* {3.51} 7.896* {9.95} 5.402** (2.42) 
Clevel -3.650* {-4.02} . 4.363* {-9.18} -3.720* {-2.61} 
Panel -10.359* (-3.37) -13.628* {-10.49} -11.587* {-3.49} 
Developing 0.124 {0.04} 2.098 (0.51) 
Developed -11.802* {-4.08} -13.240* (-9.60) -7.733** (-2.33) 
Transition 0.346 {0.42} 0.593 (0.54) 
B1990 -0.126 1-0.11) 1.216 11.02) 
Period -0.027 {-0.25} -0.133 f-1.11) 
Clogit -0.194 (-0.28) 0.003 {0.00} 
MarketSize -1.275 {-1.34} -0.475 (-0.48) 
Logs -0.655 {-0.73} -0.921** {-2.38} -1.400 (-1.49) -2.236** {-2.49} 
Real 2.623** (2.08) 2.677* (4.12) 0.212 (0.11) -3.436** {-2.35} 
HumCap -0.590 {-0.61} -1.072** {-2.07} -2.045* (-2.57) -2.165* {-2.82} 
Tax 0.920 {1.02} 0.887*** {1.79} 1.015 {0.95} 
Distance 0.242 {0.23} 0.008 {0.01} 
FDIpolicy -12.635* {-6.83} -13.154* {-10.53} -9.241* (-3.70) -5.161*** {-1.80} 
Risk -12.678* {-6.20} -13.317* {-10.01} -9.278* (-3.69) 
Infrastr 4.376* {4.23} 4.629* (6.80) 2.162*** {1.74} 
Agglom 2.970* (3.13) 4.135* (8.47) 3.283* {3.32} 
Ceffect 0.971 (0.82) 0.227 (0.18) 
Teffect 3.221 {1.32} 4.586* {3.38} 7.164** {2.45} 
Dynamic -0.445 (-0.37) 2.601 (1.58) 
Constant 16.669* {4.83} 18.176* {12.05} 14.738* {4.26} 2.021** (2.22) 
R-squared 0.823 6 0.8413 
Adj R-squared 0.771 1 0.8168 
Within R-sq 0.1352 0.1397 
Between R-sq 0.8974 0.5017 
Overall R-sq 0.8036 0.5597 
# of obs. 98 98 98 98 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Significant at 1 percent level ** Significant at 5 percent level *** Significant at 10 percent level 
Column 1 presents the results of the meta-analyses estimated by OLS when all explanatory variables are 
included. Column 2 presents the results of the meta analyses estimated by OLS when only statistically 
significant explanatory variables are included. Column 3 presents the results of the meta-analyses 
estimated with random effects panel estimation when all explanatory variables are included. Column 4 
presents the results of the meta-analyses estimated by the random effects panel estimation when only 
statistically significant explanatory variables are included, which is the preferred specification. 
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The results of meta-regression estimated by OLS, where estimates that come from the 
same primary study are weighted with the inverse of the number of estimates per study 
are presented in Table 3.6, specification 1 and 2. The results estimated by the random 
effects panel estimation are presented in specification 3 and 4, with specification 4 being 
the preferred model. Only four meta-independent variables are statistically significant, 
however, the overall model fit is quite high (55.97 percent). Original studies that control 
for human capital and FDI policies tend to report, on average, lower t-statistics than 
studies that fail to include the effects into account. The failure to control for human 
capital and FDI policies tends to overestimate t-statistics. The results presented in 
specification 4 also show that primary studies that convert variables into real terms tend 
to get, on average, lower t-statistics, as compared to studies that use variables in nominal 
terms. Finally, studies that use logarithmic specifications tend to report, on average, 
lower t-statistics. 
In order to test for publication bias, first, the basic test offered by (Card and Krueger, 
1995), is used: the logarithm of the absolute value of the t-statistics is regressed on the 
logarithm of the square root of the sample size. The estimated positive, however, 
statistically insignificant coefficient17 indicates that the presence of publication bias 
cannot be rejected. The publication bias is investigated further employing graphical 
tests, the funnel plot. 
Figure 3.7 illustrates the funnel plot of precision (inverse of standard errors) against non- 
standardised effects (estimated coefficients) for the studies that employ discrete choice 
methodology to estimate labour costs effect on FDI. The graph is more clustered on the 
left, however, it is not hollow indicating that although publication selection favours 
negative labour cost effect on FDI, it does not favour statistical significance. The funnel 
plot with precision measured in sample size is presented in Appendix 3.8. The funnel 
plot is slightly biased towards the left side but it is not hollow indicating that even if 
publication selection may prefer negative labour costs effect on FDI it does not prefer 
statistically significant results. In order not to rely only on the visual inspection of the 
17 The estimated coefficnet is 0.0471 and t-statistics is 0.35 
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funnel plots, the inverse values of standard errors in primary studies are regressed on t- 
statistics, and statistically insignificant intercept's does not go in line with the 
asymmetric funnel plots and indicates the absence of publication bias. 
Figure 3.7. Funnel plot of precision measure in the inverse of standard errors of 
primary studies that apply discrete choice methodology to estimate the labour cost 
effect on FDI (4 outliers are removed) 
420.253 
1 
. 304136 
coef 
3.2.3. Conclusions 
The results of meta-regression analysis show that the estimated t-statistics in primary 
studies employing OLS to estimate labour costs effect on FDI are affected by the 
aggregation of data, the selection of countries to be included in datasets, the type of data 
(panel data versus cross-sectional and time-series data), the definition of the dependent 
and independent variables, whether variables are converted to real terms and, finally, 
18 Estimated coefficient is -0.0001 and t-statistics is -0.44. 
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whether primary studies control for market size, human capital, FDI policy, natural 
resources in the host country and distance between investing and investment receiving 
countries. 
On the other hand, the estimated t-statistics of the labour costs effect on FDI from 
primary studies that employ discrete choice methodology are sensitive to whether 
variables are translated into logs and real terms and whether primary studies control for 
human capital and FDI policy in the host country. Surprisingly all the three meta- 
regressions (for the entire sample, for studies that employ OLS and for studies that 
employ discrete choice methodology) have high model fit (it varies from 55.97 percent 
to 61.32 percent, with meta-regression for studies that employ OLS to estimate labour 
costs effect on FDI having the highest R-squared). 
3.3. Conclusions 
Meta-regression analysis is used to systematically summarise, integrate and synthesise 
the quantitative results of the empirical literature regarding market size and labour costs 
effect on FDI. Access to foreign markets (mainly in the case of horizontal FDI) and 
lower production costs (mainly in the case of vertical FDI) are probably the main factors 
that drive FDI. The meta-sample of primary studies is divided into two groups in order 
to distinguish between the original studies that employ OLS and discrete choice 
methodology to estimate market size and labour costs effect on FDI. The random effects 
panel estimation is applied for each sample. The results of meta-regression analysis for 
the market size effect on FDI show that the model fit is much higher for each meta- 
sample separately than for the combined sample. A large number of factors related to 
model specifications, dataset characteristics and methodologies in the primary studies 
explain the variation in the estimated t-statistics of the market size and labour costs 
effects on FDI across the studies. 
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A number of tests for publication bias are employed in order to investigate if the 
empirical literature on the market size and labour costs effect on FDI favours a particular 
direction and/or statistical significance. It cannot be concluded that the empirical 
literature of the market size and labour costs effect on FDI is prone to publication bias, 
as different tests for publication bias provide contradicting results. However, more tests 
indicate publication bias in the empirical literature regarding the market size effect on 
FDI than the labour costs effect on FDI. It may be explained with the fact that the 
negative market size effect on FDI is counter-intuitive and more difficult to explain. 
While, labour costs can have a small effect on FDI especially if they are adjusted for 
productivity. Furthermore, firms may as well locate their capital abroad and employ 
more skilled labour and pay higher wages that would reflect skill premium. In that case, 
labour costs may have a positive effect on FDI. 
89 
3.4. APPENDICES 
Appendix 3.1. Studies Included in Meta-analysis of Market Size Effects on FDI 
Author Year Type of work Number of 
specifications 
Sample 
size 
Agostini 2004 Working paper 3 1555 
An el 2006 Working paper 8 3863 
Barrell and Pain 1996 Review of Economics 
and Statistics 
1 504 
Roberto 2004 Regional Science and 
Urban Economics 
2 1330 
Basile et at. 2003 Working paper 8 5761 
Becker et al. 2005 Review of World 
Economics 
4 39427 
Becker et al. 2005 Review of World 
Economics 
4 2610 
Bekes 2005 Working paper 4 1405 
Bellak and Leibrecht 2005 Working paper 11 449 
Bevan and Estrin 2004 Journal of Comparative 
Economics 
4 981 
Buch et al. 2006 Economic Policy 6 126595 
Buch et al. 2006 Economic Policy 1 193 
Buch et al. 2006 Economic Policy 1 80 
Buch et al. 2003 Journal of Comparative 
Economics 
1 349 
Buch et at. 2003 Journal of Comparative 
Economics 
5 30 
Clausing and Dorobantu 2005 Economics of Transition 9 228 
Coughlin et at. 1991 Review of Economics 
and Statistics 
6 736 
Crozet et al. 2004 Regional Science and 
Urban Economics 
4 3902 
De Santis et al. 2001 Working paper 5 1209 
di Giovanni 2005 Journal of International 
Economics 
4 2002 
Disdier and Mayer 2004 Journal of Comparative 
Economics 
6 1228 
Disdier and Mayer 2004 Journal of Comparative 
Economics 
5 262 
Disdier and Mayer 2004 Journal of Comparative 
Economics 
3 1046 
Disdier and Mayer 2004 Journal of Comparative 
Economics 
5 788 
Driffield and Munday 2000 Journal of International 
Business Studies 
1 918 
Figueiredo et at. 2002 Working paper 1 109560 
Habib and Zurawicki 2002 Journal of International 
Business Studies 
5 405 
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Head and Mayer 2004 Review of Economics 
and Statistics 
5 452 
Head et al. 1999 Regional Science and 
Urban Economics 
5 760 
Jakubiak and Markiewicz 2005 Working paper. 14 30 
Kim et al. 2003 The Review of Regional 
Studies 
1 631 
Lee and Mansfield 1996 The Review of 
Economics and Statistics 
4 100 
Merlevede and Schoors 2005 Working paper 24 595 
Pain 1997 Manchester School of 
Economic and Social 
Studies 
10 168 
Lansbury et al. 1996 National Institute 
Economic review 
1 728 
Pusterla and Resmini 2005 Working paper 12 2269 
Resmini 2000 Economics of Transition 3 124 
Sethi et al. 2002 International Business 
Review 
4 294 
Singh and Jun 1995 Working paper 35 233 
Wei et al. 1999 Regional Studies 4 256 
Wei 2000 The Review of 
Economics and Statistics 
7 426 
Allomonte and Guagliano 2001 Working paper 1 2735 
Allomonte and Guagliano 2001 Working paper 1 2871 
Benassy-Quere and 
Lahreche-R6vil 
2005 Working paper 24 1842 
Genass - u6r6 et al. 2003 Working paper 1 1163 
Billington 1999 Applied Economics 1 56 
Brunetti et al. 1997 Working paper 6 18 
Chung and Alcacer 2002 Management Science 1 1784 
Coughlin and Segev 2000 Journal of Regional 
Science 
3 2316 
Eaton and Tamura 1994 Journal of the Japanese 
and International 
Economics 
8 561 
Edmiston et al. 2003 Fiscal Studies 4 125 
Ford and Strange 1999 Transnational 
Corporations 
1 520 
Friedman, Gerlovski and 
Silberman 
1992 Juornal of Regional 
Science 
1 338 
Garibaldi et al. 2001 Working paper 1 170 
Janicki and Wunnava 2004 Applied Economics 1 126 
Campos and Kinoshita 2003 Working paper 7 76 
Nigh 1986 Managerial and Decision 
Economics 
1 162 
Sader 1993 Working paper 1 1100 
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Schneider and Frey 1985 World Development 1 54 
Woodward et al. 2000 Book section 2 854 
Woodward and Rolfe 1993 Journal of International 
Business Studies 
1 187 
Yea le 2005 Working paper 1 31426 
92 
__a: e 2v ýru- r '. + of lMip+a_inrirnentIent variables 
Published a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a study in a meta-sample is 
published in an international journal and 0 otherwise 
Country-level a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a primary study uses only 
country-level variables and 0 otherwise 
Panel a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a primary study uses panel data 
and 0 it uses either time-series or cross sectional data 
Developing a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if country(ies) that receive 
investment in a primary study include developing countries and 0 
otherwise 
Developed a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if country(ies) that receive 
investment in a primary study include developed countries and 0 otherwise 
Transition a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if country(ies) that receive 
investment in a primary study include transition countries and 0 otherwise 
Before1990 a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the dataset in a primary study 
covers the period before 1990 and 0 otherwise 
Period a number of year covered in the dataset of a primary study 
Dynamic a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the equation estimated in an 
original study includes a lagged dependent variable and 0 otherwise 
Random a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the estimated equation in a 
primary study include random effects and 0 otherwise 
OLSbasic a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the equation estimated in a 
primary study does not include fixed effects, random effects and lagged 
dependent variable and 0 otherwise. 
Flows a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the dependent variable in a 
primary stud is measured as an FDI flow and 0 otherwise 
Stock a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the dependent variable in a 
primary study is measured as a stock of FDI and 0 otherwise 
R-s uared an R-squared of the estimated model in a primary study 
GDP a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the market size in a primary 
study is measured as a GDP and 0 otherwise 
Logs a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the variables in a primary study 
are converted into natural logarithm and 0 otherwise 
Real a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the variables in an original 
stud are expressed in real terms and 0 otherwise 
Wage a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a primary study controls for 
labour costs in the investment receiving country/industry/firm and 0 
otherwise 
Humancap a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a primary study controls for 
human capital and 0 otherwise 
Openness a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a primary study controls for 
o enness of the investment receiving country and 0 otherwise 
Tax a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a primary study controls for 
corporate income taxes of the investment receiving country/industry/firm 
and 0 otherwise 
Distance a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a primary study controls for 
distance between investing and investment receiving countries and 0 
otherwise 
FDlpolicy a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a primary study controls for the 
olic towards FDI in an investment receiving country and 0 otherwise 
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Intrate a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a primary study controls for the 
return on capital in an investment receiving country and 0 otherwise 
Risk a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a primary study controls for the 
risk in an investment receiving country and 0 otherwise 
Infrastructure a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a primary study controls for the 
infrastructure in an investment receiving count and 0 otherwise 
Agglomeration a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a primary study takes into 
account agglomeration effect and 0 otherwise 
Natresources a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a primary study controls for the 
natural resources in an investment receiving country and 0 otherwise 
Ceffects a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a primary study controls for 
country or region effects and 0 otherwise 
Teffects a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a primary study controls for 
time effect and 0 otherwise 
Random a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a primary study employs 
random-effects estimation and 0 otherwise 
Fixed a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a primary study employs fixed- 
effects estimation and 0 otherwise 
Clogit a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a primary study employs 
Conditional lo it model and 0 otherwise 
Nlogit a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a primary study employs 
Nested lo it model and 0 otherwise 
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Appendix 3.3. Funnel plot with precision measured in the sample size of primary 
studies that estimate the market size effect on FDI using different methodologies 
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Appendix 3.4. Funnel plot with precision measured in the sample size of primary 
studies that apply OLS to estimate market size effect on FDI 
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Appendix 3.5. Funnel plot with precision measured in the sample size of primary 
studies that apply discrete choice methodology to estimate the market size effect on 
FDI 
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Appendix 3.6. Funnel plot with precision measured in the sample size of primary 
studies that apply various methodologies to estimate the labour cost effect on FDI 
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Appendix 3.7. Funnel plot with precision measured in the sample size of primary 
studies that apply OLS to estimate the labour cost effect on FDI 
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Appendix 3.8. Funnel plot with precision measure in the sample size of primary 
studies that apply discrete choice methodology to estimate the labour cost effect on 
FDI 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE THEORETICAL PROFIT MODEL 
4.1. Introduction 
The increasing importance of international trade and more so of FDI in the world 
economy has lead to the search of better theoretical modelling of cross-border trade and 
production allocation patters. Until the 1980s traditional endowment-based trade 
theories did not incorporate product differentiation, economies of scale and monopolistic 
competition and, therefore, ignored intra-industry trade. Sectoral economic activity was 
shaped by relative factor endowments between the partners. In the 1980s `new trade 
theory' incorporated imperfect competition (Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition) 
and increasing returns and, therefore, accounted for intra-industry trade (Helpman, 1981; 
Krugman, 1979,1981; Lancaster, 1980). 
However, the `new trade theory' failed to take into account the heterogeneity of firms. 
Under the `new trade theory' framework, firms are symmetric within an industry in 
terms of technology, and therefore, have similar productivity levels and similar 
participation on foreign trade. All firms export to all countries because each produces a 
unique variety and trade costs just absorb a proportion of firm's foreign revenue, 
however, the firm would not face sunk costs of exporting (Greenaway and Kneller, 
2007). At the time, the aim was to explain large volumes of trade for which differences 
in individual firm size and productivity was not considered to be important (Helpman, 
2006). Clerides et al. (1998) were one of the first to model explicitly the sunk costs of 
exporting. In their framework, more productive firms with lower marginal costs earn 
higher gross profits and only those with sufficiently large profits can cover sunk costs of 
exports. 
The availability of new firm-level data has facilitated detailed analyses of the 
adjustments at the firm level and it was evident that not all firms export and engage in 
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foreign production. Only a small fraction of firms export and exporters are larger and 
more productive than non-exporters. An even a smaller fraction of firms engage in 
foreign production and they are larger and more productive than exporters (Helpman, 
2006). The empirical work of Bernard and Jensen (1995) has shown that exporting and 
non-exporting firms co-exist in the same industry. Helpman et al. (2004) report that US 
exporters in 1996 had a 39 percent labour productivity advantage over non-exporters. As 
a result, firms make investment choices in response to their own characteristics and 
opportunities offered by foreign countries and industries. "Especially important is the 
finding that a systemic relationship exists between the characteristics of business firms 
and their participation in foreign trade and investment" (Helpman, 2006). 
Recently a new strand of literature pioneered by Melitz (2003) has incorporated firm 
heterogeneity into `new trade theory' in interaction with fixed costs of exporting. The 
heterogeneity of firms is mainly modelled with respect to firms' marginal costs 
(Baldwin, 2005; Helpman, 2006; Helpman et al., 2004; Jean, 2002; Melitz, 2003; 
Montagna, 2001). Schmitt and Yu (2001), on the other hand, model firm heterogeneity 
in respect to firm-specific fixed costs. Bernard et al. (2003) model firm heterogeneity 
using Bertrand competition instead of monopolistic competition. 
Bernard et al. (2007) investigate how country, industry and firm characteristics interact 
in general equilibrium to determine countries' responses to trade liberalisation. They not 
only allow for firm heterogeneity and relative growth of high-productivity firms within 
industries, but also incorporate comparative advantage as emphasised in neoclassical 
trade theory. In contrast to Melitz (2003), an additional industry and factor are 
introduced, which give rise to complex interactions. This framework simultaneously 
explains why some countries export more in certain industries than in others 
(endowment-driven comparative advantage), why nonetheless two-way trade is observed 
within industries (firm-level horizontal product differentiation combined with increasing 
returns to scale) and why, within industries engaged in these two forms of trade, some 
firms export and others do not (self-selection driven by trade costs). 
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The theoretical trade models discussed above analyse the extensiveness of the 
production: the choice among producing to serve only the home market; to serve the 
domestic market and export to the foreign market; or to serve the domestic market and to 
serve the foreign market through setting a subsidiary abroad. For example, Helpman et 
al. (2004) focus on firms' choice between exports and horizontal FDI. The results can be 
summarized that the least productive firms serve only the domestic market, while the 
relatively more productive firms also export and the most productive firms serve foreign 
market via locally established subsidiary. Firms that engage in international activities 
have greater probability of survival, as they have positive performance characteristics, 
for example, higher productivity, larger size, larger capital intensity, etc. 
The determinants of investment location choices of MNEs - where economic activity 
takes place - have been modelled in the so-called `New Economic Geography'. Having 
started with Krugman (1991), the New Economic Geography models mainly explain 
agglomeration of industries and workers. In neo-classical economics, which assumed 
constant returns to scale, activities would be evenly spread across the locations, 
therefore, there was no place for agglomeration economics. Location patterns were 
determined by transport and production costs, and, therefore, did not explain why 
regions with similar factors endowments may have different industrial structures (Barrell 
and Pain, 1999). 
The theory of New Economic Geography, on the other hand, emphasises the importance 
of the three-way interaction among increasing returns, transport costs and the movement 
of productive factors (Fujita et al., 2001). Firms choose to locate their investment, for 
example, where market access is good. Consequently, the consumers have in turn an 
incentive to co-locate with firms because the agglomeration of production bids up factor 
prices and lowers the price index through the savings on transport costs when living 
where the largest number of varieties are produced (Disdier and Mayer, 2004). The 
circular process of agglomeration emerges. `Cumulative causation' forces operate so that 
very small differences in initial conditions can translate into large differences in 
outcome, as initial advantage is reinforced by the actions of economic agents (Venables, 
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2005). Initial declines in the costs of market entry stimulate agglomeration, with 
industries exploiting economies of scale and choosing larger markets to locate their 
investment, however, further integration may cause dispersion of prices of immobile 
factors and goods, as prices at core locations rise and, therefore, outweigh the economies 
gained from agglomeration (Barrell and Pain, 1999). 
4.2. The Model 
In this model MNEs have already made a decision to serve the foreign market through 
an established subsidiary. Therefore, it is the choice to locate foreign subsidiaries among 
different investment locations that is modelled. This model is a theoretical 
rationalisation for the variables that explain investment location choices of MNEs and it 
is primarily designed to be empirically tractable. The decision where to invest does not 
only depend on opportunities offered by foreign markets and industries but also on 
firms' individual characteristics. The model makes three assumptions: firms are 
heterogeneous across industries in respect to productivity, industries vary in factor 
intensities and countries differ in relative factor abundance (but identical in terms of 
preferences and technologies). 
Each firm i produces a different product and the demand function for the firm's product 
in the foreign market c can be expressed as in Helpman (2006): 
qºý = (4.1) 
where q« is the quantity produced by firm i in the host country c and p; ', is the price, D, 
is a measure of the demand level in the host country c, and ý" = 1/(1-co) is the demand 
elasticity and a. is a mark-up. The demand elasticity is assumed to be constant (C >1, as 
0<cv<1). Producers are assumed to be small relative to the industry; as a result, D, is 
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treated as exogenous by producers. Therefore, total revenue for firm i from selling qlc at 
price pi,, can be expressed as 
TR = p,, ý4iý = 
D, pis, 1-q (4.2) 
Firms that locate their capital abroad have productivity Of (0<0<1), therefore, the fine's 
variable costs per unit of output is a/0;, where a is the cost of resources. The firm that 
enters foreign country c also incurs fixed costs afc, where f' is a measure of fixed 
production costs in terms of resources. Then the profit-maximising price for firm i is 
p1sc=aAo0j, where co is a mark-up. Fixed foreign market entry costs are the same for all 
firms, while variable costs vary with firm's productivity. The assumption that fixed costs 
of production are independent of productivity is discussed in Bernard et al. (2007), as 
many fixed costs such as costs of building or equipping a factory with machinery are 
unlikely to vary substantially with firm productivity. The presence of fixed production 
cost implies that, in equilibrium, each firm chooses to produce a unique variety (Bernard 
et al., 2007). 
Firms are assumed to use three factors of production: skilled labour, unskilled labour 
and capital. It is assumed that skilled labour and capital are allocated to fixed costs 
(reflecting costs of R&D and costs of factories and equipment), while unskilled labour 
are allocated to variable costs (capturing standard production). The relative intensity of 
factor use varies across industries (therefore, a and ß will also vary across industries). 
The minimum total costs can be specified as: 19 
= 
(w: (rc 9 ()'-a-ß fc 
(WIUC 
q1, 
er (4.3) 
19 This is a standard formulation following Krugman (1991), where the total minimum cost is derived 
from a standard cost minimization problem assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
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where wCSs is an hourly wage rate of skilled labour in country c and industry s; w, s" is an 
hourly wage rate of unskilled labour in country c and industry s, rc is a return on capital 
in country c and the a and ß parameters are the shares of skilled labour and capital in 
total cost respectively. The first term on the right hand side of (4.3) represents the fixed 
costs, so a firm that locates its capital in country c incurs fixed cost fc, of acquiring 
information about foreign markets, developing appropriate marketing strategies, 
building distribution networks (Bernard et al., 2007), also acquiring factories and 
equipment. MNEs use foreign capital in the form of foreign direct investment and host 
country skilled and unskilled labour, L3 and L. respectively. 
The labour market equilibrium requires equating labour supply, which is exogenous 
(Lý ), with the total demand for skilled (La) and unskilled (L, ") labour: 
Lý = Lý + Lu (4.4) 
The price of firm's i output can be written as constant mark-up over marginal cost: 
1a Q 
_ cd 
(w: 
c (4.5) 
Coo; 
"Iceberg" type transport costs zcd, are assumed between the source country d and host 
country c (Samuelson, 1954). For example, when goods are shipped from country d to 
country c, only a fraction 1/rdcof the original unit is assumed to arrive (rCd > 1). Hence, 
other things being equal, the more remote locations are at a disadvantage. 
The after-tax profit in each location is defined as total revenue (TR) less total costs (TC) 
net of tax and less the costs arising from the institutional, legal, political and 
macroeconomic environment prevalent in the host country. It can be written as: 
7rLC =(1-TT)(TR, 3 -TC 
J -G, (4.6) 
103 
where T, is the tax rate in location c, so that total profits are defined to be net of tax and 
GG is a term that captures the costs that firms incur due to the macroeconomic 
investment environment prevalent in the host countries. TRcs is the revenue received by 
firm i in country c and industry s from selling output qjc, and TC,, s are the costs of 
producing qic. 
Substituting (4.2) and (4.3) into (4.6) we obtain: 
(W. 
5 
)1_a_ß 
ITisc = 
(1- Tc DcPº - 
(w ca rßfý - Sc R'« - Gc Oi; 
Substituting (4.5) into p; sc and (4.1) into q; , gives 
I-s 1-a_ß 
u 1-a-Q 1-a-/ý 
S 
disc = 
(i 
- 
TC D,, 
Zcd 
(14" 
- 
(wja 
rRf 
c -Dc 
wsc Tcd 
(W,, 
U, 
-G 
w9; 0, w9, 
(4.8) 
Final rearrangements give 
1-a- 6 1-S Cu 
gist = (1- 7'c 1- 
CO) 
DC Tcd wsc - 
(w: 
c 1 
(rc ) fc Gc (4.9) Zcd O)ei 
Differences in firm productivity O allow firms' heterogeneity to be modelled with 
respect to fines' marginal costs. More productive firms are usually larger and more 
profitable (Helpman et al., 2004). For a given set of prices, the attributes of the n;.,., 
matrix of FDI determinants can be summarised as follows: 
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visa = Z(Tc, tcd' re, De, Ge, wac) (4.10) 
where TT is the tax rate in the host country, rd is the distance between investing and 
investment receiving countries, rr is the cost of capital in the host country, D, is the 
market size in the investment receiving country, G, is the risk associated with the host 
country and, finally, %, is the wage rate in the host country. 
This specification of the profit function of investment abroad allows for the 
heterogeneity of firms in different sectors and countries. Equation (4.9) has country. 
specific effects in respect to T, D, r, w, r and G but they also vary across firms with 
respect to B and across industries with respect to a and Q. Therefore, it is assumed that 
particular location advantages do not have the same value for all multinational 
enterprises, as firms investing in different sectors and firms of different productivity and, 
therefore, different size and profitability benefit from local resources to different 
degrees. Location advantages vary for MNEs with different characteristics, and the 
interaction between location and firm together with industry attributes, rather than each 
of the firm and industry factors independently affects location choices. 
MNEs choose to locate their foreign capital in country c where their expected profits are 
maximised, compared to all other locations: 
Pr(2r; 
sc > 7rL7) (4.11) 
where g is defined as other alternative locations. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE THREE-LEVEL DATASET AND THE VARIABLE SPECIFICATION 
As firms make investment location choices in response to their own characteristics as 
well as opportunities offered by foreign countries and industries, factors at all three 
levels are of importance if robust estimates are to be achieved. In order to overcome the 
limitations of the previous empirical literature on the determinants of FDI that has failed 
to take into account the investing firms characteristics in modelling foreign firms' 
investment location decisions, a novel three-level dataset is constructed. It incorporates 
three level explanatory variables and allows firm-, industry- and country-level factors to 
simultaneously determine the firm-level investment location decision. 
5.1. The Data Set 
There are 1,108 firm-level data observations on FDI flows from firms of 20 market 
economies (EU15 countries, USA, Japan, Russia, Norway and Switzerland) to the firms 
in 13 transition economies (12 new EU member states (except for Malta and Cyprus) 
plus Croatia, Russia and Ukraine) from 1997 to 2007. The firm-level data comes from 
Zephyr dataset at Bureau van Dijk20. 
Most of the empirical literature on FDI focuses on greenfield investment, excluding 
other entry modes such as mergers and acquisitions (M&A), joint ventures and 
institutional buy-outs (brownfield investment). Such focus on greenfield investment, 
however, does not apply to the majority of FDI for countries in CEE. For example, in 
20 Zephyr is a dataset containing mergers and acquisitions, initial public offerings , private equity and 
venture capital deals with links to detailed financial company information. It is the combination of high 
quality M&A data provided by Zephus, and value adding software from Bureau van Dijk Electronic 
Publishing (BvDEP). 
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2005 the share of cross-border M&As in FDI was about 96 percent in Czech Republic, 
84 percent in Estonia, 82 percent in Ukraine and 68 percent in Bulgaria (UNCTAD 
statistics). It is difficult to estimate precisely what share of FDI flows is accounted für by 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) because the values of cross-border M&As 
cannot be directly compared with FDI flows registered in the balance of payments21. In 
order to test for the location determinants of Brownfield investment, and to see to what 
extent they conform to the predictions of existing theories, which are typically based on 
greenfield investment, the MNEs in the sample enter a foreign market via Brownfield 
investment (M&A, joint ventures, institutional buy-outs, etc. ). 
Figure 5.1. The distribution of foreign capital allocations among 13 CEECs 
Of all 13 host CEECs in the sample, Poland has been chosen the largest share of* times 
by MNEs to locate their investment (about 21 percent) and it was followed by Russia 
2' More specifically, first, the values of cross-border M&As include funds raised in local and international 
financial markets, while FDI data do not. Second, FDI data are reported on a net basis using balance-of'- 
payment concept, while data on cross-border M&A purchases report only the total value of purchases 
abroad and do not subtract the amounts received from the sales of foreign affiliates. Finally, payments of 
cross-border M&As are not necessarily made in a single year, but can be phased over several years. As a 
result, calculating the value of cross-border as a percentage of FDI inflows in a given year may be 
misleading (UNCTAD, 2000). 
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with approximately 17 percent of foreign investment location choices. Slovenia and 
Latvia, on the other hand, have received the smallest share foreign capital allocations 
(approximately 2 and 3 percent respectively) (Figure 5.1). The two major investors in 
CEE in the sample are Finland and the UK with the shares of approximately 12 and II 
percent respectively. MNEs from Japan and Ireland were at the other end of' the scale 
regarding investment location choices in CEE (approximately 1 percent each) (Figure 
5.2). 
The number of foreign capital allocations from each source country to each host country 
are presented in Table 5.1. The largest shares of bilateral foreign capital allocations took 
place from France to Poland (with 40 foreign capital allocations), from UK to Russia 
(with 37 foreign capital allocations) and from US to Poland (with 32 foreign capital 
allocations). Japan, on the other hand, has invested in only tour countries in the sample, 
namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia, with 9 Foreign capital 
allocations in total. 
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Figure 5.1. The distribution of foreiin capital allocations among investinz countries 
Table 5.1. The number of bilateral foreign capital allocations between investing 
and investment receiving countries 
BG CZ EE CR HU LT LV PL RO RU SI SK UA Total 
Austria 5 5 0 7 18 0 0 10 10 1 5 5 1 67 
Belgium 0 4 0 1 3 0 0 6 3 7 3 4 0 31 
Denmark 2 3 1 0 1 8 4 15 2 0 1 0 0 37 
Germany 4 20 3 6 12 1 1 11 14 7 3 6 0 88 
Finland 0 5 32 5 0 23 10 21 2 24 0 2 7 131 
France 2 6 1 2 11 1 2 40 9 13 4 2 8 101 
Greece 19 0 0 1 7 0 0 0 19 1 0 0 4 51 
Ireland 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 1 3 13 
Italy 1 2 0 0 4 0 0 8 7 7 1 1 0 31 
Japan 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 5 0 0 0 9 
Luxembourg 3 4 0 4 0 0 0 9 0 1 0 0 0 21 
Netherlands 3 13 0 3 3 0 0 18 5 17 0 6 3 71 
Norway 0 5 4 0 1 3 2 2 1 10 0 1 2 31 
Russia 0 7 1 0 2 4 5 1 3 0 0 0 30 53 
Spain 2 7 2 1 1 0 0 7 6 6 0 0 0 32 
Switzerland 0 4 0 1 4 0 0 2 3 9 3 0 0 26 
Sweden 3 4 14 2 1 16 7 13 0 24 2 0 2 88 
UK 5 15 2 2 19 0 1 23 8 37 1 6 3 122 
US 3 15 0 0 13 1 0 32 12 20 3 3 3 105 
Total 53 122 60 35 101 57 32 223 104 192 26 37 66 1108 
The largest proportion of foreign capital allocation in CEE took place in traditional 
sectors (approximately 36 percent), followed by scale-intensive industries (about 24 
percent) and service sectors (nearly 23 percent). Science-based industries have received 
the smallest share of FDI (approximately 18 percent) in the sample (Figure 5.3). 
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Figure 5.2. The distribution of foreign capital allocations among four groups of 
sectors 
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Scale-intensive sectors include typical oligopolistic, large firm industries, with high capital intensity, 
extensive economies of scale and learning, high technical and managerial complexity, for example, 
automobiles, aircrafts, chemicals, petrol and coal products, shipbuilding, industrial chemicals, drugs and 
medicines, petrol refineries, non-ferrous metals and railroad equipment. 
Science-based sectors are characterised by innovative activities directly linked to high R&l) expenditures, 
for example, fine chemicals, electronic components, telecommunications, and aerospace. 
Traditional (supplier-dominated) sectors include such industries as textiles, clothing, furniture, leather and 
shoes, ceramics, and the simplest metal products. 
Banking, insurance and retail are examples of service sectors. 
However, when looking at the distribution of investment location choices among the 
four groups of industries in separate countries, truditioilul sectors have not necessarily 
attracted most foreign capital allocations. For example, in the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Slovakia scale-intensive industries have received the largest share of 11)1 
(approximately 30 percent, 26 percent and 47 percent respectively), while in Estonia and 
Lithuania service sector has attracted most foreign capital allocations (about 35 percent 
and 33 percent respectively) (Figure 5.4). The rest of the CEECs in the sample have the 
biggest share of foreign investment allocations in traditional sectors. 
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Figure 5.3. The distribution of foreign capital allocations among four groups of 
industries and investment receiving countries 
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The investing firms in the sample can be divided into four groups in respect to their size: 
small (up to EUR100,000 turnover), medium (from EURI00,000 to FUR Imin turnover), 
large (from EUR1m1n to EUR10min turnover) and very large firms (above FURI0min 
turnover). The largest proportion (49 percent) of very large firms in the sample have 
invested in scale-intensive industries, while service, traditional and science-based 
industries received approximately 20 percent, 18 percent and 12 percent of investment 
respectively by very large firms in the sample (Figure 5.5). Medium and large firms in 
the sample have selected traditional sectors to locate most of their investment 
(approximately 41 percent and 43 percent respectively). The second largest share of' 
investment allocations by large investing firms has taken place in scale-intclisr%'e sectors 
(about 22 percent) and by medium firms in service sectors (approximately 26 percent). 
Small investing MNEs have chosen traditional sector to locate the largest shale of their 
investment (about 33 percent), while service sector and science-huscd intlustrics 
received about 26 percent and 21 percent of foreign capital allocations respectively. 
Scale-intensive industries have received the smallest amount (approximately 2() percent) 
of foreign capital allocations by small firms in the sample. 
Investing firms in the sample can divided into three groups in respect to their 
profitability (proxied by earnings before interest and tax): firms that incur loss, firms 
that earn profit up to EUR50,000 and finns that earn profit of more than EUR50,000. 
Regardless of the investing firms' profitability traditional sectors received most 
investment allocations: approximately 37 percent in the case of' firms that incurred loss, 
about 39 percent in the case of firms that earned profit of up to EUR50,000 and about 36 
percent in the case of firms that earned profit of more than EUR50,000. 
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Figure 5.4. The investment allocations among sectors by firms of different size 
5.2. Variable Specification 
Appendix 5.1 gives a summary of variable definitions and sources. The country-specific 
determinants of FDI into the CEECs can be loosely divided into the traditional 
determinants and the transition-specific determinants. The transition-specific 
determinants are proxied by the risk associated with each host country, G,.. The 
institutional, legal and political environment, for example, transparency and 
effectiveness of legal system, are important for the decision of foreign investors to locate 
their capital abroad. The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index ("l'ICP) 
is used as a measure of the extent of corrupt practices in the host country. ']'his index 
pools information from ten different surveys of business executives, risk analysis and the 
general public. The TICP index ranks countries in terms of the degree to which 
corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians and it varies from 
I (high corruption) to 10 (no corruption). In order to make the interpretation of' the 
parameter more intuitive the TICP index is multiplied by minus one, so that the higher 
the number the higher the risk. 
113 
Figure 5. ä. The investment allocations among sectors by firms of different 
nrofiitability' 
The traditional determinants are the market size of the host country, Dc, the rate of return 
in the host country, r, distance between investing and investment receiving countries, 
zcd, and tax rates T, in the host country. As Appendix 5.1 shows, market size is simply 
the real GDP of the host country and the rate of return is measured as the real discount 
(interest) rate. Bevan and Estrin (2004) note that distance can be considered as a 
measure of the transaction costs of undertaking foreign activities, such as the costs of 
transport and communications, the costs of dealing with cultural and language 
differences, the costs of sending personnel abroad, and the informational costs of 
institutional and legal factors, e. g., local property rights, regulations and tax systems. 
These kinds of costs are assumed to increase with distance. Distance between the source 
and host country capitals are measured in kilometres. 
Corporate income taxes in host countries affect the profitability of foreign direct 
investment and hence influence the location choices of MNEs. Tax systems are 
extremely complex and any approach that tries to capture them is subject to a significant 
measurement error. The tax burden can be influenced by depreciation schemes, tax 
credits and the treatment of debt, among other factors. For example, in some countries 
companies may be allowed to accelerate depreciation; taxes can be reduced or subsidies 
can be introduced for some kinds of investment; and some countries allow companies to 
subtract interest on debt from taxable income. As a result, the tax burden can be 
reduced. Furthermore, firms can shift revenue and expenses across countries, for 
example, by issuing debt in high-tax countries and collecting royalties in low-tax 
countries, which reduces the tax burden even further (Backus et al., 2008). 
The studies that include corporate income tax rates as factors explaining investment 
location choices in CEECs usually use statutory corporate income tax rates, but these 
rates are not an appropriate indicator of the tax burden especially in the case of FDI, as 
the statutory rate is only one of the determinants of total tax burden (Bellak and 
Leibrecht, 2005; Carstensen and Toubal, 2004; Clausing and Dorobantu, 2005; Wei, 
2000). Effective corporate income tax rates, on the other hand, allow accounting for 
such factors as depreciation allowances, the source of finance, etc. The measurement of 
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the effective corporate income taxes can be based either on the analysis of the tax 
legislation (effective average and marginal tax rates) or on tax revenues (Devereux et al., 
2002). 
The effective marginal tax rates show the impact of taxes at the margin- that is on the 
cost of capital (Devereux et al., 2002). The impact of corporate income taxes on the 
level of capital is measured through the cost of capital, which is defined as the pre-tax 
real required rate of return on an investment project. The firm will invest up to the point 
at which marginal product of capital is equal to the cost of capital. The marginal product 
of capital is assumed to decline as investment increases, resulting a unique profit- 
maximising level of investment. As a result, the effective marginal tax rate measures the 
extent to which the tax raises the cost of capital. For marginal investment when 
economic profit is zero, effective average and marginal tax rates are equal. The effective 
average tax rate depends on the proportion of total profit taken in tax, and it does not 
only depend on the tax rate but also on the tax base. As a result, even if tax rates fall in 
some countries, the tax base may broaden at the same time, resulting in either an 
increased or decreased effective average tax rate. 
The disadvantages of effective average and marginal tax rates are that they are defined 
for a particular project22. It is also assumed that current tax rates will hold indefinitely, 
which is not always true in reality. Furthermore, effective marginal and average tax rates 
do not take into account fines that incur losses, which are carried forward to offset 
future taxable profits (Devereux et al., 2002). After having incurred a loss, extra revenue 
is not taxed immediately, but only when a firm returns to a taxpaying position. All those 
factors are taken into account when using a measurement of effective corporate income 
taxes based on tax revenues. 
22 For example, calculations of the effective marginal and average tax rates in Devereux, et. al. (2002) are 
based on the assumtion that investment in plant and machinery is financed by equity. The real post-tax 
required rate of return is fixed at 10 percent and the economic depreciation rate for each asset at 12.25 
percent for plant and machinery and 3.61 percent for industrial biuldings. 
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Furthermore, the effect of taxation on FDI will also depend on the focus of the research. 
The effect of different measures of taxes depend on the decision the firm is making 
(Devereux et al., 2002). A firm may face three choices. The first choice is whether to 
produce at home and export, or whether to produce abroad. Conditional on locating the 
production abroad the firm has a choice between alternative locations of production. 
Conditional on deciding where to locate the firm decides the scale of investment. The 
first two decisions are discrete. According to Devereux et al. (2002), for the third stage, 
it is the impact of effective marginal tax rates on the cost of capital- that is relevant. The 
impact of taxes on discrete decisions of firms is not captured by the effective marginal 
tax rate. Instead, it depends on the proportion of total profit taken in tax. As a result, the 
effective corporate income tax rate based on tax revenues is a more appropriate measure 
of tax burden than the effective average or marginal tax rates in explaining investment 
location choices of MNEs. 
The effective tax rate based on tax revenues for aggregate data was developed by 
Mendoza et al. (1994), and it is expressed as a ratio between the tax payment and profit 
or tax base. This method takes into account the overall tax burden and produces 
measures of tax rates that are consistent with the concept of aggregate tax rates at the 
national level. Taking into account taxes actually paid, gives a more realistic picture of 
the tax burden (Backus et al., 2008). However, it is a backward measure of the tax 
burden, which is based on historical data. Second, it is difficult to find an appropriate 
measure for the tax base, as often used proxy of the tax base - GDP - includes the 
income of noncorporate business which is not part of the corporate tax base. As a result, 
tax rates are likely to be higher in reality, as the actual tax base is smaller than GDP. In 
the thesis, the tax burden in the 13 CEECs is calculated by dividing tax revenues paid by 
corporations and other enterprises by a host country's GDP. 
In addition to the above discussed investment location factors, three other country- 
specific factors are included in the empirical model: the national rate of unemployment 
and two dummy variables, one for European Union membership (EUD) and another for 
a common border (CBD) between the investing and the investment receiving country. A 
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dummy variable for common border between the source and the host country is 
included, as it is expected that the host country is more likely to be chosen to locate 
investment if it shares the border with the source country. Usually neighbouring 
countries have similar culture and language and stronger historical ties, and, therefore, 
transaction costs associated with investment in a country with more familiar 
environment are smaller. 
Countries that joined the EU by January 2007 had to satisfy the economic (market 
economy), political (democracy and human rights) and administrative (well-functioning 
institutions) criteria set at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993. The accession of a 
CEEC into the EU meant free trade with EU member states and the adoption of Western 
business and legal environment, which provided foreign investors with confidence in 
success of each country's reforms. As a result, the parameter of the EU dummy variable 
is expected to have a positive sign. 
Although, unemployment may not be important for the individual firm's profit function, 
it may still be of significance at the country level as an indicator of labour market 
flexibility and availability of labour force. Countries with high local demand for goods 
and services and high labour market flexibility are likely to face relatively low rates of 
unemployment, which may encourage firms to invest in those countries. On the other 
hand, a high unemployment rate may mean that although it is easy to recruit labour, 
there is low demand locally and labour market rigidities. As a result, the impact of 
unemployment on the investment location decisions by MNEs is therefore strictly 
ambiguous. It is expected that unemployment will have a different effect on firms 
investing in different sectors. For example, firms investing in traditional sectors are 
expected to be more concerned about the availability of unskilled labour as compared to 
firms that invest in science-based industries. 
Industry-level real wage rates, w,,, are included in the model as a proxy for the average 
costs of firms and it is implicitly assumed that workers are not fully mobile across 
sectors, at least in the short run. The profitability of the firm investing abroad is expected 
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to be higher if the labour costs are lower in the chosen country than in the rest of the 
destination countries, which is why the coefficient on labour costs is expected to have a 
negative sign. 
The data on industry level wages come from the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO). They are measured in EUR per hour or month. If the wage rates are given on a 
monthly basis, they are divided by the average amount of hours worked per month, 
which is also given by the ILO. However, if the amount of hours worked per month is 
not given, the monthly wages are divided by 4.4 (weeks per months) and 40 (average 
amount of hours worked per week). Instead of providing the average wage rate in each 
industry, the ILO provides data on wages for different positions in different industries. 
As a result, wages are averaged over different position to get the average wage rate in 
the industry. Finally, some industries are defined in a different ways in the ILO and 
Zephyr databases, as the Zephyr database uses a combination of US SIC and NACE 
codes. As a result, the industry matching is conducted in Table 5.2. 
Incomplete data on wages rates is provided by the ILO for Ukraine, as the data for some 
industries (manufacture of electronic equipment, machinery and supplies; manufacture 
of machinery; printing, publishing and allied industries; and banks and insurance) are 
missing. The wages in those industries for which data exist are compared to the wages in 
respective industries in other countries. A similar trend exists between wages in Poland 
and Ukraine. Although, the margins between wage rates in Ukraine and Poland vary in 
different years, it is more or less constant across industries. As a result, these margins 
are applied to calculate wages in Ukraine in the industries with missing data. 
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Table 5.2. The match of industries in ILU and 
ILO Classification 
Coalmining; other mining and quarrying 
Crude petroleum and natural gas production; 
petroleum refineries 
Slaughtering, preparing and preserving meat; 
manufacture of dairy products; Grain mill 
products; Manufacture of bakery products 
Spinning, weaving and finishing textiles; 
manufacture of wearing apparel (except 
footwear); manufacture of footwear 
Sawmills, planning and other wood mills; 
manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard 
Manufacture of wooden furniture and fixtures 
Printing, publishing and allied industries 
Manufacture of industrial chemicals; 
manufacture of other chemical products 
Iron and steel basic industries 
Manufacture of metal products (except 
machinery and equipment) 
Manufacture of machinery (except electrical) 
Manufacture of electronic equipment, machinery 
and supplies 
Electric light and power 
Construction 
Retail trade (grocery) 
Restaurants and hotels; air transport; supporting 
services to air transport 
aatasets 
Zephyr Classification 
Mining (coal, diamonds and gemstones, general mining, 
gold mining, platinum and precious metals) 
Oil and gas producers; oil equipment, services and 
distribution 
Food and beverages (brewers; distillers and vintners; soft 
drinks; farming and fishing; food products); tobacco 
Personal goods (clothing and accessories; footwear; 
personal products) 
Forestry and paper 
Household goods (durable household goods; nondurable 
household products; furnishings) 
Media (broadcasting and entertainment; media agencies; 
publishing) 
Chemicals (commodity chemicals and specialty chemicals) 
Industrial metals (aluminium, nonferrous metals and steel) 
Containers and packaging; diversified industries 
Industrial engineering (commercial vehicles and trucks; 
industrial machinery); automobiles and parts 
Electronic and electrical equipment (electrical components 
and equipment; electronic equipment); leisure goods ( 
consumer electronics; recreational products and personal 
products); telecommunications (telecommunications; fixed 
line telecommunications; mobile telecommunications); 
technology (software and computer services; technology 
hardware and equipment) 
Utilities (Electricity; gas, water and multiutilities) 
Construction and materials (building materials and 
fixtures; heavy construction) 
Retail ( Food and drug retailers; general retailers) 
Travel and leisure (airlines; gambling; hotels; recreational 
services; restaurants and bars; travel and tourism) 
Railway transport; freight transport by road; Industrial transportation (Delivery services; marine 
maritime transport; supporting services to transportation; railroads; transportation services; trucking) 
maritime transport 
Financials (banks; insurance); financial services (real Banks; insurance 
estates; general financials; investment instruments) 
Medical and dental services 
Healthcare (healthcare equipment and services; 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology) 
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The ILO does not report the data on wages in the industry of manufacture of machinery 
in Estonia, and the missing values are replaced with the data on wages in the industry of 
manufacture of metal products, as the wages in the two industries are very similar in 
other countries in the sample. The ILO does not report the data on wages in two 
industries (iron and steel basic industries; and coalmining and other mining and 
quarrying) in Croatia. The wages in the former are replaced with the wages in the 
industry of manufacture of metal products; and the wages in the latter are replaced with 
the wages in the industry of crude petroleum and natural gas production and petroleum 
refineries. 
The country-level factors discussed above may have a different effect on firms investing 
in different sectors. For example, firms investing in science-based industries are 
expected to employ more skilled labour and pay higher wages, which would reflect skill 
premium. On the other hand, firms locating investment in traditional sectors may be 
more concerned about the availability of unskilled labour and may choose host countries 
with higher unemployment rates as investment locations. As a result, foreign firms 
investing in traditional sectors are expected to be more sensitive to higher wages but less 
sensitive to higher unemployment in host countries, as compared to firm that invest in 
science-based industries. 
Four main groups of industries are analysed: scale-intensive (Scale), science-based 
(Science), service (Service) and traditional sectors (Tradit). Scale-intensive sectors 
include typical oligopolistic, large firm industries, with high capital intensity, extensive 
economies of scale and learning, high technical and managerial complexity, for 
example, automobiles, aircrafts, chemicals, petrol and coal products, shipbuilding, 
industrial chemicals, drugs and medicines, petrol refineries, non-ferrous metals and 
railroad equipment (Midelfart-Knarvik et al., 2000). Science-based sectors, on the other 
hand, are characterised by innovative activities directly linked to high R&D 
expenditures, for example, fine chemicals, electronic components, telecommunications, 
and aerospace (Midelfart-Knarvik et al., 2000). Traditional (supplier-dominated) sectors 
include such industries as textiles, clothing, furniture, leather and shoes, ceramics, and 
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the simplest metal products. Finally, banking, insurance and retail are examples of 
service sectors. 
Firms make investment location choices in response to opportunities offered by foreign 
countries and industries as well as their own characteristics. The characteristics of 
individual investing firms can also have an influence on the responsiveness of country- 
level variables. The firm-level variables include the turnover of the investing firm as a 
proxy for its size (s, ) and earnings before interest and tax as a proxy for its profitability 
(e, ). Firms of different sizes and profitability possess different resources and capabilities 
(Dean et al., 1998). Small firms are characterised by speed, flexibility and niche-filling 
capabilities due to their structural simplicity and faster decision making, entrepreneurial- 
orientation and less risk aversion (Woo, 1987). As a result, smaller firms respond 
quicker to the dynamics of the industry environment. Larger firms, which are usually 
more profitable, are able to acquire larger market share by exploiting scale economies, 
bargaining power, patents, reputation and financial resources (Dean et al., 1998). The 
degree of internationalisation is largely determined by the size of the firm, since larger 
firms tend to be more profitable and productive and higher productivity increases the 
probability of setting up a foreign affiliate (Buch et al., 2005). 
Larger firms, characterised by higher economies of scale, are expected to invest in 
countries with larger markets in order to exploit those economies. More profitable firms, 
on the other hand, are expected to be less discouraged to invest in remote countries, as 
more funds are available to cover transaction costs, such as costs of transport and 
communication, the costs of dealing with cultural and linguistic differences, information 
costs of institutional and legal factors, etc. As a result, country-specific factors are 
expected to have different value to firms of different characteristics. 
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5.3. Appendices 
Appendix 5.1 List of variables, definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Choice, a CEEC, in which firm n chooses to locate its Bureau van Dijk Zephyr 
investment over the period of time from 1997 to database 
2007 (it gets the value of 1 if the country 
received investment and 0 otherwise) 
Distance distance between the capital cities of the source http: //www. indo. com/distance/ 
country d and the host country c in kilometres 
GDPc Real GDP of the host country c of the year IFS 
investment took place 
Risks Corruption perception index of the host country c Transparency International 
of the year investment took place 
Unemplc unemployment rate of country c (percentage per IFS 
annum) of the year investment took place 
Tax, effective corporate income tax rate in country c Calculated using data from 
of the year investment took place IFS 
Bordered a dummy variable that takes a value 1 if both constructed 
source country d and host country c share a 
border, and 0 otherwise 
EU, dummy variable that takes value 1 if country c constructed 
joined EU before January 2007, and 0 otherwise 
rc return on capital (lending rate) in country c of the IFS 
year investment took place 
Scale, dummy variable that takes a value 1 if industry s constructed 
is a scale-scale industry, and 0 otherwise 
Science: dummy variable that takes a value 1 if industry s constructed 
is a science-based industry, and 0 otherwise 
Tradit, dummy variable that takes a value 1 if industry s constructed 
is a traditional industry, and 0 otherwise 
Service, dummy variable that takes a value 1 if industry s constructed 
is a service sector, and 0 otherwise 
Wage, hourly real wage rates in the industry s in the International Labour 
country c of the year investment took place Organisation 
Size. turnover of the investing firm i in Euros of the Bureau van Dijk Zephyr 
ear investment took place database 
Earnings. earnings before interest and taxes of the investing Bureau van Dijk Zephyr 
firm i in Euros of the year investment took place database 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL 
Multinational enterprises face three main choices while undertaking foreign activities. 
The first choice is whether to produce at home and export, or whether to produce at 
home and abroad. Conditional on locating the production abroad the firm has a choice 
between alternative locations of production. Conditional on deciding where to locate the 
firm decides the scale of investment. The first two decisions are discrete. Most of the 
existing empirical literature on FDI has analysed the last stage, where the determinants 
of the size of investment between different pairs of countries are modelled. The few 
studies that investigate where MNEs choose to invest rely either on Multinomial logit 
(MNL) or Nested logit (NL) models (Becker et al., 2005; Crozet et al., 2004; Disdier and 
Mayer, 2004; Head and Mayer, 2004). 
However, these models are subject to restrictive assumptions: the MNL model is subject 
to the assumptions of restrictive substitution patterns across alternatives and the absence 
of random taste heterogeneity across decision-makers, while the NL model only partially 
relaxes the assumption of independence from irrelevant alternatives23. As a result, in this 
thesis very flexible discrete choice models, namely the Mixed logit (ML) model and the 
Latent Class (LC) model, are applied for the first time to model the investment location 
choices of multinational corporations. For comparison reasons, the MNL and NL models 
are also applied to the constructed dataset. However, in contrast to the previous 
literature, which has used an intuitive partitioning of investment locations into nests in 
the NL model, the Heteroskedastic Extreme Value model is applied as a tool to reveal an 
appropriate nesting structure. 
23 The assumption of independence from irrelevant alternatives means the ratio of probabilities of any two 
alternatives in the choice set is independent of the presence or absence of other alternatives and their 
attributes. 
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The Multinomial logit (MNL) model used in spatial probability choice modelling is 
based on Carlton (1983) where firms simultaneously make decisions as to where to 
locate their capital and how many employees to hire, taking into account a close link 
between location and firm size. McFadden (1974) has further developed MNL analysis 
of population choice behaviour from the distribution of individual decision rules. It was 
assumed that all the utility maximizing economic consumers in a population have a 
common behaviour rule, except for purely random `optimisation' error. McFadden 
assumed that these "random errors" have a specific statistical distribution in the 
population. A few studies since then have researched investment location choices of 
foreign investors, mostly in manufacturing, using discrete choice methodology (Barrios 
et al., 2004; Basile et al., 2003; Becker et al., 2005; Bekes, 2004; Disdier and Mayer, 
2004; Guimaraes et al., 2000; Head et al., 1999). Although, an extensive empirical 
literature exists on how much MNEs invest in foreign countries, there is still lack of 
detailed analyses investigating where foreign firms choose to locate their capital. 
6.1. The Specification of the Multinomial Logit Model 
The MNL model selects the investment location (country or region) which maximises 
expected profits of MNEs. Therefore, the dependent variable is a Central and Eastern 
European country (CEEC), in which a multinational enterprise decides to locate its 
investments. The effects of country characteristics on an investment location choice are 
estimated, and host country characteristics vary across firms investing in different 
industries and across firms of different characteristics. A foreign firm, i, is faced with 
the choice of locating its investment in a particular Central and Eastern European 
country (CEEC), c, from a set of C CEECs, according to the expected level of profit 
(2ruc) to be earned in that location: 
Irilc = pisc + cup X6.1) 
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where zisc is a vector of country characteristics, which have been defined before in 
Chapter 4, namely Tc, zd, rc, D,, Gc and wsc 
24. They have different value for firm, i, 
investing in sector, s, and for firm, i, of different characteristics. ß' is a vector of 
parameters and Eu, is an error term. If the firm chooses country c it is assumed that irc,, 
is the maximum among the C alternative locations. Therefore the statistical model is 
driven by the probability that country c is chosen because 
P(7T 
j,, >. Iris) (6.2) 
Following McFadden (1974), the investor will choose country c provided the following 
condition holds for every g#c: 
Prob[ir (c)>7; 
ßg(5)]=Prob[ctsg <ýe +ßz, ý -ßzug)] (6.3) 
where g is any other location and g#c. Following McFadden (1974), if and only if the 
C country disturbances e; s are 
independent and identically distributed with a extreme 
value distribution, such that the density for each unobserved component of profit is 
f (e;,, ) = exp(- c. )exp[- exp(- c ,, 
J] (6.4) 
and the cumulative distribution is 
F(euc) = exp[- exp(- --,., c)] (6.5) 
where exp is the exponential function, then 
24 where TT is the tax rate in the host country, rd is the distance between investing and investment 
receiving countries, rr is the cost of capital in the host country, D, is the market size in the investment 
receiving country, GG is the risk associated with the host country and, finally, w3 is the wage rate in the 
host country. 
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Pr(Y = c) = 
exp(ß z, sc 
L exp(ß Zuc) 
(6.6) 
c=1 
is the probability of investment in country c, which is referred to as the MNL model. 
The MNL is subject to the assumption of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
(IIA), which means that the ratio of probabilities of any two alternatives in the choice set 
is independent of the presence or absence of other alternatives and their attributes. All 
alternatives in the choice set are equally similar or dissimilar. This assumption can be 
illustrated with a famous example often used in transport economics, referred to as red- 
bus-blue-bus problem. For example, a traveller has a choice of going to work by car or 
taking a blue bus. For simplicity it is assumed that the choice probabilities are equal: P, 
= Pbb = 1/2 , where c 
is car and bb is blue bus. In this case, the ratio of probabilities is 
one: PJPbb = 1. Assume a red bus is introduced and travellers consider the red bus to be 
exactly like the blue bus. The probability that the traveller will take the red bus is 
therefore the same as for the blue bus, so that the ratio of their probabilities is one: 
P, b/Pbb =1 and in the MNL model the ratio is the same whether or not another 
alternative exists. Therefore P, = Pbb = P, b = 1/3, which are the probabilities that the 
logit model predicts. In reality, however, we would expect the probability of taking a car 
to remain the same when a new bus is introduced that is exactly the same as the old bus 
and the original probability of taking the bus to be split between the two buses. That is, 
we would expect P, = 1/2 and Pbb= P, b = 1/4. In this case, the logit model, because of its 
IIA property, overestimates the probability of taking either of the buses and 
underestimates the probability of taking a car. The ratio of probabilities of car and blue 
bus, Po/Pbb, actually changes with the introduction of the red bus, rather than remaining 
constant as required by the logit model. 
Since the MNL probabilities have a closed form, the traditional maximum likelihood 
procedures can be applied to estimate the model. Assuming that each decision maker's 
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choice is independent of that of other decision makers, the probability of each decision 
maker in the sample is (Train, 2003) 
IC 
(6.7) 
i=1 c=1 
where ß is a parameter vector. 
However, difficulties may arise for more complex models while locating the point on the 
likelihood function, as the multiplication of very small values result even smaller ones, 
which can be difficult to detect by most of the software packages (Hensher et al., 2005). 
As a result, the log of the likelihood function is used instead of the likelihood function: 
IC 
LLGl3ý _ yi c 
In Pi 
c i=t c=1 
(6.8) 
Taking logs of added small values will produce negative log-likelihood values. At the 
maximum of the likelihood function, its derivative with respect to each of the parameters 
is zero (Train, 2002): 
dLL(ß) 
=0 dß (6.9) 
The maximum likelihood estimates are therefore the values of ß that satisfy this first- 
order condition. "In mathematical terms, the search for the maximum value of the 
likelihood function may be thought of a search along the likelihood function surface for 
a point at which the slope or gradient of that surface equals to zero" (Hensher et al., 
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2005). At this point, the first derivative of the function will be equal to zero, which is 
easy to locate in less complicated likelihood functions. McFadden (1974) shows that 
LL(ß) is globally concave for linear-in-parameter profit function. Following Train 
(2002), if utility is linear in parameters, using (6.6) and the formula for the 
logit 
probabilities, the first-order condition (6.9) becomes 
/C 
E (Yi 
c-P, ý, c 
X 
uc =0 (6.10) 
i_1 CA 
6.2. The Estimation results of the MNL model 
The MNL mode125 is applied to the constructed three-level dataset gradually combining 
all the three levels of variables. Specification 1 in Table 6.1 uses just one layer of data 
(country-level); specification 2 adds the variable that does not only vary among 
countries but also among industries; specification 3 augments the model with interaction 
terms between industry dummies and country-level variables; and finally, in 
specification 4, interaction terms between firm-level and country-level variables are 
added26. The estimated parameters in Table 6.1 are stable and statistically significant 
(except for the rr and TT) predominantly at one percent level. The preferred model in 
Table 6.1 is specification 4, which has the best goodness of fit statistics as shown in the 
last three rows at the bottom of the table. 
Specification 4 shows that the variables of the market size in the investment receiving 
country, D,, the distance between investing and investment receiving countries Td, the 
zs The model was estimated using Limdep 9 Nlogit 4 software. 
26 Since country-level variables do not vary among the decision-makers they cannot be identified 
separately from the alternative specific constants (ASCs). As a result, either country-level variables or 
ASCs have to be excluded. As the reason for estimating the model is to measure the effect of a change in a 
particular characteristic on the probability of choosing a particular alternative, ASCs are excluded and it is 
therefore assumed that all relevant characteristics are included in the model. This procedure of dropping 
the ASCs is common in environmental economics (see, for example, O'Hara, 2006). 
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dummy variables for EU membership and common border between the host and the 
source countries, the risk, G,, the wage rate, w,.,, and the unemployment rate, u,, in the 
host country are highly significant. Furthermore, the following interaction terms appear 
to be statistically significant: the interaction term between the dummy variable for 
traditional sectors and the unemployment rate in the host country, Tradit xu,; the 
interaction term between the dummy variable for traditional sectors and the wage rate in 
the host country, Tradit xws,; the interaction term between the dummy variable for 
traditional sectors and the dummy variable for EU membership, Tradit xEU; the 
interaction term between the profitability of an investing firm and the distance between 
investing and investment receiving countries, e; xrd; and, finally, the interaction term 
between the size of an investing firm and the size of the host country, sj xD,. 
Table 6.1. Estimation results of the Multinomial Lo&it model 
1 2 3 4 
Distance -0.8300* {-11.134} -0.8796* {-11.656} -0.8992* {-11.855} -0.9699* (-12.278) 
GDP 0.4333* (12.345) 0.4675* {13.363} 0.4723* (13.418) 0.4217* (11.589) 
Border 0.5576* {5.076} 0.5542* {5.103} 0.5456* {4.999} 0.5586* {5.111} 
EU 0.7506* (6.797) 0.7787* {7.051} 0.9158* {6.952} 0.9761* {7.265} 
Risk 0.4025* (8.496) 0.2882* {5.147} 0.2795* (4.964) 0,2894* {5.138} 
Unempl -3.7601* (-3.837) -2.1141* {-2.053} -4.7611* (-3.878) -4.9005* {-3.986} 
Return 0.2499 {0.261 } 
Tax -0.3639 -0.096 
Wage -0.1567* (-3.291) -0.1097* -2.274 -0.0940** -1.961 
Tradit_Unempl 7.9709* {4.598} 8.2278* (4.738) 
Tradit_Wage -0.2540* {-2.795} -0.2691* {-2.957} 
Tradit EU -0.3211** -1.852 -0.4121 * -2.357 
Prof Dist 0.1107* {2.785} 
Size GDP 0.1093* {4.586} 
Log-likelihood -2560.4290 -2554.5390 -2537.4370 -2512.9640 
Chi-squared 56.5078 68.2878 102.4918 151.3 778 
Pseudo R-s 0.0109 0.0132 0.0198 0.02 92 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Significant at 1 percent level ** Significant at 5 percent level 'Significant at 10 percent level 
Although, t-statistics indicate the statistical significance of the explanatory variables, the estimated 
coefficients do not have much explanatory power, as neither the sign nor the magnitude of the coefficients 
are informative. 
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Despite the widespread use of interaction terms in Discrete Choice Methodology, the 
majority of applied researchers misinterpret the coefficients of interaction terms. For 
example, Ai and Norton (2003) review 13 economic journals listed on JSTOR and find 
72 articles published between 1980 and 1999 that use interaction terms in nonlinear 
models, however, none of them (with only one exception (DeLeire, 2000)) interpreted 
the coefficients of interaction terms correctly. Unlike in linear models, the interaction 
effect in nonlinear models is a function of not only the coefficient for the interaction, but 
also the coefficients for each interacted variable and the values of all the variables in the 
model (Greene, 2008). Therefore, the sign of the interaction coefficient may not indicate 
the direction of the interaction effect, as the interaction effect may have different signs 
for different values of covariate. As a result, neither the magnitude nor the sign of the 
interaction term are informative. 
Furthermore, the interpretation of a separately included in the model variable if it is also 
a part of an interaction term changes (Jaccard, 2001). It does not represent a "main 
effect" but a conditional effect instead: the effect of the variable when the value of the 
moderator variable (the other interacted variable) is zero. For example, the variable, w,., 
is not only included in the model separately but also interacted with the dummy variable, 
Tradit. As a result, while the interaction, ws, xTradit, represents the effect of wages in 
traditional sectors in a particular host country on the probability of selecting the country 
to locate foreign capital, the variable, w,,, represents the effect of wages in other sectors 
(Science-based, Service and Scale-intensive sectors). As a result, in order to reveal the 
direction of the interaction terms and separate variables in the model further estimation 
of elasticities and marginal effects has to be conducted. 
There are two types of elasticities: direct elasticities and cross-elasticities. A direct 
elasticity measures the percentage change in the probability of choosing a particular 
alternative in the choice set with respect to a given percentage change in an attribute of 
that same alternative, while a cross-elasticity measures the percentage change in the 
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probability of choosing a particular alternative in the choice set with respect to a given 
percentage change in a the attribute of a competing alternative (Louviere et at., 2000) 27. 
There are two methods to calculate elasticities for each decision maker (investing firm): 
the arc elasticity method and the point elasticity method. How elasticity is measured will 
depend on the size of the change in the level of the attribute (Louviere et al., 2000). The 
calculations by the NLOGIT software are based on the point elasticity, which is useful 
for interpreting small changes in the level of an attribute. Direct point elasticity for the 
MNL model of the probability of choosing alternative c by decision maker i with respect 
to marginal (small) change in the nth attribute for the cth alternative28 is given by: 
aP . ý tcn E 
Pu 
= rc x xkI axicn Pin (6.11) 
(Louviere et al., 2000) derives direct point elasticity for the MNL for each observation 
EXic -PcnXicn(i-Pic) (6.12) 
and the cross-point elasticity 
P_D E'c 
--ßngXign1 g 6.13) 
Elasticities in (6.12) and (6.13) are calculated for each individual. There are three ways 
to aggregate elasticities: to use the average estimated PP (Pg) and sample average X,  
Z' The cross elasticities which measure the percentage change in the probability of choosing a particular 
alternative in the choice set with respect to a given percentage change in a competing alternative have no 
sensible interpretation in the case of the MNL model. 
28 The elasticity of any variable X with respect to another variable Y is (EX/X)I(DY/Y) which reduces 
((9 X/ ö Y)(Y/X) as AY becomes very small. 
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(Xe) for direct point (cross-point) elasticity; to calculate the elasticity for each 
individual decision maker and weight each elasticity with the decision maker's 
associated choice probability (probability weighted sample enumeration); or calculate 
the elasticity for each individual decision maker and average them without weighting 
(naive pooling). 
Probability weighted sample enumeration has been shown to be superior to the other two 
aggregation methods. For example, when a single observation has a very small estimated 
probability, the estimated elasticity of that observation will be very large, resulting in 
misspecification (Louviere et al., 2000). Weighting based on probabilities can alleviate 
this effect. Furthermore, Louviere et al. (2000) state that naive aggregation fails to 
recognize the contribution of each observation to the choice outcome of each alternative 
and advice using probability weighted sample enumeration (PWSE) to calculate 
elasticities for discrete choice models: 
I 
Pic EXP` 
i_1 rgý EX 
'g" I (6.14) 
Pic 
1=ý 
where 
P, 
- estimated choice probability; 
P- aggregate probability of choice of alternative c. 
The calculation of elasticities for dummy variables is meaningless, as only a 100 percent 
change in a dummy variable can be meaningfully interpreted. As a result, marginal 
effects should be calculated, allowing the change in probability given a unit change in a 
variable. Marginal effects can also be direct and cross-effects. Direct marginal effects 
represent the change in the choice probability for an alternative given a unit change in a 
variable related to that alternative, while cross-marginal effects represent the impact of 
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one unit change in a variable on choice probabilities of competing alternatives (Hensher 
et al., 2005). Instead of being expressed in percentage as elasticities, marginal effects are 
expressed as unit changes. 
The direct marginal effect for the MNL model can be written as: 
Mk= aIC vXicn (6.15) 
It can be seen from equation (6.11) that the difference between the elasticity and 
marginal effect formula is the second component in the elasticity formula, which 
translates a unit change into a percentage change. 
Direct marginal effects at the level of the individual decision maker are calculated as: 
MXkPk = 
. aXicn 
Ll 
- 
Pic Ifln 
(6.16) 
Then cross-marginal effects at the level of individual decision maker: 
P Ac-, 8Bn 1g (6.17) 
As with aggregate elasticities, aggregate marginal effects can be calculated using the 
average estimated P, (Pg) and sample average X,, (Xg) for direct point (cross-point) 
marginal effect; calculating the marginal effect for each individual decision maker and 
weighting each marginal effect with the decision maker's associated choice probability 
(probability weighted sample enumeration); or calculating the marginal effect for each 
individual decision maker and averaging them without weighting (naive pooling). With 
the same reasoning as for the calculation of aggregate elasticities, probability weighted 
sample enumeration is used to calculate aggregate marginal effects. 
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Table 6.2. Direct elasticities and marginal effects for the MNL model 
Country Unempl 
UTrnempL 
adit 
Sum Wage Wageý Tradit Sum Border 
Bulgaria -0.4496 0.3438 -0.1058 -0.0671 -0.0609 -0.1280 4.6662 
Czech Rep -0.3354 0.1772 -0.1582 -0.2308 -0.1496 -0.3804 6.1159 
Estonia -0.1414 0.0622 -0.0792 -0.1249 -0.0907 -0.2156 3.2947 
Croatia -0.5629 0.5057 -0.0572 -0.1667 -0.2089 -0.3756 2.3236 
Hungary -0.2772 0.1483 -0.1289 -0.1954 -0.1174 -0.3128 4.0787 
Lithuania -0.2870 0.1642 -0.1228 -0.1422 -0.1071 -0.2493 3.3153 
Latvia -0.3271 0.1855 -0.1416 -0.1302 -0.1086 -0.2388 4.2254 
Poland -0.5924 0.4335 -0.1589 -0.1923 -0.1856 -0.3779 8.5475 
Romania -0.2879 0.1806 -0.1073 -0.0505 -0.0370 -0.0875 4.6660 
Russia -0.2419 0.1725 -0.0694 -0.0385 -0.0358 -0.0743 9.3493 
Slovenia -0.3811 0.1542 -0.2269 -0.4063 -0.2158 -0.6221 2.2375 
Slovakia -0.5259 0.3709 -0.1550 -0.1727 -0.1685 -0.3412 4.3382 
Ukraine -0.3715 0.3107 -0.0608 . 0.0287 -0.0352 -0.0639 2.8873 
Country EU EU Tradit Sum Distance GDP Risk 
Bulgaria 8.1168 -3.4591 4.6577 -1.7099 0.0705 -1.0346 
Czech Rep 10.6384 -4.5337 6.1047 -1.2016 0.3129 -1.1031 
Estonia 5.7311 -2.4423 3.2888 -1.5290 0.0351 -1.6686 
Croatia 4.0418 -1.7224 2.3194 -1.5638 0.1036 -0.9778 
Hungary 7.0948 -3.0235 4.0713 -1.4595 0.2536 -1.3299 
Lithuania 5.7670 -2.4576 3.3094 -1.6425 0.0742 -1.2756 
Latvia 7.3500 -3.1323 4.2177 -1.5366 0.0395 -1.1073 
Poland 14.8683 -6.3362 8.5321 -1.2058 0.7090 -0.8425 
Romania 8.1164 -3.4589 4.6575 -1.8270 0.1170 -0.7891 
Russia 16.2631 -6.9306 9.3325 -1.5127 0.9733 -0.5062 
Slovenia 3.8921 -1.6586 2.2335 -1.3934 0.0890 -1.7030 
Slovakia 7.5462 -3.2159 4.3303 -1.3611 0.1144 -1.1153 
Ukraine 5.0224 -2.1403 2.8821 -1.8875 0.1614 -0.6803 
Elasticities are estimated for the continuous variables and marginal effects are estimated for the dummy 
variables. A direct elasticity measures the percentage change in the probability of choosing a particular 
alternative in the choice set with respect to a given percentage change in an attribute of that same 
alternative. Direct marginal effects represent the change in the choice probability for an alternative given a 
unit change in a variable related to that alternative 
Table 6.2 presents estimated elasticities for continuous variables and marginal effects for 
dummy variables using probability weighted averages. Negative estimated elasticities 
for the variable, w,,, indicate that the higher wage costs are in a host country, the less 
likely the country will be chosen by multinational enterprises to locate foreign capital if 
they choose to invest non-traditional sectors (Science-based industries, Service sectors 
and Scale-intensive industries). The effect of the wage rate on the probability of locating 
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investment in a particular country if a firm chooses to invest in traditional sectors is a 
sum of the estimated elasticities for ws, and ws, xTradit. The sums of the estimated 
elasticities are negative, but larger in absolute values as compared to the elasticities for 
the w, It implies that firms that choose to invest in traditional sectors are less likely to 
invest in countries with higher wages than firms that choose to invest in non-traditional 
sectors. 
The estimated negative elasticities for u, indicate that the higher the unemployment in 
the host country the less likely the host country will be chosen by foreign investors who 
choose to locate their capital in non-traditional sectors (Science-based, Service and 
Scale-intensive sectors). On the other hand, negative but smaller is absolute value or 
even positive sums of the elasticities of u, and Traditxu, indicate that higher 
unemployment in a host country have a less negative or even positive effect on the 
probability of selecting the country to locate foreign capital for firms that choose to 
invest in traditional sectors, as compared to the firms that invest in non-traditional 
sectors. Typically, traditional sectors employ more unskilled labour, as compared to 
other sectors, for example, science-based industries, which employ more skilled labour 
and pay higher wages that reflect a skill premium. 
The positive elasticities of the dummy variables of EU membership indicate that host 
countries, which joined the EU by January 2004, are more likely to be chosen by foreign 
investors if they choose to locate their capital in non-traditional sectors. On the other 
hand, smaller in absolute value sums of the elasticities of EU and Tradit xEU show that 
firms investing in traditional sectors are less concerned if a host country is a EU 
member, as compared to firms which choose to invest in non-traditional sectors. 
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Table 6.3. Simulation results for the MNL model 
Prof Unempl Prof Unempl Prof Unempl Prof Unnempl Country 1/0 10% 50% 100% 
Bulgaria -0.002 0 -0.017 -1 -0.078 0 -0.145 -1 
Czech Rep -0.003 0 -0.029 0 -0.139 -1 -0.264 -3 
Estonia 0.000 0 -0.005 0 -0.023 0 -0.045 -1 
Croatia -0.001 0 -0.011 0 -0.051 0 -0.095 -1 
Hungary -0.001 0 -0.015 -1 -0.071 -1 -0.137 -2 
Lithuania -0.001 0 -0.011 0 -0.054 0 -0.104 -1 
Latvia -0.001 0 -0.015 0 -0.074 -1 -0.141 -2 
Poland -0.009 0 -0.089 -1 -0.412 -5 -0.753 -8 
Romania -0.004 0 -0.018 0 -0.088 -1 -0.168 -2 
Russia -0.004 0 -0.055 0 -0.274 -3 -0.546 -6 
Slovenia 0.000 0 -0.007 0 -0.036 -1 -0.069 -1 
Slovakia -0.002 0 -0.021 0 -0.103 -1 -0.193 -2 
Ukraine -0.002 0 -0.034 -1 -0.060 -1 -0.114 -1 
Prof Dist Prof Dist Prof Dist Prof Dist Country 1/0 10% 50% 100% 
Bulgaria 0.006 0 0.040 1 0.436 5 1.200 14 
Czech Rep 0.005 0 0.055 1 0.542 6 1.246 14 
Estonia 0.003 0 0.033 0 0.296 3 1.085 12 
Croatia 0.002 0 0.017 0 0.152 2 0.818 9 
Hungary 0.004 0 0.046 0 0.485 5 1.197 13 
Lithuania 0.004 0 0.041 1 0.388 4 1.189 13 
Latvia 0.004 0 0.043 0 0.360 4 1.208 13 
Poland 0.011 0 0.121 1 0.949 10 1.623 18 
Romania 0.007 0 0.073 1 0.734 8 1.537 17 
Russia 0.022 0 0.216 3 0.986 11 1.855 21 
Slovenia 0.002 0 0.015 0 0.162 1 0.781 8 
Slovakia 0.003 0 0.033 1 0.292 4 1.046 12 
Ukraine 0.003 0 0.039 0 0.414 4 1.216 13 
GDP Size Size GDP Size GDP SIze GDP Country _ 1% _ 10% _ 50% _ 100% 
Bulgaria 0.000 0 0.003 0 0.018 1 0.037 1 
Czech Rep 0.003 0 0.040 1 0.210 2 0.449 5 
Estonia 0.000 0 0.002 0 0.008 0 0.015 0 
Croatia 0.000 0 0.003 0 0.015 0 0.031 0 
Hungary 0.002 0 0.020 0 0.102 1 0.215 2 
Lithuania 0.000 0 0.004 0 0.020 0 0.042 1 
Latvia 0.001 0 0.003 0 0.013 0 0.025 0 
Poland 0.0.16 0 0.162 2 0.916 10 2.079 23 
Romania 0.001 0 0.010 0 0.060 0 0.102 1 
Russia 0.028 0 0.283 3 1.397 16 2.732 30 
Slovenia 0.001 0 0.003 0 0.014 0 0.027 0 
Slovakia 0.001 0 0.008 0 0.037 1 0.074 1 
Ukraine 0.000 0 0.007 0 0.036 0 0.074 1 
The first column shows the change in the market shares of the host countries regarding foreign capital 
allocations due to 1,10,50 and 100 percent increase in the profitability and firm size variables. The 
second column shows the change in the number of firms investing in a particular country due to 1,10,50 
and 100 percent increase in the two variables. 
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When two continuous variables are interacted, for example, ei x rid and s, xD,, the 
interpretation of the interaction terms is much more complicated. As a result, the 
direction of the effect under investigation is revealed with the help of simulation. The 
change in market shares of different countries regarding foreign capital allocations and 
the change in the number of foreign firms investing in a particular country are 
investigated due to the gradual change in the moderator variable with the help of 
simulation. The results presented in Table 6.3 show the effect of 1,10,50 and 100 
percent increase in the variables e, and s; on the change in the market shares (the first 
column) and in the number of firms investing in a particular country (the second 
column). The estimated changes in market shares and in the number of investing firms 
show consistently positive and increasing effects for both interaction terms ej x zed and 
s, xDc. 
The results for e; x rd indicate that the further the host country from the source country, 
the more likely the host country to be chosen by more profitable investors to locate their 
capital as compared to less profitable investors. More profitable firms usually have more 
resources to cover transaction costs associated with investment in more remote 
countries, for example, cost of transport and communication, the costs of dealing with 
cultural and linguistic differences, the cost of sending personnel abroad, and information 
costs of institutional and legal factors. Negative elasticities for the variable rd (Table 
6.2) are not very informative, they indicate that the increase in distance between 
investing and investment receiving countries will have a negative effect on the 
probability of selecting the investment receiving country by multinational enterprises to 
locate their capital, when investing firms' profitability is equal to zero. 
The simulation results for si xD, indicate that the larger the host country, the more likely 
it is to be chosen by large investing firms to locate their capital. Larger firms are usually 
characterized by high economies of scale; therefore, they search for larger foreign 
markets to exploit these economies. Positive elasticities for the variables D, (Table 6.2) 
indicate that the larger the foreign market the more likely it is to be chosen by foreign 
investors to locate their capital when the size of those investors is equal to zero. 
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Statistically significant interaction terms between country-level variables and industry- 
level dummies together with the firm-level variables show that multinational enterprises 
investing in different sectors and firms of different size and profitability benefit from 
country-level factors to a different degree. 
Country-level variables that are not part of the interaction terms, for example GG and the 
dummy variable for common border between investing and investment receiving 
countries, represent the main effect. Positive elasticities of the dummy variable for 
common border (Table 6.2) indicate that a host country sharing a common border with a 
source country is more likely to be chosen by MNEs to locate their investment than a 
host country, which does not have a common border with the investing country. 
Neighbouring countries usually have stronger historical ties and less cultural and 
linguistic barriers. Negative elasticities for GG show that the higher is the risk in the host 
country, the less likely the country will by chosen by MNEs to locate their capital, as 
investors prefer host countries with sound institutional, legal and political environment. 
6.3. Model Fit and the Statistical Significance of the Interaction Terms 
The statistical tests of model fit for OLS regression, such us F-statistics, cannot be used 
in maximum likelihood estimation. The following formula of LL-ratio test is used to 
determine if the overall model is statistically significant: 
-2(LLbase - LLmodel) "' X2number of new parameters 
where 
LLbase - the log-likelihood function of the model with alternative specific constants 
(ASCs) only; 
LLmodel - the log-likelihood L function of the chosen model at convergence; 
X2number 
of new parameters -a Chi-square statistic with degrees of freedom equal to the 
difference in the number of the parameters estimated for the two models. 
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The log-likelihood function of the estimated choice model is statistically closer to zero 
than the log-likelihood function of the base model: 
-2(-2588.6529- (-2512.964)) = 153.3778 > X213 
The -2LL value exceeds the critical Chi-square value, and the null hypothesis that the 
estimated model is no better than the base model can be rejected. 
The R-squared statistics in discrete choice models is different from the R-squared 
statistics in the linear regression models. The following formula shows how a pseudo-R- 
squared for a discrete choice model can be calculated: 
R2 =1- (LLmodel /LLbase) 
where 
LLbase - the log-likelihood function of the model with alternative specific constants 
(ASPs) only; 
LLmodeý - the log-likelihood function of the chosen model at convergence; 
There exists a direct relationship between the calculated pseudo-R-squared and the R- 
squared in the linear regression models, illustrated in Figure 6.1 (Domencich and 
McFadden, 1975). The calculated pseudo-R-squared for the estimated model is 0.0292 (1 
- (-2512.964/-2588.6529)), which can be translated to equivalent R-squared of about 0.1 
for the linear model. 
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Figure 6.1. Mapping the pseudo-R-squared to the linear R-squared 
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In order to confirm the statistical significance of the interaction terms revealed by the t- 
statistics, the log-ratio test is applied. Each interaction term is removed and the log- 
likelihood is compared to the one of the full mode (the Chi-square for the interaction 
term Tradit xuc is 20.912; it is 8.904 for ws, xTradit, 5.744 for Tradit XEU; 3.258 for e1 x 
red, and 30.758 for s; xD, ). The degrees of freedom for the critical value of Chi-square 
statistics is equal to the difference between number of parameters estimated between the 
two models (as only one interaction terms is removed each time, the degrees of freedom 
is 1). After having compared the test-statistics to the Chi-squared critical value of 
0.0039, it can be concluded that models without each of the interaction terms are inferior 
to the full model. 
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6.4. Conclusions 
The results of the MNL model applied to the multi-level data set show that the 
investment location decisions in the CEECs are complex and they depend on country-, 
industry- and firm-specific characteristics. Local market size together with the 
institutional, legal and political environment, unemployment and wage costs appear to 
be the main factors influencing where MNEs locate in the CEECs. The responsiveness 
of FDI in CEECs to country-level variables, however, differs across sectors and across 
firms of different sizes and profitability. For example, larger firms characterised by high 
economies of scale are more likely to invest in countries with larger markets in order to 
exploit these economies. More profitable firms, on the other hand, are less discouraged 
to invest in more remote countries with weaker historical ties and larger cultural and 
language differences, as they have more funds to cover transaction costs related to the 
investment in more remote countries. MNEs investing in traditional sectors are more 
likely to be discouraged to invest in host countries with higher wages but less 
discouraged or even prefer to invest in countries with higher unemployment rates, as 
compared to foreign firms that choose to invest in non-traditional sectors. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE NESTED LOGIT MODEL 
The MNL model is subject to the restrictive assumption of Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA), which states that the ratio of the choice probabilities of any pair of 
alternatives is independent of the presence or absence of any other alternative in a choice 
set ((Hensher et al., 2005). It means that all the pairs of alternatives are equally similar 
or dissimilar. As a result, the MNL model does not allow testing if national boundaries 
affect the location of MNEs and to what extent MNEs consider countries belonging to 
the same region as close substitutes. However, location choices of foreign investors are 
very likely to have a nested structure: investors simultaneously choose a region and a 
country within a region chosen (the choice of the country is conditional to the choice of 
the region). The composition of the set of location alternatives is particularly important, 
since it allows a better comprehension of multinational firms' location patterns in 
transition countries (Pusterla and Resmini, 2005). 
Proposed by McFadden (1981), the Nested Logit (NL) model is the generalisation of the 
MNL model that maintains the extreme value distribution of the unobserved proportion 
of utility for all alternatives but partially relaxes the IIA assumption in order to 
accommodate different degrees of substitution across alternatives, consequently, 
different variances across the alternatives and correlation among sub-sets of alternatives. 
The NL model allows partitioning the alternative choices into mutually exclusive groups 
which seem to share similar characteristics. The NL model extends the MNL model in 
order to allow groups of alternatives to be similar to each other in an unobserved way, 
that is, to have correlated error terms (Heiss, 2002). The interdependence arises when 
specific alternatives associated with one choice are influenced by specific alternatives 
associated with another choice. Since alternatives are bundles of attributes, the 
142 
interdependences of alternatives results from the interdependences of attributes, some of 
which are unobserved (Hensher et al., 2005). 
The NL model is computationally straightforward due to the existence of a closed-form 
expression29 for the likelihood function. One of the disadvantages of the NL model is the 
difficulty of determining the correct nesting structures, as a nested structure is consistent 
with the condition of profit maximisation only when the scale parameters are in the unit 
interval. All previous researchers working on investment location choices in CEE have 
relied on intuitive partition of investment locations into nests. In contrast to the existing 
empirical literature on the investment location choices of MNEs, the heteroskedastic 
extreme value model (HEV) proposed by Hensher (1999) is used to help choose the 
most appropriate nesting structure for the data, prior to the estimation of the Nested logit 
model, rather than to base such decisions on intuition, which could lead to inappropriate 
estimates. 
7.1. The Specification of the Nested Logit Model 
There are two forms of the NL model: the random profit maximization nested logit 
(UMNL) and the non-normalized nested logit (NNNL), based on probability 
relationships, which is not consistent with utility maximization 
30. Both models have 
different properties that may substantially influence the estimation results, predictions, 
and, consequently, policy implications. Although, often the specification of the NL 
model is not explicitly stated in the literature, making the estimation results impossible 
to compare. Since the profit maximisation condition is crucial for the underlying model, 
the UMNL model is employed. 
29 It may be solved using mathematical operations and does not require complex, analytical calculations 
such as integration each time a change occurs somewhere within the system Hensher, D. A., Rose, J. M., 
and Greene, W. H. (2005). "Applied Choice Analysis A Primer, " Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge.. 
30 "Compliance with utility maximization requires that any monotonically increasing transformation of the 
utility functions of all elemental alternatives leave unaffected the ranking of the choice probabilities of the 
alternatives" Hensher, D. A., and Greene, W. H. (2002). Specification and estimation of the nested logit 
model: alternative normalisations. Transportation Research Part B-Methodological 36,1-17. 
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The profit for each alternative c can be expressed as 
; uc = visc + eis, (7.1) 
where ni,, consists of an observed component Vü, and error term c i,,, which may stem 
from the modeller's inability to take into account all the variables that influence the 
individual firm's choice decision, for example, measurement errors, idiosyncrasies and 
even erroneous perceptions (Carrasco and Ortuzar, 2002). If the firm chooses country c 
it is assumed that iru, is the maximum among the C alternative locations. The observed 
component can be expressed as: 
Vüc = 16Oisc 
+ ßliscf (X 11sc) 
+ß 
isc 
(X 
2isc) +'** + 
ßMscf (X 
Nsc) (7.2) 
where the X;,, terms are the potential variables that determine n;, The unobserved 
components of utility can each influence the random components in a different way 
resulting in different variances (standard deviations) of the random error components 
across groups of alternatives in the choice set (Hensher and Greene, 2002). Louviere et 
al. (2000) derive the variance for the extreme value type 1 distribution as oZ = 7ý/ 6u2, 
where y is a scale parameter and r=3.14. As scale parameters in the NL model vary 
due to the different variances of the unobserved effects of alternatives in different nests, 
p becomes an additional multiplicand of each factor influencing a choice. Therefore: 
Visc = duiscAisc 
+ 
juiscAisc 
(X1) + 
JUiscfl2isc 
(X 
21sc) 
+"""+ Pisc ßNisc (X Nisc 
) 
(7.3) 
The scale parameter p can be moved to the left-hand side of the equation: 
Visc / Pisc = Aisc + ß1iscf (X lisc) + 
ß2isc (X 
2isc) +"""+f Niscf 
(X 
Nisc) (7.4) 
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Each alternative c in nest k will have a scale parameter p'(cIk) and each nest (upper level) 
will have a scale parameter Ak. However, the variance of the unobserved effects and 
therefore, the scale parameters for alternatives in the same nest, have to be equal and the 
notation c for U(clk) is dropped, as U'(cjk)- 4Uk 
The NL model can be decomposed into standard logit models, marginal and conditional 
probabilities. In the case of two-level NL model, the probability of choosing alternative 
c in nest k is equal to the product of the marginal probability Pk of choosing nest k and 
conditional probability PcIk of choosing the alternative conditional on that nest k has 
been chosen: 
P =P qk x 
pk (7.5) 
where 
Ik = 
exp(, ukVc/k Palk = (7.6) exp vg/, 
geL 
exp 2k Vk + -k I Vk 
Pk 
(7.7) 
exp A, V, +-r IV, 
r ýr 
Indices g and 1 indicate other alternative and nest respectively. The natural logarithm of 
the denominator in equation (7.6) is called the inclusive value IVk. It corresponds to the 
expected value of the utility the investing firm i obtains from alternatives g in nest 1, that 
is: 
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IV, =1n l exp( , Vg/l) (7.8) 
gEL 
Substituting (7.6) and (7.7) into PP results: 
exp 2kVk + 
Ak 
IVk 
Pý luk x 
exp(lukVc, k 
) 
79 
exp ýi., V, + 
Al 
IVr 
gENrexP 
ru, Vg, r 
('ý 
Jul 
The utility expression for the upper level (nest) can be written (Hensher et al., 2005): 
Vk =ßok+Akf(Xlk)+# 2kf(X2k)+""+ßNkf(XNk)+(Ilk1"Pk)IVN+1k 
7.10) 
The parameter of IV is the ratio of the scale parameter at the upper level to the scale 
parameter at the lower level 2klPk. Due to the identification problem31, normalisation of 
one of the scale parameters is required. If the numerator is normalised to 1 (2k = Al = 1), 
the RU2 UMNL model is estimated (normalisation at the upper level), and if the 
denominator is normalised to 1 (JUk = III = 1), the RUl UMNL model is estimated 
(normalisation at the lower level) (Table 7.1). Without imposing restrictions, however, 
only the RU2 UMNL specification is consistent with profit maximisation theory. The 
estimated parameters of both the RUI UMNL model and the RU2 UMNL model will be 
the same (after re-scaling) only when all the parameters are alternative ( country) 
specific. 
;' Identification problem arises when the model tries to estimate more parameters than it is possible to 
estimate with the information given. 
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Tah1p 7.1 - Pill 
IIMNI. versus RU2 UMNL 
RU1 RU2 
exp(AkVk + 2kIVk) exp Vk +1 1Vk 
exp(2, V, +A, IV, 1 
exp Vr + IV, 
r fir 
exp(VV, k) exp 
( 
kV, k 
Pclk E exP Vg r 
I exp (u ,Vg 
g¬N, geN1 
IV ,l In 
Z exp V 1n exp(p, V  k g g¬L g geL 
Furthermore, the scale parameters, which are inversely related to the variance, have to 
satisfy the inequality 2k <_ Ilk, as upper-level error components include the variance 
components from both the lower-level and upper-level, and, therefore, have greater 
variance (Louviere et al., 2000). Furthermore, as the standard deviations are positive, 
their ratio of the sale parameters will also be positive (Louviere et al., 2000). As a result, 
the IV parameters will lie in the unit interval, 0 <_. %k u<1. 
As the model also includes generic variables the RU2 UMNL specification (the random 
profit maximisation nested logit normalised at the upper level) is preferred. In the case 
of RU2 UMNL, the probability of choosing alternative c in nest k is the following: 
exp(Vc /pk )cE exp(Vg Irk 
))k-ý 
PC K ZIA 
SEL eXp(V9 
/, U, 
The parameter Pk is a measure of the degree of independence in unobserved utility 
among the alternatives in nest k. When uk = 1, there is a complete independence within 
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nest k, that is, no correlation. In this case, the NL model reduces to the standard logit 
model. The model is consistent with utility maximization for all values of the 
explanatory variables, if all eck lie in the unit interval. If Pk is greater that 1, the model is 
consistent with utility-maximizing behaviour for some range of the explanatory variable 
values, while negative values of Uk are inconsistent with utility maximization (Train, 
2003). 
7.2. Heteroskedastic Extreme Value Model 
One disadvantage of the NL model is the difficulty in determining the correct nesting 
structure. Although there is a possibility that the nesting structure based on common 
sense is the appropriate one, for example, grouping the countries that have strong 
historical and cultural ties together; there is a high risk that a misspecified nesting 
structure will cause losses in predictive ability and yield misleading insights about the 
attribute elasticities within nests. Hensher (1999) therefore proposes the Heteroskedastic 
Extreme Value (HEV) model as a tool to reveal the best nesting structure for 
hierarchical choice models. Although the HEV model itself in not consistent with utility 
maximisation, it assumes that the random components in the utilities of different 
alternatives have a type I extreme value distribution and they are non-independent and 
non-identically distributed. As a result, all alternatives in the choice set have free 
variance. 
Thus the probability density function and the cumulative distribution function of the 
random error term, e for the cth alternative with unrestricted variance and scale 
parameter &, which is the inverse of the standard deviation of the random component, are 
given by the following formulas: 
fýýý) =1 exp(- eý / ýJexp(- exp(e /ý )) (7.12) 
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and 
FA(Z) =f (')de, = exp(- exp(- z/ý 
)) (7.13) 
C 
where z= F() and f() are the probability density functions and cumulative 
distribution functions, respectively of the type I extreme value distribution. The 
probability that an individual will choose alternative c, given the probability distribution 
for the random components and non-independence among the random components, is 
given by: 
Pý = Pr ob(U,, > U, ), for all c*g, geC 
= Pr ob(eg <_ V, - Vg + c, ), for all c#g, geC 
_ `- rl F 
yc - Vg +. Cc ifc ds c (7.14) 
gec, ö*c 
ýg ýc ýc 
Substituting z=e, /ý,, the probability of choosing alternative c can be re-written as: 
-+D V -V +s f, -1 
=_.. 
F f(z)dz (7.15) PC _ 
gEC, g; tc 
ýg 
If the scale parameters of the random components of all alternatives are equal, then the 
probability expression collapses to the standard Multinomial logit model. 
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7.3. The Estimation Results from the Nested Logit Model 
Before estimating the NL model, the appropriate nesting structure is chosen with the 
help of the HEV model. The HEV model puts each alternative in a separate nest and 
estimates inclusive value parameters for those nests. The inclusive value parameters 
with the closest estimated values are then grouped together to form nests in order to 
accommodate differential patterns of variance between subsets of alternatives. 
Sometimes, however, it is difficult to distinguish between different nests and the F1EV 
model may fail to converge (Hensher et al., 2005). 
Talkie 7.2_ The inclucive value narameters estimated by the HEV model 
Country IV arameters Country IV parameters 
Bulgaria 0.8411 Lithuania 0.8921 
Croatia 1.4242 Poland 0.4279 
Czech Republic 0.5681 Romania 0.5522 
Estonia 1.0060 Russia 0.4824 
Hungary 0.5683 Slovakia 0.9915 
Latvia 1.2844 Slovenia 0.8387 
Ukraine 1.0000 
The HEV model places each country in a separate nest and estimates inclusive value (IV) parameters for 
each nest. Then countries are grouped together into nests according to the similarity among the estimated 
IV parameters. 
Table 7.2 presents the values of the IV parameters estimated by the HEV model. As the 
HEV model is only used as a means to find the best nesting structure, while combining 
the nest/alternatives (there is one alternative per nest) with similarly sized IV 
parameters, the 0-1 range for the values of IV parameters estimated by the HEV model 
is not applicable. Once alternatives are divided into nests and the NL model is estimated, 
then the values of IV parameters have to be in the unit interval to keep the model 
compliant with the assumption of utility maximisation. As a result, the 13 CEECs are 
divided into different nests according to the similarity among IV parameters estimated 
by the HEV model, keeping values of IV parameters estimated by the NL model in the 
unit interval and statistically different from both one and zero. 
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Various nesting structures have been examined and a few of them (the same 
specification) are presented for illustrative purposes in Table 7.3. The nesting structure 1 
is based on intuition, where Czech Republic and Slovakia are grouped together, as they 
used to be one country; three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) are allocated 
into a separate nest due to their strong historical ties; Bulgaria and Romania, the newest 
members in the EU are put into the third nest; the two Balkan countries- Croatia and 
Slovenia- are grouped together, as they have strong historical, cultural and linguistic 
ties; neighbouring countries Russia and Ukraine are allocated into the same nest due to 
their close historical, cultural and linguistic ties; and, finally, Poland and Hungary are 
grouped together as they are often regarded as the most economically advanced 
countries in the sample. Three out of six estimated inclusive value parameters are not in 
the unit interval, indicating that alternatives in those nest are more similar to the 
alternatives in other nests than to the alternatives in the same nest. 
The preferred nesting structure is 4, which has two nests: the first nest contains Poland, 
Russia, Romania, the Czech Republic and Hungary, and the second nest contains 
Slovenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Slovakia, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia and Croatia. Countries 
in the first nest not only have received the largest share of FDI but they are also the 
largest countries with respect to GDP in the sample32. Furthermore, the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Hungary are the most economically advanced countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The second nest contains the smallest countries in terms of GDP, apart 
from Ukraine, with the smallest share of FDI. The values of the inclusive value 
parameters are in the unit interval and they are statistically different from zero and one. 
The results show that the NL structure guided by the IV parameters estimated with the 
HEV model produce the NL model that fits the data better than the nesting structure 
based on intuition. As a result, the richness of variability in the unobserved effects is 
captured by the NL model based on HEV model results better as compared to the NL 
model based on intuition. 
32 Romania is an exception, as it is has not received a large share of FDI and it is not a large country in 
respect to GDP. 
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Tah1a 7 't Alternative nectinQ structures 
Nesting Nesting Nesting Nesting 
structure 1 structure 2 structure 3 structure 4 
Nests A (Czech Republic A (Poland, Russia, A (Poland, A (Poland, 
and Slovakia) Romania) Russia, Romania, Russia, Romania, 
B (Estonia, Latvia B (Czech Republic, Czech Republic, Czech Republic, 
and Lithuania) Hungary) Hungary) Hungary) 
C (Bulgaria and C (Slovenia, B (Slovenia, B (Slovenia, 
Romania) Bulgaria, Bulgaria, Bulgaria, 
D (Croatia and Lithuania) Lithuania, Lithuania, 
Slovenia) D Slovakia, Slovakia) Slovakia, 
E (Russia and Ukraine, Estonia) C (Ukraine, Ukraine, Estonia, 
Ukraine) E (Latvia, Croatia) Estonia, Latvia, Latvia, Croatia) 
F (Hungary and Croatia) 
Poland) 
IV A=0.6768 A=1.4712 A=1.0691 A=0.6651 
parameters (4.317) (12.913) (14.633) (7.959) 
B=0.6445 B=1.3144 B=0.3768 B=0.2232 
(4.689) (8.582) (5.433) (4.095) 
C=1.2072 C=0.4052 C=0.2691 
(4.391) (0.0762) (5.080) 
D=0.6559 D=0.3803 
(2.423) (5.730) 
E=1.9834 E=0.2353 
(7.009) (4.761) 
F=1.4794 
(7.758) 
Log- -2440.741 -2428.642 -2431.945 -2438.204 
Likelihood 
Chi- 997.9068 915.0739 976.0401 565.4636 
squared 
t-statistics in the parenthesis 
The table presents four different nesting structure, when alternatives are grouped together due to the 
similarity among IV parameters estimated by the HEV model and presented in Table 7.2. 
The NL model is estimated gradually adding all the three levels of variables (Table 7.4): 
the model is estimated with country-level variables in specification 1; adding the 
variable that varies among industries and countries in specification 2; augmenting the 
equation with interaction terms between industry dummies and country-level variables 
in specification 3; and finally, adding interaction terms between firm-level and country- 
level variables in specification 4. The preferred specification 4 has the highest values of 
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log-likelihood, pseudo-R-squared and Chi-square, therefore, the best model fit. In 
comparison to the results of MNL model fewer explanatory variables are statistically 
significant, however, the fit of the model is better: the log-likelihood is -2438.204 for the 
preferred specification of the NL model, as compared to -2512.13 10 for the preferred 
specification of the MNL model. Therefore, there is a statistically significant 
improvement in the fit of the model estimated by the NL model as compared to the 
MNL model (the Chi-square value of 347.854 is higher than the critical value). The 
pseudo-R-squared of 0.1039 for the preferred model can be translated to an R-squared of 
about 0.30 for the linear model. 
Tnhle 7- 4. The results of the Nested Logit model 
1 2 3 4 
Coef. T-stats Coef. T-stats Coef. T-stats Coef. T-stats 
Distance -0.2099* {-4.14} -0.2589* {-4.19} -0.3052* {-4.47} -0.4274* {-4.57} 
GDP 0.1243* {6.51} 0.1318* {6.51} 0.1391* {6.49} 0.1224* (4.96) 
Border 0.1118* {2.81} 0.1325* (2.93) 0.1475* (2.97) 0.2076* (3.15) 
EU 0.0193 {0.86) 
Interest 0.0144 {0.06} 
Risk 0.0358* {2.65} 0.0132 {1.41} 
Unemployment -0.1793 {-1.25} 
Tax 0.0054 (0.01) 
Wage -0.0422* -3.26 -0.0390* -3.08 -0.0524* -3.09 
Tradit_Unempl 1.5051* {2.79} 2.3112* {3.15} 
Tradit Wage -0.1002* -3.29 -0.1455* -3.44 
Profit_Distance 0.0524* (2.55) 
Size_GDP 0.0619* (3.67) 
IV parameter 
for nest A 0.1122* {3.86} 0.1379* (3.86) 0.1605* (4.05) 0.2232* (4.10) 
IV parameter 
for nest B 0.4959* {9.38} 0.5408* {8.89} 0.5716* {8.64} 0.6651* (7.96) 
Chi-squared 486.8088 505.0743 532.1502 565.204 
R-squared 0.0895 0.0928 0.0978 0.103 9 
Log-Likelihood -2477.531 -2468.398 -2454.86 -2438.204 
t-stausucs in parentnesis 
* Significant at 1 percent level ** Significant at 5 percent level *** Significant at 10 percent level 
Although, t-statistics indicate the statistical significance of the explanatory variables, the estimated 
coefficients do not have much explanatory power, as neither the sign nor the magnitude of the coefficients 
are informative. The values of the estimated N parameters for the two nests, on the other hand, have to be 
in the unit interval in order the alternatives in the same nests are more similar to each other than to the 
alternatives in the other nests. 
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The three statistically significant country-level variables and one variable that varies 
among countries and industries, are the distance between investing and investment 
receiving countries, zcd, the market size in the host country, D,, the dummy variable for 
common border between investing and investment receiving countries, and wages in the 
host country, ws,. As neither the magnitude nor the direction of the estimated parameters 
presented in Table 7.4 are informative, elasticities and marginal effects have to be 
estimated for continuous variables and dummies respectively using probability weighted 
averages (Table 7.5)33. 
Three out of four statistically significant variables are interacted with industry dummies 
and firm-level variables. As a result, they represent a "conditional effect" instead of a 
"main effect". For example, the dummy variable for traditional sectors is interacted with 
variable for wages in the host country, ws, x Tradit. Negative estimated elasticities for the 
variable ws, indicate that the higher the wage rates in the host country, the less likely the 
country will be chosen by foreign investors to locate their capital, when these investors 
choose to invest in non-traditional sectors. The effects of the wage rate in the host 
country on the probability of locating investment in that particular country if a firm 
chooses to invest in traditional sectors is a sum of the estimated elasticities for wS, and 
wsc x Tradit. The sums of the estimated probabilities are negative and larger in absolute 
terms as compared to the elasticities for wcs for all host countries indicating that 
multinational enterprises that choose to invest in traditional sectors are less likely to 
locate their capital in host countries with higher wage rates, as compared to firms, which 
choose to invest in non-traditional sectors. 
33 Elasticities are estimated separatelly for the nest the alternative belongs to, for the alternative itself and 
the total effect. 
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Table 7.5. Direct elasticities and marginal effects for the Nested Logit model 
Nest 
Wage 
Country Total Nest 
Tradit_Wage 
County Total Nest 
Sum 
Country Total 
Bulgaria -0.009 -0.117 -0.126 -0.009 -0.128 -0.137 -0.018 -0.245 -0.263 
Czech Rep -0.009 0.043 0.034 -0.006 -0.129 -0.135 -0.015 -0.086 -0.101 
Estonia -0.010 -0.237 -0.247 -0.005 -0.190 -0.195 -0.015 -0.427 "0.442 
Croatia -0.013 -0.346 -0.359 -0.016 -0.348 -0.364 -0.029 -0.694 -0.723 
Hungary -0.006 -0.144 -0.150 -0.004 -0.102 -0.107 -0.010 -0.246 -0.257 
Lithuania -0.007 -0.318 -0.325 -0.006 -0.263 -0.269 -0.013 -0.581 -0.594 
Latvia -0.010 -0.278 -0.288 -0.009 -0.245 -0.253 -0.019 -0.523 -0.541 
Poland -0.011 -0.147 -0.158 -0.010 -0.130 -0.140 -0.021 -0.277 -0.298 
Romania -0.001 -0.039 -0.041 -0.001 -0.032 -0.034 -0.002 -0.071 -0.075 
Russia -0.003 -0.031 -0.034 -0.003 -0.025 -0.028 -0.006 -0.056 -0.062 
Slovenia -0.021 -0.858 -0.878 -0.002 -0.279 -0.281 -0.023 -1.137 -1.159 
Slovakia -0.018 -0.345 -0.363 -0.018 -0.332 -0.349 -0.036 -0.677 -0.712 
Ukraine -0.002 -0.061 -0.064 -0.003 -0.072 -0.075 -0.005 -0.133 . 0.139 
GDP Distance 
Bulgaria 0.005 0.066 0.071 -0.084 -2.548 -2.632 
Czech Rep 0.007 0.126 0.133 -0.040 -0.772 -0.811 
Estonia 0.002 0.037 0.039 -0.079 -2.338 -2.417 
Croatia 0.004 0.112 0.117 -0.090 -2.564 -2.654 
Hungary 0.004 0.101 0.105 -0.037 -0.932 -0.969 
Lithuania 0.002 0.089 0.091 -0.062 -2.990 -3.052 
Latvia 0.002 0.046 0.048 -2.685 -2.767 -5.452 
Poland 0.022 0.285 0.306 -0.054 -0.761 -0.815 
Romania 0.002 0.049 0.051 -0.040 -1.194 -1.234 
Russia 0.041 0.399 0.440 -1.018 -1.106 -2.124 
Slovenia 0.003 0.104 0.106 -0.044 -2.248 -2.293 
Slovakia 0.006 0.121 0.128 -0.077 -2.170 -2.247 
Ukraine 0.007 0.182 0.189 -0.106 -3.189 -3.295 
Border Tradit_unempl 
Nest Country Total Nest Country Total 
Bulgaria 1.078 4.130 5.209 0.028 0.387 0.414 
Czech Rep 0.197 3.373 3.571 0.004 0.080 0.083 
Estonia 0.391 5.197 5.589 0.002 0.068 0.070 
Croatia 0.223 4.671 4.894 0.021 0.451 0.472 
Hungary 0.139 2.914 3.053 0.003 0.069 0.072 
Lithuania 3.280 3.280 3.365 0.005 0.222 0.227 
Latvia 0.190 4.426 4.616 0.009 0.230 0.238 
Poland 0.337 4.104 4.442 0.013 0.160 0.173 
Romania 0.113 2.571 2.684 0.004 0.084 0.088 
Russia 0.527 4.282 4.809 0.007 0.068 0.075 
Slovenia 0.135 3.541 3.675 0.001 0.116 0.117 
Slovakia 0.386 5.196 5.581 0.022 0.393 0.415 
Ukraine 0.277 3.919 4.196 0.016 0.341 0.357 
Elasticities are estimated for the continuous variables and marginal effects are estimated for the dummy 
variables. The first (second) column indicates a change in the probability of choosing a particular nest 
(country) given a change in an explanatory variables. The third column gives the total effect (the sum of 
the two effects). 
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The variable that captures unemployment in the host country is interacted with the 
dummy variable for traditional sectors, u, xTradit, however, the variable u, is not 
included in the model separately, as unemployment only has an effect on the firms 
investing in traditional sectors. The positive estimated elasticities for u, x Tradit indicate 
that the higher the unemployment rate is in the host country the more likely the country 
will be chosen by multinationals enterprises to locate their capital of they invest in 
traditional sectors. In contrast to firms investing to non-traditional, firms choosing to 
invest in traditional sectors are more concerned about the availability of unskilled labour 
and they may prefer to invest in countries with high unemployment rates, as this may 
mean the availability of the labour force. 
The dummy variable for a common border between the host and the source countries, 
CBD, d, is not interacted with other variables; therefore, it reveals the `main effect'. 
Positive marginal effects for the common border dummy variable indicate that foreign 
firms on average are more likely to invest in adjacent countries, with which they may 
have stronger historical, linguistic and cultural ties. 
When two continuous variables are interacted, for example, ei Xrd and s, xDc, the 
direction of the interaction term is revealed with the help of simulation. The change in 
the market shares of the host countries in respect to foreign capital allocations and the 
change in the number of investing firm in each host country are investigated due to the 
gradual change in the moderator variables. Table 7.6 shows the effect of 1,10,50 and 
100 percent increases in the values of variables eI and s, on the changes in the market 
shares (first column) and the number of investing firms in each host country (second 
column). The simulation results of the interaction term si xD, show a consistently 
positive and increasing effect indicating that the larger the market in the host country the 
more likely the country is to be chosen by larger foreign investors to locate their capital. 
Large firms characterized by high economies of scale usually search for larger foreign 
markets to exploit those economies. Positive estimated elasticities for the market size 
proxied by the host country's GDP (Da) (Table 7.5) show that the larger the foreign 
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market, the more likely it is to be chosen by multinational enterprises whose size is 
equal to zero. 
Table 7.6. Simulations results for the Nested Lo2it model 
Prof_Dist Prof Dist Prof Dist Dist Prof Dist 
Country 1% 10% 50 100% 
Bulgaria 0.002 1 0.024 1 0.131 2 0.292 4 
Czech Rep 0.001 0 0.001 0 0.003 0 0.031 1 
Estonia 0.002 0 0.020 0 0.110 1 0.246 2 
Croatia 0.002 0 0.020 0 0.109 1 0.244 3 
Hungary 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.002 0 0.036 1 
Lithuania 0.002 0 0.020 0 0.112 1 0.251 2 
Latvia 0.002 0 0.020 0 0.110 1 0.246 2 
Poland 0.000 0 0.001 0 0.007 0 0.096 1 
Romania 0.000 0 0.001 0 0.004 0 0.052 1 
Russia 0.000 0 0.002 0 0.028 1 0.027 3 
Slovenia 0.002 0 0.019 0 0.102 1 0.229 3 
Slovakia 0.002 0 0.019 0 0.106 1 0.238 3 
Ukraine 0.002 0 0.024 0 0.133 2 0.296 3 
Size_GDP Size_GDP Size_GDP Size_GDP 
Country 1% 10% 50% 100% 
Bulgaria 0.000 0 0.001 1 0.007 1 0.014 1 
Czech Rep 0.001 0 0.001 0 0.001 0 0.001 0 
Estonia 0.000 0 0.001 0 0.004 0 0.007 0 
Croatia 0.000 0 0.002 0 0.010 0 0.020 0 
Hungary 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 
Lithuania 0.000 0 0.001 0 0.007 0 0.024 0 
Latvia 0.000 0 0.001 0 0.003 0 0.008 0 
Poland 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.002 0 0.004 0 
Romania 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.001 0 
Russia 0.000 0 0.001 0 0.006 0 0.021 1 
Slovenia 0.000 0 0.002 0 0.008 0 0.017 0 
Slovakia 0.000 0 0.002 0 0.012 0 0.024 0 
Ukraine 0.000 0 0.003 0 0.016 0 0.032 1 
The first column shows the change in the market shares of the host countries regarding foreign capital 
allocations due to 1,10,50 and 100 percent increase in the profitability and firm size variables. The 
second column shows the change in the number of firms investing in a particular country due to 1,10,50 
and 100 percent increase in the two variables. 
More profitable firms, on the other hand, have more resources to pay for transaction 
costs associated with investment in more remote countries, for example, costs of 
transport and communication, the costs of dealing with cultural and linguistic 
differences, the cost of sending personnel abroad, and information costs of institutional 
and legal factors. Consequently, the simulation results for the interaction terms between 
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the investing firm's profitability and distance between investing and investment 
receiving countries, e; xrcd, show consistently positive and increasing effect. The more 
remote the host country is from the investing country, the more likely it is to be chosen 
by more profitable investors to locate their capital. Negative estimated elasticities for rcd 
(Table 7.5) indicate that the more remote the host country is from the investing country, 
the less likely it is to be chosen by multinational enterprises whose profitability is equal 
to zero. The statistically significant interaction terms show, that even though FDI to the 
CEECs can be partially explained by a number of country-level variables, the 
responsiveness of FDI to those variables differs across sectors and accross firms of 
different sizes and profitability. 
In order to confirm the statistical significance of the interaction terms revealed by the t- 
statistics, the log-ratio test is applied. Each interaction term is removed and the log- 
likelihood of the model is compared to the one of the full mode (the Chi-square for the 
interaction term Traditxuc is 14.72; it is 24.128 for ws, xTradit, 6.838 for elx rcd, and 
241.384 for si xD, ). The degrees of freedom for the critical Chi-square statistic is equal 
to the difference between number of parameters estimated between the two models (as 
only one interaction terms is removed each time, the degrees of freedom is 1). After 
having compared the test-statistics to the Chi-squared critical value of 0.0039, it can be 
concluded that models without each of the interaction terms are inferior to the full 
model. 
7.4. Conclusions 
The NL model applied in this chapter takes into account the nested structure of 
investment location choices of MNEs and shows to what extent multinational enterprises 
consider countries belonging to the same region as close substitutes. In contract to the 
previous empirical literature that applied the NL model to investigate the investment 
location choices of MNEs and used an intuitive partitioning of investment locations into 
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nests, the Heteroskedastic Extreme Value (HEV) model is used as a tool to reveal the 
best nesting structure for hierarchical investment choices of MNEs. 
The statistically significant interaction terms show, that even though FDI to the CEECs 
can be partially explained by a number of country-level variables, the responsiveness of 
FDI to those variables differs across sectors and across firms of different sizes and 
profitability. Despite the fact that less variables are statistically significant for the NL 
model as compared to the MNL model, the fit of the model is improved. The statistical 
significance of some variables in the MNL that are not statistically significant in the NL 
model (for example, G, and Tradit Eb) may be explained by the fact that those 
variables may be picking up some other effect due to the restrictive assumptions of the 
MNL model. 
The results of the NL estimation go in line with the rest of the results of the MNL 
estimation. For example, as it has already been revealed by the results of the MNL 
model, the results of the NL model show that larger firms characterised by high 
economies of scale are more likely to invest in countries with larger markets in order to 
exploit these economies. More profitable firms, on the other hand, are less discouraged 
to invest in more remote countries with weaker historical ties and larger cultural and 
language differences, as they have more funds to cover transaction costs related to the 
investment in more remote countries. MNEs investing in traditional sectors more likely 
to be discouraged to invest in host countries with higher wages but less discouraged or 
even prefer to invest in countries with higher unemployment rates, as compared to 
foreign firms that choose to invest in non-traditional sectors, as they are more concerned 
about the availability of cheap labour. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE MIXED LOGIT MODEL 
The empirical literature on investment location choices of multinational enterprises has 
applied either the Multinomial logit (MNL) or the Nested logit (NL) model to 
investigate where foreign firms choose to locate their capital (see for example, Head et 
al., 1999; Guimaraes et al., 2000 and Kim et al., 2003). The MNL model is subject to the 
assumptions of restrictive substitution patterns across alternatives and the absence of 
random taste heterogeneity across decision-makers, while the NL model only partially 
relaxes the IIA assumption in order to accommodate the substitution across alternatives 
to a limited degree. In this chapter, a very flexible discrete choice model, namely the 
Mixed logit (ML) model, is applied to investigate investment location choices by MNEs 
for the first time. 
The ML model is probably the most flexible discrete choice model and it has become 
applicable only recently with the development of simulation and increased computer 
speed. The ML model allows the parameters associated with some attributes to vary 
among the decision makers according to the distribution imposed on those random 
parameters. The ML34 model is a very flexible model that approximates any random 
utility model (McFadden and Train, 2000). In contrast to the MNL model, the ML model 
allows for random taste variation, unrestricted substitution patterns and correlation in 
unobserved factors over time. Furthermore, the ML probability can still be derived from 
utility-maximising behaviour. In contrast to the Probit model, it is not restricted to the 
normal distribution. The derivation of ML is straightforward, and simulation of its 
choice probabilities is computationally simple (Train, 2003). The ML model has been 
applied in environmental, health and transport economics (Greene and Hensher, 2003; 
;4 In the literature also referred to "random parameter logit", "mixed multinomial logit", "kernel logit" and 
"hybrid logit". 
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Hole, 2007; Meijer and Rouwendal, 2006), however, it has never been applied to 
investigate where MNEs locate their capital abroad. 
The first application of the ML model was by Boyd and Mellman (1980) and Cardell 
and Dunbar (1980), who analysed how fuel economy improvements as a result of higher 
gasoline prices and other car attributes influence consumer choices among car models. 
However, the explanatory variables did not vary over decision makers and the dependent 
variable was market shares rather than individual consumers' choices (Train, 2003). As 
a result, the integration for the ML had to be done only once for the entire market. 
Further applications on the data of individual customers by Ben-Akiva and Francois 
(1983) and Train et al. (1987) included only one or two dimensions of integration. 
Recently, the development of simulation and increased computer speed has enabled 
researchers to fully use the capabilities of the ML model (see, for example, Bhat, 1998, 
2000; Brownstone and Train, 1999 and Revelt and Train, 1998) 
8.1. The Mixed Logit Model Specification 
The ML model has been specified in different ways in different applications. In the most 
general form, the ML probabilities are the integrals of standard logit probabilities over a 
density of unobserved random parameters (Train, 2003): 
Pisc = 
JL(ß, )f(ß1)dß1 
uc (8 . 1) 
where f(ß; ) is the density function, which is specified to be continuous. The mixed logit 
probability is a weighted average of the logit formula evaluated at different values of ßh 
with the weights given by the density f(ß; ) (Train, 2003). The logit probability evaluated 
at parameters Q; is expressed as in (6.5): 
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Where z;, is a vector of observed choice-specific variables, which have different value 
for firms investing in sectors and firms of different characteristics; and ß, are individual- 
specific parameters. 
Since the integral cannot be calculated analytically, it has to be approximated through 
simulation by maximising the simulated log-likelihood function. A value of ß is drawn 
form the distribution f(ß 10) for a given value of 0 and labelled ß` with the subscript r=1 
referring to the first draw. The logit formula L;,, (f') is calculated with this draw. Finally, 
the two steps are repeated many times, and the results are averaged, which gives the 
simulated probabilityy. 
I (ý rl I'sc = R1: Liso l8' 
) 
(8.3) 
r-1 
where R is the number of draws. P,,, is an unbiased estimator of Pic. Its variance 
decreases as R increases. It is strictly positive (In c 
is defined) and smooth (twice 
differentiable) in the parameters 9 and the variables z, which facilitates the numerical 
search for the maximum likelihood function and the calculation of elasticities. 
Furthermore, Puc sums to one over alternatives which is helpful when interpreting the 
results. The simulated probabilities are substituted into the log-likelihood function to 
give the simulated log likelihood: 
CI 
SLL = disc 
In Psc 
(8.4) 
_, 
1: 
c=1 i=1 
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where d,, =1 if i choses c and zero otherwise. The maximum simulated likelihood 
estimator (MSLE) is the value of 0 that maximizes SLL. 
8.1.1. Error-Component Structure 
The ML structure can be derived in two different but formally equivalent ways: by 
allowing flexible substitution patterns across alternatives (error-components structure) 
and by accommodating unobserved heterogeneity across individuals in their sensitivity 
to observed exogenous variables (random-coefcients structure). In the existing 
literature regarding the ML model, the error-components structure has been specified in 
a few different ways. Brownstone (2000) decomposes the utility of each alternative into 
three components: one non-stochastic and two stochastic. The non-stochastic part 
depends on observed data and it is linear in parameters. One of the stochastic parts may 
be correlated over alternatives and heteroskedastic over the decision makers and 
alternatives (the unobserved error terms are non-identical and non-independent cross 
alternatives). Another stochastic part is identical and independent over alternatives and 
decision makers. As a result the ML model can be used without a random-coefficient 
interpretation, letting error components create correlations among the utilities for 
different alternatives (Train, 2003). Brownstone (2000) specifies the utility 
Uic ' ýZic + %ic + hic (8.5) 
Where zk is a vector of observed variables related to alternative c and decision-maker i; 
Q is a vector of structural parameters; r7; c is a random term with zero mean whose 
distribution over alternatives and decision-makers depends on underlying parameters 
and observed data related to alternative c and decision-maker i; and c; c is a random term 
which is independent and identically distributes over alternatives and decision makers, it 
has zero mean, it does not depend on underlying parameters or data and it is normalised 
to set the scale of utility, as it may not be identified separately from Pi. 
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As ' is not known, the unconditional choice probability is given by a logit formula 
integrated over all values of rj weighted by the chosen density of, : 
1'C = 
JL1(7l). '(171 Cl ý11 (8.6) 
where f(IIQ) is a density with fixed parameters of the distribution, 0. Different 
substitution patterns can be obtained by specifying f. As the integral does not have a 
closed form, it has to be approximated through simulation. The logit formula L1, (, 7) is 
calculated for every value of q drawn from the chosen distribution and averaged over 
calculated L;, (n) 's: 
SPIC _ (1 /R )E. _l,..., R 
LI (? 7r) (8.7) 
where R is a number of draws of rj, j' is the r-th draw, and SP,, is the simulated 
probability that the decision maker i chooses alternative c. SPj, is an unbiased estimator 
of P;, for any R, it is strictly positive (ln(SP; c) is always defined) and smooth (twice 
differentiable) in parameters and variables, which helps in calculation of elasticities and 
especially in the numerical search for the maximum of the likelihood function. 
Ben-Akiva and Bolduc (1996) and Train (1995) impose a particular structure on q, 
namely i =µ'; x;, Then utility for decision maker i and alternative c is specified as 
U,, = a:  +fu, x, +erc (8.8) 
where x,, is a vector of observed variables related to alternative c some of whose 
elements might also appear in the vector y;,. a is a vector of fixed coefficients, ,u is a 
vector of random terms with zero mean whose distribution over decision makers and 
alternatives depends on underlying parameters and observed data related to a particular 
alternative. ,u has a density of &IQ) with parameters 92 and the choice probabilities are 
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simulated by drawing values of ,u from its distribution. The component p'x1 
induces 
heteroskedasticity and correlation across unobserved utility parts of the alternatives. 
Correlation and flexible substitution patters among alternatives are obtained through the 
appropriate specification of variable vector x,, and g combined with (usually) the 
specification of independent normally distributed random elements in the vector P. Bhat 
et al. (2002) have derived ML model structure for the choice probability of alternative c 
of individual i by defining ß= 
(a', fit') and z t, = 
(Y? 
, xic . 
Bhat et al. (2002) show that x, may be specified to be a row vector of dimension M, with 
each row representing a group m (m = 1,2, ..., M) of alternatives sharing common 
unobserved components. Each row corresponding to the group to which c belongs, takes 
a value of 1 and other rows take the value of 0. The vector p of dimension M may be 
specified to have independent elements, each element having a variance component Q, 2. 
The result of this specification is a covariance of a,, 2 among alternatives in a group m 
and heteroskedasticity across groups of alternatives. This structure is analogous to the 
Nested logit structure, however, in contrast to the Nested logit structure, alternatives can 
belong to more than one group and the variance of the alternatives is different. Each 
group m is like a nest and a dummy variable can be specified for each nest (group m) 
that equals to 1 for each alternative in the nest and 0 for alternatives outside the nest. 
M 
With M non-overlapping nests, the error-components are , uixtc = m=1 
Ptmdcm 
, 
where dim =1 if c is in the nest m and 0 otherwise (Train, 2003). The random quantity 
U;, n enters the profit of each alternative 
in nest m, inducing correlation among these 
alternatives. The variance a. captures the magnitude of the correlation. It is analogous to 
the inclusive value parameter in the Nested logit model. The overlapping nests can be 
captured with dummies that identify overlapping sets of alternatives, while the 
heteroskedastic logit is obtained by entering an error component for each alternative 
(Train, 2003). 
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8.1.2. Random Coefficient Structure 
The random-coefficient structure allows heterogeneity in the sensitivity of individuals to 
exogenous variables. The ML structure accommodating unobserved heterogeneity across 
individuals has been used by Bhat (1998,2000), Revelt and Train (1998) and Train 
(1998). In the derivation of the ML model structure based on random coefficients, a 
decision-maker faces a choice among the alternatives in the choice set C and the utility 
of alternative c to decision maker i can be defined in its simplest form as 
U,, =ßzic+6ic (8.9) 
where z, is a vector of observed characteristics of alternative c and decision maker i, ß, 
is a vector of coefficients of these variables that vary over decision makers in the 
population with density f 
(%3; I B), and e,, is a random error which is independent and 
identically distributed (IID) extreme value type 1 across individual and alternatives. 
Conditional on ß;, the probability that a decision-maker i will choose an alternative c is a 
standard logit: 
exp ß z1, 
(8.10) Egexp(, 
, zrg 
However, ß; and c,; are not observed by the researcher and are treated as stochastic 
influences. As a result, the unconditional choice probability should be estimated, which 
is the integral of conditional choice probability L;, (ß) over all possible values of Q;: 
Pi(e)= JL, (ß1)f(ß, IO)d(ß, ) (8.11) 
Various density functions can be used for f(). The density f (P, IB) is described by a set 
of parameters 0, for example, mean and variance, on which the ML choice probabilities 
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depend. The ML choice probabilities do not depend on the values of /3r, as the 
parameters ß; are integrated out (Train, 2003). As a result, the purpose is to estimate 0 
which is the population parameters that describe the distribution of individual 
parameters. 
Since the integral cannot be calculated analytically, it has to be approximated through 
simulation by maximising the simulated log-likelihood function. A value of ß is drawn 
form the distribution f(ß 10) for a given value of 0 and labelled ß' with the subscript r=1 
referring to the first draw. The logit formula L,; (ß') is calculated with this draw. Finally, 
the two steps are repeated many times, and the results are averaged, which gives the 
simulated probability: 
R 
'c =Z Lic 
ýr) 
(8.12) 
R , _, 
where R is a number of draws. 1 is an unbiased estimator of Pry. Its variance decreases 
as R increases. It is strictly positive (In P, is defined) and smooth (twice differentiable) 
in the parameters 0 and the variables z, which facilitates the numerical search for the 
maximum likelihood function and the calculation of elasticities. Furthermore, Pc sums 
to one over alternatives which is helpful when interpreting the results. The simulated 
probabilities are substituted into the log-likelihood function to give the simulated log 
likelihood: 
C! 
SLL =Zd; c 
In A (8.13) 
c=1 i=l 
where d,, =1 if i chose c and zero otherwise. The maximum simulated likelihood 
estimator (MSLE) is the value of 0 that maximizes SLL. 
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If Q; is distributed with mean a and deviation 4u, then the two equations 
(8.8) and (8.9) 
are identical with xi, = y; c = z;,, as the standard deviation of a random parameter can be 
considered as an additional error component (Bhat et al., 2002). The presence of 
standard deviation of a beta parameter accommodates the presence of preference 
heterogeneity in the sampled population, which is referred to unobserved heterogeneity 
(Greene and Hensher, 2003). Elements in z, that do not appear in xi, can be viewed as 
variables the coefficients of which are deterministic in the population, while elements of 
y;, that do not enter in x, may be viewed as variables the coefficients of which are 
randomly distributed in the population with zero mean (Bhat et al., 2002). 
8.2. The Choice of the Distribution 
A choice of an appropriate distribution for random parameters is one of the major issues 
in the specification of the ML model, especially when a priori information about the true 
shape of the distribution is not known. A choice of an inappropriate distribution can lead 
to poor model performance and misleading policy implications. Distributions are 
arbitrary approximations to the real behavioural profile and specific distributions are 
selected as "empirical truth" is believed to be somewhere in the domain (Train, 2003). 
Hess and Axhausen (2005) divide distributions into three groups: unbounded 
distributions (Cauchy, Error, Exponential power, Extreme value type A, Extreme value 
type B, Johnson SU, Laplace, Logistic, Normal and Student's t), distributions bounded 
on one side (Chi-square, Earlang, Exponential, F, Gamma, Inverse Gaussian, Inverted 
Weinbull, Log-Laplace, Log-logistic, Lognormal, Pareto, Pearson type V, Pearson type 
VI, Random walk, Rayleigh, Wald and Weibull) and distributions bounded on both sides 
(Beta, Johnson SB, Power functions, Triangular and Uniform). The whole group of 
bounded distributions can be divided into two parts depending on whether the bounds 
are present (for example, Lognormal) or estimates (for example, Triangular). When the 
bounds are estimated from the data during model calibration, it is possible to detect data 
impurities or model misspecifications (Hess et al., 2005). When unbounded distributions 
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are used, it is assumed that both positive and negative values for the given coefficient 
can exist in the population. However, when bounded distributions are used, it is assumed 
that the sign of the specific coefficient stays constant across individuals. A uniform 
distribution usually with a (0,1) bound is used for dummy variables (Hensher et al., 
2005). 
Although a large number of distributions exist, the practical application of them is 
restricted by the capabilities of the software. There are four main distributions used in 
empirical work regarding the application of the ML model: Uniform, Triangular, 
Normal and Lognormal, which are described in details in Hensher and Greene (2003). 
For the Triangular distribution, the density function looks like a tent: a peak in the 
centre and dropping off linearly on both sides of the centre. If c is the centre and s the 
spread, the density starts at c-s, rises linearly to its upper value at c, and then drops 
linearly at c+s. It is zero above c+s and below c-s. The mean of the triangular 
distribution coincides with mode at c. The standard deviation is the spread divided by 
J. The height of the tent at c is 11s, and each side of the tent has an area 
s*(1/s)*(1/2)=1/2, summing to one for both sides. The slope is (1/2)2. When c-s<_x<c, 
then density function can be written as f(x)=(x-(c-s))/s2 and cumulative distribution as 
F(x)=(x-(c-s))2/s2. When c<x<c+s the density function is f(x)=((c+s)-x)/s2 and 
cumulative distribution is F(x)=((c+s)-x)2/s2. When x<c-s or x>c+s, both the density 
function and cumulative distribution are equal to 0. 
The density function of the Normal distribution is bell-shaped and perfectly 
symmetrical. Its mean, mode and median are in the centre. Starting from the mean, its 
shape is convex until it reaches "the point of inflection" and then becomes concave, as 
the shape starts to level off. Depending on the standard deviation, the normal curve may 
be tall and thin, or short and stocky. The distance between the mean and the point of 
inflection on either side is equal to the standard deviation. About 2/3 of all observations in 
a normal distribution lie within one standard deviation either side of the mean. In 
contrast to the Normal distribution, the Lognormal distribution is limited to the non- 
negative domain and its density function is positively skewed. The Lognormal 
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distribution is helpful when the random parameter upon which the distribution is 
imposed, can only have a positive or a negative sign. 
Hess and Axhausen (2005) conduct an empirical comparison of various distributions 
with the aim of offering guidance for the choice of distributions in ML analysis. They 
conclude that Normal distribution performs well in terms of recovering the mean and the 
variance of the true distributions, as well as the overall shape of the distribution 
function, but its symmetrical nature can lead to problems in the tails of the distribution, 
if the true distribution is asymmetrical. Lognormal distribution performs poorly while 
recovering the mean of the true distribution and it can significantly overestimate the true 
variance. The poor performance of the Lognormal distribution is due to its tail and strict 
shape assumption, as distributions bounded on one side generally have long tails on the 
other side. 
In order to overcome some weaknesses of certain distributions, the spread or standard 
deviation of each random parameter can be set as a function of its mean (a standard 
deviation can be set to be equal to the mean or less than the mean, as the standard 
deviation greater than the mean usually results in behaviourally unacceptable parameter 
estimates) (Train, 2003). Imposing the spread equal to the mean in the Triangular 
distribution generates the same sign for the parameter estimate across the entire 
distribution, which is useful when the change in sign does not make any sense (Hensher 
et al., 2005). Furthermore, Restricted Triangular distribution avoids the long tail of the 
Lognormal distribution. 
8.3. Random Draws versus Halton Draws 
As the integral does not have a closed form, the computation of ML probabilities 
requires simulation. The independent draws from a distribution are approximated by the 
generation of "pseudo-random sequences". The number of draws needed to ensure stable 
parameters depends on the complexity of the model, however, with random draws there 
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is a possibility that the parameters will be drawn from a limited section of the 
distribution even with a large number of draws. In order to sample the entire parameter 
space in accordance with the empirical distribution imposed, "intelligent" draw methods 
have been designed. Two intelligent draw methods can he used in Nl. O(Il'F: standard 
Halton sequence (SHS) and shuffled uniform vectors, however, the Cornier is more 
widely used in the empirical literature. 
The use of the Halton sequence in the ML model estimation has been Bound to be 
superior to random draws, as it reduces computer run time and simulation errors in the 
estimated parameters. Bhat (2001) and Train (2000) have shown that simulation 
variance in the estimated parameters is lower using 100 Halton numbers than with 1000 
random numbers. With 125 Halton draws, simulation errors in the estimated haranwters 
are half as large as with 1000 random draws and smaller than with 2000 random draws. 
While with random draws the variance decreases at a rate of approximately 1/R, with the 
Halton draws, the rate of decrease is faster: doubling the number of draws decreases the 
simuation variance by a factor of about three (Train, 2000). The superior herli0rm trace 01' 
the Halton sequence is illustrated in Figure 8.1. Even with 1000 draws, the pseudo- 
random sequence leaves noticeable holes in the unit square, while the Halton sequence 
gives a uniform coverage. 
Figure 8.1.1000 Draws fron the Uniform Distribution with two-dimensional 
Source: Hensher et at. (2006) 
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Halton sequence could be best illustrated with the example by Train (2000). First, the 
number that defines the sequence is chosen, for example, the number 3. A Halton 
sequence for number 3 is constructed as follows. The unit interval (0,1) is taken and it is 
divided into 3 parts. The dividing points become the first two elements of the Halton 
sequence: 1/3 and 2/3. Then each of the three parts are taken and divided into 3 parts. 
The dividing points constitute the next elements in the Halton sequence: 1/9,4/9 (which 
is 1/9 above 1/3), 7/9 (which is 1/9 above 2/3), and 2/9,5/9 (which is 2/9 above 2/3), and 
8/9 (which is 2/9 above 2/3). The unit interval has now been divided into nine parts. 
Each of these nine parts are then divided into thirds. The dividing points are 1/27,10/27, 
19/27,4/27,13/27,22/27,7/27,16/27,25/27 (which are 1/9 added to zero and the 
previous numbers) and 2/27,11/27,20/27,5/27,14/27,23/27,8/27,17/27,26/27 (which 
are 2/9 added to zero and the previous numbers. ) Each of the 27 spaces are then divided 
into three parts, and so on for as many numbers as needed in the sequence. Similar 
sequences are defined for other numbers, such as 2 (1/2,1/4,3/4,1/8,5/8,3/8, ... ) and 5 
(1/5,2/5,3/5,4/5,1/25,6/25,11/25, ... ). 
Halton sequence is created for each dimension of the mixing distribution, that is, for 
each random term. Halton sequences should be based on prime numbers, since the 
Halton sequence for a non-prime number divides the unit space the same as each of the 
primes that constitute the non-prime. The length of each sequence is determined by the 
number of observations and the numbers of draws used. With N observations and R 
draws per observation, sequences of length (N*R)+10 are created. The first 10 elements 
of the sequence are discarded, since the early elements have a tendency to be correlated 
over Halton sequences with different primes. 
With the Halton sequence, draws for each observation are more evenly spread, allowing 
better coverage over the mixing distribution, as the draws for one observation fill in 
spaces left empty by the previous observation (Train, 2000). As a result, the simulated 
probabilities become negatively correlated over observations. Using 125 Halton draws, 
Train (2000) has found that correlation between simulated probability for one 
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observation and the simulated probability for the immediately previous observation is 
equal to -0.44, while the correlation with random draws does not exceed ±0.002. 
8.4. Estimation and Results 
The empirical analysis starts by treating each country level variable and the variable that 
varies among countries and industries (ws, ) separately as random by imposing various 
distributions35 (Table 8.1). The random parameters with most appropriate distributions 
are then combined in the final specification, which has the best model fit (the largest 
log-likelihood value) and which avoids distributions that cause flat log-likelihood at the 
estimates. Triangular distribution is imposed on the variables for market size in the host 
country, D, the wage variable, ws,, the distance variable, rcd, and the unemployment 
variable, u,. Restricted uniform distribution is imposed on the two dummy variables: the 
dummy variable for common border and the dummy variable for EU membership. The 
means of the uniform distribution for the dummy variables are restricted to be equal to 
their variances; as a result, the sign of the estimated random parameters of the two 
dummy variables will be the same for all the investing firms. Insignificant parameter 
estimated for derived standard deviation for the variable rr indicates that all information 
in the distribution is captured by the mean. 
35 Normal, Log-normal, Triangular, Restricted Triangular, Dome, Erland, Weibull and Exponential. 
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The following variables appear to have statistically significant parameters and their 
standard deviations: the market size in the host country, D,, the wage rate in the host 
country, w,,, the distance between investing and investment receiving country, Tcd, the 
unemployment in the host country, u,, and the two dummy variables: one for common 
border and another one for EU membership. ML is not only able to determine the 
existence of heterogeneity around the mean parameter, through the estimation of the 
standard deviation parameter, but it can also indicate the source of the heterogeneity 
through the interaction between a random parameters and other attributes (moderator 
variables). For example, an observed heterogeneity in some country level determinants 
of investment location choices can be due to differences in industry or/and investing 
firms' characteristics. The following interaction terms are statistically significant: the 
interaction terms between the dummy variable for traditional sectors and unemployment 
rate in the host country, Traditxu,; the interaction term between the dummy variable for 
traditional sectors and the wage rate in the host country, Tradit xw,,; the interaction term 
between investing firms profitability and distance between investing and investment 
receiving countries, ei x Tcd, and finally, the interaction term between investing firm's 
size and host country's market size, six GDP, (Table 8.2). 
As neither the magnitude nor the direction of the estimated parameters presented in 
Table 8.2 are informative, elasticities and marginal effects have to be estimated for 
continuous variables and dummies respectively using probability weigthed averages 
(Table 8.3). Negative estimated elasticities for the variable, w,,, indicate that the higher 
the wage costs are in non-traditional sectors in the host country, the less likely the 
country will be chosen for foreign capital allocations by foreign investors who choose to 
invest in non-traditional sectors. The effect of the wage rate on the probability of 
locating investment in a particular country if a firm chooses to invest in traditional 
sectors is a sum of the estimated elasticities for ws, and ws' XTradit. The sums of the 
estimated elasticities are negative and larger in absolute values, as compared to the 
elasticities of ws, showing that firms that choose to invest in traditional sectors are more 
sensitive to higher wages rates in the host country than firms, which choose to invest in 
non-traditional sectors. 
176 
T, ohls+ R7_ The rec»ltc of the Mixed Loizit model estimation 
Variables Distribution Mean Stand. Dev. 
Wage Triangular -0.285* {-4.493} 0.7252* {3.021} 
GDP Triangular 0.575* (10.760) 1.4868* (5,511) 
Distance Triangular -1.252* {-10.625} 1.9154* {3,223} 
Unemployment Triangular -3.5644* {-2.684} 20.7788* (2.653) 
Restricted 
Border Uniform 0.5651* {4.205} 0.5651* (4.205) 
Restricted 
EU Uniform 0.8028* {5.204} 0.8028* (5.204) 
Interest - 4.5863* (3.945) - - 
Prof Dist - 0.1471* (2.922) - - 
Size GDP - 0.1334* {4.090} 
Tr Unemp - 8.4893* (4.308) - 
Tr Wage - -1.4718* -5.065 - - 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Significant at 1 percent level ** Significant at 5 percent level *"Significant at 10 percent level 
The triangular distribution is imposed on the wage, market size, distance and unemployment variables, 
while the restricted uniform distribution is imposed on the dummy variables for common border and EU 
membership. The third and the fourth column present the estimated mean coefficients and their t-statistics 
respectively, while the fifth and the sixth columns present the estimated standard deviation parameters and 
their t-statistics respectively 
The unemployment variable, u,, is not only included in the model separately but also 
interacted with the dummy variables for traditional sectors, Tradit xu,, Negative 
elasticities for, uc, indicate that the higher the unemployment rate in the host country, the 
less likely the country to be chosen by foreign firms to locate their capital, if they choose 
to invest in non-traditional sectors. Negative but smaller in absolute values or even 
positive sums of the elasticities for uc and Traditxu, indicate that higher unemployment 
in a host country has a less negative or even positive effect on the probability of 
selecting the country to locate foreign capital for firms that invest in traditional sectors, 
as compared to firms that invest in non-traditional sectors. Typically, traditional sectors 
employ more unskilled labour and they are more concerned about the availability of 
cheap labour, as compared to other sectors, for example, science-based industries, which 
employ more skilled labour and pay higher wages that reflect a skill premium. 
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Tah1e R_ V_ flirret elasticities and marginal effects for the Mixed Lnnit model 
Country Nage Tr_Wa Sum Unem Tr_Un Sum GDP Dist Border EU 
BG -0.2202 -0.1107 -0.3309 -0.2445 0.3796 0.1351 0.0519 -1.6297 2.7083 7.1613 
CZ -0.5055 -0.2631 -0.7686 -0.3289 0.1867 -0.1422 0.3748 -1.7266 1.5842 7.8312 
EE -0.3121 -0.1521 -0.4642 -0.1797 0.0607 -0.1190 0.0222 -1.7427 0.3026 7.1535 
CR -0.4737 -0.3035 -0.7772 -0.1930 0.4491 0.2561 0.0798 -2,0011 0.000 0.000 
HU -0.4693 -0.2257 -0.6950 -0.3290 0.1733 -0.1557 0.2714 -1.7798 1.2098 6.2476 
LT -0.4095 -0.2069 -0.6164 -0.3091 0.198 -0.1111 0.0528 -2.0335 0.000 4.5774 
LV -0.3861 -0.2000 -0.5861 -0.3177 0.211 -0.1067 0.0262 -2.0144 0.2689 5.1733 
PL -0.3865 -0.2599 -0.6464 -0.0760 0.3714 0.2954 1.0206 -1.3697 1.1459 10.8886 
RO -0.1836 -0.0732 -0.2568 -0.3222 0.2252 -0.0970 0.0956 -1,8359 0.000 5.0919 
RU -0.0886 -0.039 -0.1276 -0.1628 0.1214 -0.0414 1.3678 -1.9985 1.9985 0.000 
SI -0.3268 -0.2823 -0.6091 -0.321 0.1284 -0.1926 0.0686 -1.7367 0.8931 3.9600 
SK -0.4688 -0.293 -0.7618 -0.1991 0.3965 0.1974 0.093 -1.7468 1.0103 5.8174 
UA -0.1212 -0.0617 -0.1829 -0.3373 0.3159 -0.0214 0.1277 -1.9746 0.4912 0.000 
Elasticities are estimates for the continuous vananies ans marginal ettects are estimated for the dummy 
variables. A direct elasticity measures the percentage change in the probability of choosing a particular 
alternative in the choice set with respect to a given percentage change in an attribute of that same 
alternative. Direct marginal effects represent the change in the choice probability for an alternative given a 
unit change in a variable related to that alternative 
When two continuous variables are interacted, for example, eh x red and s! xD,, the 
interpretation of the interaction terms is much more complicated. As a result, the 
changes in market shares in different countries in respect to foreign capital allocations 
and the changes in a number of firms investing in a particular country are investigated 
due to the gradual change in the moderator variable with the help of simulation. The 
results presented in Table 8.4 show the effect of 1,10,50 and 100 percent increase in 
variables e; and s; on the change in the market shares of different countries (first column) 
and in the number of firms investing in a particular country (second column). 
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T_L1- 0 ,. ociiltc 
für the MiTP(I T. nolt mn(IP1 
i savav v --- 
Size GDP 1% 10% 50% 100% 
BG 0.001 0 0.005 0 0.022 0 0.045 1 
CZ 0.004 0 0.038 0 0.202 2 0.435 4 
EE 0.000 0 0.002 0 0.011 0 0.023 1 
CR 0.000 0 0.003 0 0.017 0 0.035 1 
HU 0.002 0 0.021 0 0.111 1 0.236 3 
LT 0.001 0 0.004 0 0.021 1 0.042 0 
LV 0.001 0 0.003 0 0.011 0 0.023 1 
PL 0.018 0 0.185 2 1.007 11 2.148 24 
RO 0.001 0 0.007 0 0.039 1 0.081 1 
RU 0.025 0 0.254 2 1.230 3 2.373 26 
SI 0.000 0 0.003 0 0.018 0 0.037 0 
SK 0.001 0 0.008 0 0.039 0 0.079 1 
UA 0.001 0 0.007 0 0.034 1 0.070 1 
Prof dist 1% 10% 50% 100% 
BG 0.008 0 0.089 1 0.973 11 1.788 20 
CZ 0.007 0 0.09 1 0.899 10 1.64 18 
EE 0.007 0 0.071 1 0.732 8 1.723 19 
CR 0.003 0 0.034 1 0.538 6 1.21 14 
I-IU 0.007 0 0.085 1 0.914 10 1.667 18 
LT 0.006 0 0.063 0 0.747 8 1.639 18 
LV 0.006 0 0.062 1 0.738 8 1.633 18 
PL 0.022 0 0.261 3 1.33 15 2.164 24 
RO 0.008 0 0.102 1 1.051 12 1.905 21 
RU 0.032 0 0.3 3 1.267 14 2.103 23 
SI 0.003 0 0.037 0 0.508 5 1.134 12 
SK 0.005 0 0.059 0 0.727 8 1.476 16 
UA 0.005 0 0.06 1 0.833 10 1.626 18 
The first column snows the cnange in me marxer snares or the post countries regarcung foreign capital 
allocations due to 1,10,50 and 100 percent increase in the profitability and firm size variables. The 
second column shows the change in the number of firms investing in a particular country due to 1,10,50 
and 100 percent increase in the two variables. 
The estimated changes in market shares and in the number of investing firms in each 
host country show consistently positive and increasing effects for both interaction terms. 
The results for ei x rd indicate that more profitable investing firm are less likely to be 
discouraged to invest in more remote countries as compared to less profitable firms. 
More profitable firms usually have more resources to pay for transaction costs 
associated with investment in more remote countries, for example, cost of transport of 
communication, the costs of dealing with cultural and linguistic differences, the cost of 
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sending personnel abroad, and information costs of institutional and legal factors. The 
results for six GDP indicate that the larger the host country is, the more likely it is to be 
chosen by an investing firm to locate its capital, and the effect is stronger for larger 
investing firm, as compared to smaller firms. Larger firms are usually characterized by 
high economies of scale; therefore, they search for larger foreign markets to exploit 
these economies. Statistically significant interaction terms between country-level 
variables and industry-level dummies together with the firm-level variables confirm the 
existence of heterogeneity revealed by statistically significant standard deviations of the 
parameters of certain country-level variables. 
Elasticities for D, and rd are not very informative as they show the effect of the 
variables when the values of the moderator variables (e; and sr respectively) are equal to 
zero (Table 8.3). Positive elasticities for D, indicate that the larger the market in the host 
country, the more likely the country is to be chosen as an investment location by foreign 
investors whose size is equal to zero. Negative elatsicities for rcd indicate that the further 
the host country from the source country the less likely it is to be chosen for foreign 
capital allocation by foreign investors whose profitability is equal to zero. 
Positive and statistically significant estimated elasticities for EU dummy variable 
indicate that countries which became members of the EU by January 2004 are more 
likely to be chosen by foreign investors to locate their capital. An investment receiving 
country that has a common border with an investing country is more likely to be chosen 
as an investment location, and this is reflected in the positive elasticities for CBDd 
(Table 4). Neighbouring countries usually have strong historical ties and less linguistic 
and cultural barriers. The elasticities for the two dummy variables are highly elastic 
indicating that the integration into EU and common border with Western Europe are 
very important factors that drive FDI to CEECs. 
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8.5. Conclusions 
This chapter applies the Mixed logit (ML) model, which is probably the most flexible 
discrete choice model, to investigate investment location choices by MNEs in CEE for 
the first time. The highly significant empirical results support the presence of 
heterogeneity in the investment location decisions, which is not only revealed by 
statistically significant interaction terms but also by statistically significant standard 
deviations of the random parameters. This more general approach to the FDI decision 
shows that to allow for firm heterogeneity is important if robust estimates are to be 
found for their complex effects. These results cast doubt on the robustness of earlier 
empirical studies that did not incorporate investing firms characteristics while modelling 
FDI location decision and applied Multinomial logit and/or Nested logit models, which 
are subject to restrictive assumptions. 
The results of the ML model go closely with the results of the MNL model and 
especially the NL model. For example, as it has already been revealed by the results of 
the MNL and NL models, larger firms characterised by high economies of scale are 
more likely to invest in countries with larger markets in order to exploit these 
economies. More profitable firms, on the other hand, are less discouraged to invest in 
more remote countries with weaker historical ties and larger cultural and language 
differences, as they have more funds to cover transaction costs related to the investment 
in more remote countries. MNEs investing in traditional sectors are more likely to be 
discouraged to invest in host countries with higher wages but less discouraged or even 
prefer to invest in countries with higher unemployment rates, as compared to foreign 
firms that choose to invest in non-traditional sectors, as they are more concerned about 
the availability of cheap labour. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE LATENT CLASS MODEL 
The Latent Class (LC) model is a semi-parametric extension of the ML model, which 
does not require the researcher to make specific assumptions about the distribution of 
random parameters across decision makers, as parameter heterogeneity across individual 
firms is modelled with a discrete distribution. The LC model approximates the unknown 
distribution of random coefficients by a finite number of mass points; therefore, 
simulation is not needed in the estimation process (Meijer and Rouwendal, 2006). 
Decision makers (investing firms) are implicitly divided into a number of classes Q, 
however it is not known to the analyst and it may be known or not to a decision maker, 
which class contains a particular decision maker. Individual behaviour depends on 
observable attributes and on latent heterogeneity that varies with factors that are 
unobserved by the analyst (Greene and Hensher, 2003). 
9.1. The Latent Class Model Specification 
Following Greene and Hensher (2003), the profit parameters become class specific (ViSc q 
= Qqz cc + Egsc1q). An investing 
firm i in class q chooses among C alternatives to locate its 
investment: 
exp(ßq z; ýý Pr(Y; sc = cl class = q) _ zc eXprWn ) Tezrsc 
where ßq are class specific estimated profit parameters and z, s,,, as 
defined before, is a 
vector of country characteristics, which have different value for firms investing in 
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sector, s, and for firms of different characteristics. Within the class, choice probabilities 
are assumed to be generated by the Multinomial logit (MNL) model. 
The class membership is not observed and class probabilities are specified by the MNL 
form. Therefore, the probability of investing firm i belonging to class q can be expressed 
as: 
exp(O h; ) 
Hý9 =Q ,q =1,..., Q, ©Q = 0, (9.2) Y9=1 exp(ogh, 
where h1 denotes a set of observed investing firms' characteristics, for example, 
investing firms size and profitability. The LC model estimates the probabilities of a 
decision maker (investing firm) belonging to each class and each investing firm is 
assigned to one of the classes on the basis of the largest probability. If there are no 
observed characteristics of decision makers and the class membership probability is a 
function of only constants, the probability of belonging to each class would be constant 
across decision makers and the latent class probabilities would sum up to one. Due to the 
identification problem the Qth parameter vector is normalised to zero; as a result, all 
other coefficients are interpreted relatively to the normalised class. 
Combining conditional choice equation (9.1) and membership classification equation 
(9.2), the joint probability that investing firm i belongs to class q and chooses alternative 
c can be written: 
QQ exp (g z; scý exp 
(e9 h' ý 
1'c = 2> . 
ýHj9 PcI9 =ýcQ (9.3) 
9=l 9=1 , _t 
exp(#9 zucý ý9=, exp(eq jtr 
The parameter vectors ßq and °q are simultaneously estimated by the maximum 
likelihood method. The log likelihood for the sample is defined as 
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LL In P =E, ' 1n[ , 
H, 
Q 
Pcle J (9.4) 
The log likelihood is maximised with respect to the Q structural parameter vectors, ßq, 
and the Q-1 latent class parameter vectors °q" 
The issue in the estimation process is the choice of the number of classes, Q, to which 
foreign investors belong, as the comparison of the log likelihoods of models with 
different number of classes is not appropriate. While the increasing number of classes 
increases the fit of the model, it may lead to some coefficients having very large 
standard errors. The trade-off between the goodness of fit and the precision of the 
parameter estimates can be found with the help of information criteria summarised by 
Shen and Saijo (2007), which could help determine the number of classes, Q: 
Akaike Information Criterion: AIC = -2(LL7, - KQ) (9.6) 
Akaike's p2: pQ =1- 
[AICQ /(2LLO )] (9,7) 
Bozdogan Akaike Information Criterion: AIC3 = -2LL'Q + 3KQ (9.8) 
Bayesian Information Criterion: BIC = -LCQ + 
(K. log N)/2 (9.9) 
where LLQ* is the log likelihood at convergence with Q classes, KQ is the number of 
parameters in the model with Q classes, LLo is the log likelihood of the sample with 
equal choice probabilities, and N is the sample size. The "optimal" number of latent 
classes is indicated by the minimum (maximum) values of AIC, AIC3 and MC (n ). 
9.2. The Estimation and Results 
The above discussed measures of AIC, ; 5Q 2, AIC3 and BIC are calculated for 1,2,3,4 
and 5 classes in order to determine the "optimal" number of latent classes (Table 9.1). 
Although the decreasing log likelihood values with the number of latent classes show the 
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improvement in model fit, when an additional latent class is added, the number of 
parameters that has to be estimated increases and some coefficients can have large 
standard errors. 
Table 9.1. The AIC. o2n. AIC3 and BIC Measures for 2.3.4 and 5 Classes 
2 3 4 5 
LogL*Q -2467.643 -2426.882 -2380.229 -2351.094 
Kq 18 29 40 51 
AIC 4971.286 4911.764 4840.458 4804.188 
p2Q 0.1254 0.1359 0.1484 0.1548 
AIC3 4987.286 4940.764 4880.458 4855.188 
BIC 2530.7357 2528.5314 2520.435 2529.8567 
The optimal number of latent classes is indicated by the minimum value of AIC, AIC3 and BIC and by the 
maximum value of PQ 2. 
Three out of four criteria support five latent classes as the optimal solution for the data, 
as the calculated values of AIC and AIC3 (p2) are minimum (maximum) for five latent 
classes. Based on the results of the majority of the criteria for the selection of the 
number of class, the LC model is estimated with five latent classes. However, it is not 
known to the researcher and it may or may not be known to the investing firm, which 
class it belongs to. The probabilities of each investing firm belonging to each of the five 
classes are estimated, assigning each firm to the one of the classes according to the 
largest probability. 
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The estimation results are presented in Table 9.2. The different estimated parameters for 
each latent class reveal five groups of investing firms in the sample. None of the group 
has a clearly-defined type of investor who is concerned about particular exclusive host 
country characteristics. The LC model allows for the preferences to overlap, as investing 
firms are heterogeneous and complex entities. Furthermore, absolute parameter 
estimates for each class (Table 9.2. ) are not comparable, and therefore, not informative 
due to scale differences. In order to be able to compare the results across different 
classes and analyse to what degree investors with different characteristics benefit from 
different country-level variables, marginal rates of substitution between two country- 
level factors should be calculated for each group. 
For example, in transport economics a common objective in the use of Discrete Choice 
models is the derivation of measures designed to determine the amount of money 
individuals are willing to forfeit in order to obtain some benefit from undertaking some 
specific action or task, referred to as willingness to pay (WTP) measures. One of the 
most important WTP measures is the value of travel time savings, defined as the amount 
of money an individual is willing to outlay in order to save a unit of time spent 
travelling, ceteris paribus. A WTP measure is calculated as the ratio of two parameter 
estimates, holding else constant, provided at least the attribute in the denominator of the 
ratio is measured in monetary units. Furthermore, both attributes used in the calculation 
of WTP measures have to be statistically significant, otherwise, no meaningful WTP 
measure can be established. 
In order to be able to compare the LC model estimation results among different classes, 
the ratios of two estimated parameters in each latent class are calculated, with the 
parameter of the market size variable being in the denominator (Table 9.3). The ratios in 
Table 9.3 show how much investing firms are willing to "pay" in host country's GDP in 
billion of EUR for the decrease (increase if the ratio is positive) in the distance between 
investing and investment receiving country by one kilometre, for the decrease in the 
hourly wage rate by one EUR, for the decrease (increase if the ratio is positive) in the 
unemployment rate by one percentage point, for the increase in the return on capital by 
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one percentage point, for the host country being a EU member as compared to a non-EU 
members and for the host country having a common border with the source country. 
However, it is not the absolute value of the ratio itself that is of interest but its absolute 
value in relation to the equivalent ratios from other latent classes. The comparison of the 
ratios across different groups reveals the extent of the sensitivity of foreign investors in 
one class to country-level factors as compared to the foreign investors from other latent 
classes. 
Table 9.3. Ratios of the estimated parameters with the parameter of the GDP 
variable (billion EUR) being in the denominator 
Variables in 
the nominator 
Class I Class II Class III Class IV Class V 
Distance 0.8019 not s. s. -10.5000 -6.1490 not s. s. 
Wage not s. s. not s. s. -0.5895 -0.4012 -0.7107 
Unemployment -3.8356 not s. s. 24.0401 -35.4891 -20.5282 
Interest 5.2266 not s. s. 15.7601 16.5249 not s. s. 
EU 2.5681 not s. s. not s. s. 8.6093 not s. s. 
Border -0.9431 not s. s. not s. s. 2.3475 not s. s. 
Traditional not s. s. not s. s. not s. s. -4.8864 not s. s. 
Size not s. s. not s. s. 1.6211 -8.0354 not s. s. 
Profitability not s. s. not s. s. -4.0890 3.7710 not s. s. 
Not s. s. = not stausucany sigmncant 
In order to compare the estimated coefficients across latent classes presented in Table 9.2, marginal rates 
of substitution are derived, where the ratios of two estimated parameters in each latent class are calculated, 
with the parameter of the market size variable being in the denominator. 
Following the results presented in table 9.2. and 9.3., the first class contains foreign 
investors who choose to locate their capital abroad to access foreign markets (the 
coefficient of the market size variable in the first class is positive in Table 9.2. ) 
preferably in EU member states (the marginal rate of substitution for the EU dummy in 
Table 9.3. and the coefficient of the dummy in Table 9.2. for the first class are positive) 
and they are not discouraged to invest in more remote countries (the marginal rate of 
substitution for the distance variable in Table 9.3. and the coefficient of the variable in 
Table 9.2. in the first class are positive) in order to access those markets. The ratios 
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cannot be calculated for the second class because the market size variable is not 
statistically significant for that class. However, the estimated coefficients for the second 
class presented in Table 9.2. imply that foreign investors in the second class are small 
firms (the estimated coefficient of the investing firm's size variable is positive and 
statistically significant for the second class in Table 9.2. ) who are concerned about the 
availability of cheap labour force and they prefer to invest in closer neighbouring 
countries, preferably EU members, which have similar culture and traditions. 
The third group contains larger but less profitable foreign investors with the highest 
sensitivity to the remoteness of the host country to the source country, as compared to 
foreign investors from other latent classes (the marginal rate of substitution for the 
distance variable presented in Table 9.3. is the largest in absolute value as compared to 
the marginal rates of substitution for the variable in other classes). The MNEs in the 
third class are not only discouraged to invest in more remote countries but also in 
countries with higher wages, as lower profitability means less resources available to 
cover higher labour costs and transactions costs associated with investment in more 
remote countries. Furthermore, the MNEs prefer to invest in countries with high 
availability of labour force, probably low-skill, as they also prefer host countries with 
lower labour costs. Therefore, foreign firms in the third class would choose host 
countries with higher unemployment rates but lower wages to locate their capital. 
The fourth group of foreign investors contains profitable but small investing firms in the 
sample, who choose to locate their capital in non-traditional sectors. Foreign firms in the 
fourth latent class have the highest sensitivity to unemployment in the host country (the 
marginal rate of substitution for the unemployment variable in the fourth class is the 
largest in absolute terms as compared to other classes in Table 9.3. ), as investors 
choosing to locate their capital in non-traditional sectors (science-based industries, 
service sectors and scale-intensive industries) usually employ more-skilled labour as 
compared to MNEs investing in traditional sectors, and, therefore, they will be 
discouraged to invest in countries with high unemployment rates. The investment by 
foreign firms in the fourth class is driven by larger and closer foreign markets, with the 
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investing firms in the fourth class having the largest marginal rate of substitution for 
common border dummy variable (Table 9.3. ). Furthermore, investing firms in the fourth 
class have the strongest preference to invest in EU member states, as the marginal rate of 
substitution for the EU dummy variable for the fourth class has the largest value as 
compared to the marginal rates of substitution for the variable in other classes (Table 
9.3. ). 
Foreign firms in all four classes are positively affected by the return on capital in the 
host country, with investing firms in the fourth latent class having the highest sensitivity 
to the return on capital. In the fifth latent class, the parameters of investing firm-specific 
variables are normalised and their values are set to zero. Foreign investors in the fifth 
latent class choose to locate their capital in countries with large foreign markets, 
however, they are discouraged by higher labour costs and unemployment in the host 
country. Investing firms in the fifth latent class have the largest marginal rate of 
substitution for the labour cost variable in absolute terms as compared to firms in other 
classes (Table 9.3. ), implying that firms in the fifth class have the highest sensitivity to 
the labour cost in the host country. 
For comparison reasons, elasticities and marginal effects are presented in Table 9.4. 
However, elasticities and marginal effects cannot be estimated for each group separately, 
as it is not known which class contains which investing firm, therefore, only an average 
effect over the five groups is given. On average, the further the host country from the 
source country, the less likely the host country is to be chosen by foreign investors (the 
exception is Poland, Russia and Slovenia, where the probability of choosing those 
countries by foreign investors to locate their capital increases with distance). The higher 
the wage rate in the host country, the less likely the country to be chosen by foreign 
investors and this applies to all the host countries in the sample. Market size of the host 
country, on average, has a positive effect on the probability of selecting the country for 
foreign capital allocations. 
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Table 9.4. Direct elasticities and marginal effects for the Latent Class model 
Distance Wage GDP Unempl Interest Border EU 
Bulgaria -1.1198 -0.7868 0.0549 -0.2090 0.1068 49.8544 -9.1200 
Czech Republic -2.3937 -0.5394 0.4413 -0.4757 0.2056 85.2759 -25.9932 
Estonia -1.6507 -0.2620 0.0247 -0.1104 0.0420 0.2908 27.2543 
Croatia -6.7581 -0.7221 0.1127 1.0865 0.4267 0.0000 0.0000 
Hungary -0.6468 -0.3047 0.5176 -0.4523 0.3137 57.5517 9.6482 
Lithuania -2.4114 -0.3400 0.0598 -0.3041 0.1198 0.0000 
13.9957 
Latvia -2.6042 -0.3839 0.0261 0.2342 0.0367 0.4678 15.4712 
Poland 0.0187 -0.1304 0.1967 -0.1540 0.0217 19.7147 -9.5116 
Romania 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Russia 0.0098 -0.0349 0.3615 -0.0830 -0.0341 0.0000 0.0000 
Slovenia 0.0168 -0.2229 0.0265 -0.1403 0.0296 19.4843 -11.4722 
Slovakia -0.0006 -0.0407 0.0043 -0.0241 0.0015 2.2724 -1.1777 
Ukraine -0.0300 -0.0061 0.0282 -0.0344 0.0883 0.0000 0.0000 
Ftnctiritioc are ectimated for the continuous variables and marginal effects are estimated for the dummy 
variables. A direct elasticity measures the percentage change in the probability of choosing a particular 
alternative in the choice set with respect to a given percentage change in an attribute of that same 
alternative. Direct marginal effects represent the change in the choice probability for an alternative given a 
unit change in a variable related to that alternative 
The higher the unemployment rate is in the host country, the less likely the host country 
to be chosen by MNEs to locate their capital and this applies to all the host countries in 
the sample except for Croatia and Latvia. The return on capital has a positive effect on 
the probability of selecting the host country as an investment location by MNEs and 
Russia is an exception. If the host country shares a common border with the source 
country, it is more likely to be chosen by foreign investors to locate their capital. The 
EU membership has a positive effect on the probability of selecting the host country to 
locate foreign capital for all host countries except for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, 
Slovenia and Slovakia. In contrast to the elasticities and marginal effects estimated by 
other models (MNL, NL and ML models), the results estimated by the LC model reveal 
much more diversity among host countries and investing firms. 
As compared to the results of the other three previously estimated models (the MNL 
model in Chapter 6, the NL model in Chapter 7 and the ML model in Chapter 8), the 
results of the LC model show a statistically significant increase in the model fit with 
respect to the log likelihood, chi-squared and pseudo R-squared (Table 9.5). All the 
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three more flexible models (NL, ML and LC model) improve the fit of the model as 
compared to the MNL model. However, the ML, which is probably the most flexible 
discrete choice model, does not improve the model fit, as compared to the NL model. 
This may be due to the fact that the ML may be slightly overparametrised. The LC 
model appears to be the model that fits the data best and has the most explanatory 
power. These results go in line with the previous literature, which has found that the LC 
model is superior to the ML model (see for example, Greene and Hensher (2003); Hole 
(2007); Shen et al. (2006), etc. ) 
Table 9.5. The model fit measures for the MNL, NL. ML and LC models 
MNL model NL model ML model LC model 
Log likelihood -2512.9640 -2438.204 -2498.132 -2349.385 
Chi-squared 151.3778 565.204 687.6641 985.158 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0292 0.1039 0.1210 0.1733 
9.3. Conclusions 
Although, many host country factors together with industry and investing firm 
characteristics explain the investment location choices of MNEs, the FDI location 
decisions do not appear to be very responsive to the majority of country-level 
explanatory variables, for example, labour costs, unemployment and market size in the 
host country. This is true for funs investing in different sectors and for firms of 
different size and profitability. For example, the elasticities of the labour cost variable 
appear to be inelastic for all the countries in the sample and these results are confirmed 
by all the four models (the MNL, NL, ML and LC models). The results of the ML model 
reveal the strongest negative effect of the labour cost in the host country on the 
probability of selecting that country as an investment location by MNEs for all the 
countries in the sample, except for Bulgaria and Slovenia, with the LC model revealing 
the strongest negative labour costs effect for Bulgaria and the NL model for Slovenia. 
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The elasticities of the unemployment variable for all the models are inelastic 
(unemployment variable is not statistically significant for the NL model for non- 
traditional sectors, while elasticities of the unemployment variable for traditional sectors 
are positive for all the countries in the sample). The estimated elasticities by the ML, LC 
and MNL models reveal both positive and negative effects of unemployment in the host 
country on the probability of selected that country for foreign capital allocations by 
MNEs. The strongest negative effect of unemployment in the host country is reported by 
the LC and MNL models. 
The EU membership and common border between investing and investment receiving 
countries, on the other hand, appear to be very important for the investment location 
decisions of MNEs in CEECs. The strongest positive, on average, effect of EU 
membership is revealed by the ML model, while the EU dummy variable is not 
statistically significant for the NL model. The LC model finds both positive and negative 
effect of the EU membership on the FDI location decisions of foreign firms across the 
countries in the sample. For the LC model the EU membership has a negative effect for 
only one group of investors, however, the variable does not appear to be statistically 
significant. 
The elasticities of the common border dummy variable are highly elastic for all the 
countries in the MNL, NL and LC models and for about half of the countries in the ML 
model. The LC model reveals very strong positive effect of common border between the 
source and the host country on the probability of selecting the host country as an 
investment location if the host country is Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland or 
Slovenia. These countries benefit from having a common border with Western European 
countries in attracting FDI most, as, for example, Poland and Czech republic have a 
common border with Germany, which is one of the largest investors in CEE. 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSIONS 
The thesis generalises and synthesises the existing empirical literature on the 
determinants of FDI which has tended to focus on macroeconomic (i. e. country and 
industry) factors, although it has also incorporated firm-level determinants mainly to 
analyse the agglomeration effects on FDI. The previous empirical literature on the 
determinants of FDI has, however, failed to take into account the investing firms' 
characteristics. The choice as to where to invest abroad does not only depend on the 
opportunities offered by foreign markets and industries, but also on investing firms' 
individual characteristics. The constructed three-level dataset allows country-, industry- 
and firm-level characteristics to simultaneously determine the firm-level investment 
location decision. Furthermore, very flexible discrete choice models - the Mixed Logit 
(ML) model and the Latent Class (LC) model - are applied for the first time to model the 
investment location choices of multinational corporations. The previous empirical 
literature on the determinants of investment location choices of MNEs has applied the 
Multinomial logit (MNL) and Nested logit (NL) models, however, those models are not 
sufficiently flexible to analyse where foreign firms choose to locate their capital. 
The highly significant empirical results show that the responsiveness of FDI in the 
CEECs to country-level variables differs both across sectors and across investing firms 
of different sizes and profitability. These results support the presence of heterogeneity in 
the investment location decisions, which is not only revealed by statistically significant 
interaction terms, but also by statistically significant standard deviations of the random 
parameters in the ML model and statistically significant class-specific explanatory 
variables in the LC model. The results show that firms investing in traditional sectors are 
less likely to be discouraged to invest in countries with higher unemployment rate but 
more likely to be discouraged by higher wage rates as compared to MNEs that invest in 
non-traditional sectors. The larger the host country is the more likely it is to be chosen 
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by foreign investors to locate their capital and the effect is stronger for larger investing 
firms. On the other hand, more profitable firms are less likely to be discouraged to invest 
in more remote countries, when compared to less profitable firms, as they have more 
resources to pay for transaction costs associated with investment in more remote 
countries. 
Furthermore, the results show that although a large number of country-level factors 
contribute to the explanation of the investment location choice of MNEs in CEE, 
quantitatively the FDI location decisions are not very responsive to the country level 
variables such as GDP, unemployment or wage rates in the investment receiving 
countries. These results indicate that the FDI location decision could be largely a 
strategic decision, rather than a strictly economic decision and that the decision reached 
is part of the MNE global, rather than regional strategy. The tax variable does not appear 
to be statistically significant implying that government policies regarding taxation are 
not effective in attracting FDI. It may also be also due to the fact that tax systems are 
extremely complex and any approach that tries to capture them is subject to a significant 
measurement error. The tax burden can be influenced by many factors and it is 
impossible to take them all into account. 
EU membership and a common border between investing and investment receiving 
countries, on the other hand, appear to be very important for the investment location 
decisions of MNEs in CEECs. The higher probability of MNEs investing in 
neighbouring countries indicates that foreign firms prefer to locate their capital in 
countries with similar culture, language and traditions, as transaction costs associated 
with investment in a country with more familiar environment are smaller. 
The satisfaction of economic, political and administrative criteria during the integration 
of CEECs into the EU meant the adoption of a Western business and legal environment, 
and it provided foreign investors with confidence in the success of each country's 
reforms. EU membership and the European Union's commitment to accept qualifying 
CEE states to the Union, has reduced the perceived level of risk and reinforced positive 
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perception by foreign investors that most CEECs are suitable investment locations with 
well-functioning market economies, transparent legal systems and successful structural 
reforms. Many of the policies required to fulfil the conditions for the EU membership 
are also those required for successful transition. EU membership or the awaiting 
accession to the EU may indicate favourable investment climate and provide investors 
with an insurance of the host country's adherence to certain economic standards. This 
may be the factor as to why such countries as Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and 
Estonia among others were keen to join the EU. This may also be one of the reasons 
why Turkey and Croatia are also keen to join the EU. 
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